☢ test - Í

Accord, Griffin (April 23, 1999), below; Bryant v. State , 286 Ga.App. 493, 649 S.E.2d 597 (July 10, 2007) (trial court reviewed video of statement, concluded that statement was voluntary despite defendant’s claims that he was “tired from not sleeping in over 24 hours and was under the influence of cocaine”; officers testified that defendant “did not appear to be intoxicated and was coherent.”); Fennell v. State , 292 Ga. 834, 741 S.E.2d 877 (April 29, 2013) (“Although appellant stated at one point during the interview that he was tired, he did not indicate that he wanted to stop the interrogation or that he was not thinking clearly.”). Forehand v. State, 271 Ga.App. 746, 611 S.E.2d 78 (February 22, 2005). Rape and related convictions affirmed. “Forehand argues that because of his intoxication, the court erred in admitting his audiotaped statement. ‘However, intoxication, standing alone, does not render a statement inadmissible. If the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant’s statement was the product of rational intellect and free will, it may be admitted even if the defendant was intoxicated when he made the statement.’ (Footnote omitted.) Screws v. State, 245 Ga.App. 664, 665(1), 538 S.E.2d 547 (2000). See Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 340-341(9), 282 S.E.2d 334 (1981) (‘the mere fact that the [defendant] may have been intoxicated at the time of making the statement does not necessarily render it inadmissible’). … The trial court should review ‘[t]he totality of circumstances that precedes the statement ... in determining voluntariness.’ [Cit.] Despite evidence of intoxication, police testimony that the defendant was in control of himself and knew what he was saying, or that he understood his rights and knew what was going on, will sustain a trial court’s finding that the statement was voluntary. [Cits.] Evidence that a defendant was coherent supports admissibility. [Cits.] Testimony that the defendant, though smelling of alcohol, did not exhibit signs of intoxication such as slurred speech, glassy eyes, or unsteadiness may also sustain a finding of voluntariness.” ““[W]e note that at least four prior cases have involved blood alcohol levels far exceeding Forehand’s .093 level and have nevertheless held that the trial court was authorized to admit the defendant’s statement where some evidence showed the defendant was acting voluntarily. See Willis [ v. State, 263 Ga. 597,] 599(2), 436 S.E.2d 204 (1993) (.19 blood alcohol level); Carter [ v. State, 257 Ga. 510,] 513(3), 361 S.E.2d 175 (1987) (.19 blood alcohol level); Cunningham [ v. State, 255 Ga. 727,] 729(2), 342 S.E.2d 299 (1986) (.30 blood alcohol level); Mickens [ v. State, 177 Ga.App. 838,] 341 S.E.2d 316 (1986) (.26 blood alcohol level). We hold similarly here and conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in admitting the statement.” Accord, Stanley v. State , 283 Ga. 36, 656 S.E.2d 806 (January 28, 2008); Walker v. State , 300 Ga.App. 116, 684 S.E.2d 293 (September 17, 2009). Fuller v. State, 262 Ga.App. 656, 586 S.E.2d 359 (August 5, 2003). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; trial court properly determined that defendant’s statements to police were voluntary. “ Despite some evidence of intoxication, a trial court may determine based on countervailing evidence that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicants and that the defendant was acting voluntarily and knowingly, which ruling we will uphold as not ‘clearly erroneous.’ See, e.g., Christopher v. State, 269 Ga. 382, 383(2) (497 S.E.2d 803) (1998); Willis v. State, 263 Ga. 597, 599(2) (436 S.E.2d 204) (1993).” Accord, Brownlee v. State , 271 Ga.App. 475, 610 S.E.2d 118 (February 1, 2005); Norton v. State , 293 Ga. 332, 745 S.E.2d 630 (July 1, 2013) (“The mere fact that Norton may have been somewhat intoxicated at the time of the interview does not automatically render evidence thereof inadmissible.”); Spencer v. State , 328 Ga.App. 1, 761 S.E.2d 464 (July 8, 2014) (defendant said he used marijuana seven hours before interview but was “fine”; “the officer, who was experienced with individuals under the influence, testified that Spencer did not appear impaired.”); Wallace v. State , 296 Ga. 388, 768 S.E.2d 480 (January 20, 2015). Myers v. State, 275 Ga. 709, 572 S.E.2d 606 (November 12, 2002). Malice murder and firearms convictions affirmed. “‘ The fact that a defendant is in pain or taking pain medication does not, in and of itself, render any statement made involuntary. Nor does the circumstance of a defendant being hospitalized and undergoing treatment require such a finding.’” Accord, Sanders v. State , 281 Ga. 36, 635 S.E.2d 772 (October 2, 2006); Rivera v. State , 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (June 25, 2007); Rogers v. State , 290 Ga. 18, 717 S.E.2d 629 (November 7, 2011) (defendant receiving emergency room treatment for shotgun wound). Screws v. State, 245 Ga.App. 664, 538 S.E.2d 547 (August 24, 2000). Robbery and cocaine possession convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress defendant’s custodial statement, despite defendant’s contention that “at the time of the confession he had been using crack cocaine and was incoherent.” “Although [Detective] Massa testified that Screws ‘appeared to be a little drunk or a little high,’ he also testified that ‘[Screws] knew exactly what was going on.’” “[I]ntoxication, standing alone, does not render a statement inadmissible. Mickens v. State, 177 Ga.App. 838–839, 341 S.E.2d 316 (1986). If the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant's statement was the product of rational intellect and free will, it may be admitted even if the defendant was intoxicated when he made the statement. Fowler v. State, 246 Ga. 256, 258(3), 271 S.E.2d 168 (1980).” Accord, Fuller (August 5, 2003), above; Frazier v. State , 311 Ga.App. 293, 715 S.E.2d 712 (July 12, 2011) (“the police officer who conducted the interview