☢ test - Í

testified that although Frazier appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, he also appeared to understand what was going on, and his answers were responsive.”); McNear v. State , 326 Ga.App. 32, 755 S.E.2d 844 (March 6, 2014). Bergeson v. State, 272 Ga. 382, 530 S.E.2d 190 (May 8, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court did not err in concluding that defendant knowingly waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily gave pre-trial custodial statement because GBI agent testified that at the time of defendant’s statements, defendant did not appear to be intoxicated, appeared to understand his rights, and answered questions quickly and responsively, despite evidence that he had consumed alcohol about eight hours prior to making the statement. Accord, Krause v. State , 286 Ga. 745, 691 S.E.2d 211 (March 22, 2010) (statement voluntary where defendant appeared sober, spoke freely and responsively, despite evidence of prior drug and alcohol consumption). Cunrod v. State, 241 Ga.App. 743, 526 S.E.2d 900 (December 14, 1999). Conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute affirmed; custodial statement properly admitted despite defendant’s claim that he was under the influence of marijuana at the time it was given. “Whether a waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Bishop v. State, 268 Ga. 286, 287(2), 486 S.E.2d 887 (1997). Because the issue of waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances, even an impaired person can validly waive his rights. See Shelby v. State, 265 Ga. 118, 119(2), 453 S.E.2d 21 (1995).” Evidence here supported court’s finding that defendant was not impaired. Griffin v. State, 237 Ga.App. 753, 516 S.E.2d 588 (April 23, 1999). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Trial court’s finding that defendant made a valid waiver of rights before giving custodial statement was supported by the record. “The officer acknowledged that Griffin said he had just awakened and could not remember details of the events in question because he was sleepy, and that he kept yawning during the interview. But the officer testified that Griffin was coherent and responsive to questioning.” Accord, Adams (October 25, 2005), above, and cases cited thereunder. 38. VOLUNTARINESS – DEFENDANT NOT INFORMED OF CHARGES/INCIDENT UNDER INVESTIGATION Seminal case: Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). Clark v. State, 309 Ga.App. 749, 711 S.E.2d 339 (June 2, 2011). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; custodial statement admissible though defendant not advised he might be charged with aggravated child molestation, not just molestation. “Clark argues that he was therefore tricked into confessing to aggravated child molestation, which carries a 25–year, mandatory minimum sentence. Clark's argument is without merit. See Bazansilva v. State, 251 Ga.App. 608, 610 (554 S.E.2d 794) (2001) (confession admissible even though officer did not inform suspect of charges against him so long as juvenile suspect had knowledge of the ‘substance of the charge’).” Hill v. State, 279 Ga.App. 402, 631 S.E.2d 446 (May 15, 2006). After arresting defendant on outstanding bad check warrants and reading Miranda warnings, officer began questioning defendant about recent armed robbery. “Hill argues that … the officer failed to give him a Miranda warning that specifically notified him that he was going to be questioned about the armed robbery, instead of just the bad check charges. Therefore, he argues that his admissions about the robbery should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal interrogation. This argument, however, has been rejected by Georgia’s courts. The fact that a police officer does not identify the specific subject matter of an interrogation at the beginning of questioning does not render the defendant’s ensuing statement inadmissible. Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424(3) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001); Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 85(3) (402 S.E.2d 41) (1991). Even pretermitting that the officer in this case somehow misled Hill about the subject matter of his interrogation, ‘[o]nce Miranda warnings are given and a person in custody gives a statement to police without invoking his right to remain silent and without requesting an attorney, he has in effect waived his rights. Use of trickery and deceit to obtain a confession does not render it inadmissible, so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 274 Ga. at 424(3).” Overruled to the extent it holds that admissibility of an incriminatory statement is not the same as a confession, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). Rivera v. State, 279 Ga.App. 1, 630 S.E.2d 152 (April 17, 2006). “‘[A] law enforcement officer’s failure to advise a suspect as to the crimes about which he is to be questioned prior to the suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights is not relevant to the question of whether the suspect’s waiver was knowing and voluntary.’ Peebles v. State, 260 Ga. 430,