☢ test - Í

431(1) (396 S.E.2d 229) (1990), citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577(III)(B) (107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954) (1987).” See also King (November 30, 2000), below. Accord, Ellis v. State , 316 Ga.App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (June 25, 2012). Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 48, 610 S.E.2d 26 (February 21, 2005). “Smith argues that his custodial statements to police in Florida were improperly admitted because he waived his Miranda rights only for the Florida issues, rather than for the issues relevant to his Georgia crimes. But it is not necessary for a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege that the criminal suspect know and understand every consequence of that waiver. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). The statement at issue was properly determined to be admissible at a Jackson v. Denno [cit.] hearing.” Grindle v. State, 265 Ga.App. 717, 595 S.E.2d 549 (February 19, 2004). Officer investigating first purse snatching asked defendant to tell him about the second one, although it happened in a different county. Officer told defendant “that he was not investigating the November 25 incident but that he was just curious about it. Because the officer prefaced his interrogation of Grindle with these remarks, defense counsel argued that Grindle's statements to the officer concerning the November 25 incident were obtained by trickery and should not be admitted. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court ruled that the officer’s remarks, though arguably misleading, could not have led Grindle to believe that his statements concerning the Winder crime would not be used against him. Consequently, the court admitted [officer’s] testimony. We uphold the trial court’s determination in favor of admissibility as we do not find it to be clearly erroneous. [Cit.]” Goings v. State, 265 Ga.App. 296, 593 S.E.2d 751 (January 26, 2004). Officers were not required to re- Mirandize defendant when they started asking questions about a second criminal incident. “[A]bsent evidence of ‘official trickery’ [cit.] the validity of a Miranda waiver does not depend upon the subject matter of an interrogation but upon a suspect’s voluntary decision to submit to interrogation in relinquishment of the 5 th Amendment right to silence.” Based on Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). “ Investigators, who presented waiver of rights forms referring only to the robbery of the convenience store, were under no duty to inform King specifically that he was suspected of murder before accepting his signed waivers and subsequent statements. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987); Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80, 85-86(3), 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991).” Accord, Rivera (April 17, 2006), above. Brumelow v. State, 239 Ga.App. 119, 520 S.E.2d 776 (July 14, 1999). Defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid although all charges against defendant may not have been disclosed to him at the time. “A suspect's awareness of all the crimes he is to be questioned about is not relevant to the issue of whether the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary. Peebles v. State, 260 Ga. 430, 431(1), 396 S.E.2d 229 (1990); Peebles v. State, 196 Ga.App. 176, 177(1)(a), 395 S.E.2d 640 (1990). Thus, the mere facts that the federal agent investigating federal crimes informed Brumelow of his rights and had Brumelow sign a federal waiver of rights form are completely irrelevant to the knowing and voluntary nature of his waiver and statements concerning the state crimes involved in this case. See generally Vaughan v. State, 210 Ga.App. 381, 383(3)(a)(1), 436 S.E.2d 19 (1993).” 39. VOLUNTARINESS – EVIDENCE AT TRIAL Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (March 19, 1999). “On several occasions during trial, the trial court prevented Cook from cross-examining state witnesses about whether Cook was read his Miranda rights and other issues that may relate to the voluntariness of his statements under OCGA § 24-3-50. This was error as the defense retains the right, regardless of a pretrial determination by the trial court that a statement was voluntary, to present testimony and cross-examine witnesses regarding the circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a confession. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688-690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986); Griffin [ v. State, 230 Ga.App. 318, 324, 496 S.E.2d 480 (1998)].” 40. VOLUNTARINESS – FEAR OF INJURY Burden v. State, 332 Ga.App. 811, 775 S.E.2d 183 (July 7, 2015). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; “ a detective's statement that he was getting ‘pissed off’ did not amount to a threat of injury that renders the confession inadmissible. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the detective testified that Burden giggled when the detective used that phrase and thus he did not think Burden was intimidated.”