☢ test - Í

Browner v. State, 296 Ga. 138, 765 S.E.2d 348 (November 3, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement despite defendant’s complaint that he “was kept waiting in isolation from others for over an hour before the interviewing officer first informed him of his rights and took his first statement, during which time he was under video surveillance. No evidence gleaned from the pre- interview videotape, however, was admitted into evidence. Thus, the fact that a videotape was made, unbeknownst to appellant, before he was advised of his right to counsel and right to remain silent is irrelevant to the issue of whether the statements admitted into evidence were freely and voluntarily given. … The record … shows appellant was not a minor and was a high school graduate who was enrolled in his second year of technical school at the time of these events. Thus, we reject the suggestion that he was of such tender years that being held in the interview room by himself prior to commencement of the questioning, without more, constituted physical or mental torture of the type to render an in- custody statement involuntary and inadmissible.” Smith v. State, 295 Ga. 283, 759 S.E.2d 520 (June 2, 2014). Convictions for felony murder and related offenses affirmed; detective’s statement that defendant’s sister was subject to arrest for lying to officers wasn’t threat of injury, making defendant’s statement involuntary. “The statement that appellant's sister might be subject to arrest for lying to police about an item taken in a robbery is a ‘mere truism’ and not the type of statement that would necessarily render a confession involuntary under former OCGA § 24–3–50[fn] as being a hope of benefit or a threat of injury. See Smith v. State, 291 Ga.App. 535, 537 (662 S.E.2d 305) (2008) (the suggestion that defendant's wife was being targeted for arrest did not render the defendant's confession involuntary). The statements by police likewise did not involve physical or mental torture, the hallmark of inducement by a fear of injury. See Griffin v. State, 257 Ga.App. 167,168 (570 S.E.2d 611) (2002) (police statement that defendant's girlfriend might be in trouble for driving the getaway car was not an inducement by fear of injury because such statement did not amount to physical or mental torture).” Accord, Barlow v. State , 327 Ga.App. 719, 761 S.E.2d 120 (June 24, 2014) (“The officer's statement regarding the potential charging of other family members for the drug offenses fell into the category of a mere ‘truism’ or ‘recounting of the facts’ rather than an offer of benefit or threat of injury.”). State v. Munoz, 324 Ga.App. 386, 749 S.E.2d 48 (October 2, 2013). Interlocutory appeal in rape prosecution; trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s statement to police. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, statement was neither product of threats or hope of benefit. Trial court found “that the statement was induced by ‘a threat that if [Munoz] denied having sexual intercourse with [P.G.] he would be charged with forcible rape, and a promise that if he admitted to having sexual intercourse with ... her he would not be charged with forcible rape, that he would not be thrown in jail[,] and that he would not have to register as a sex offender.’” No improper fear of injury here: “With respect to the implicit threat that Munoz was potentially facing a charge of forcible rape, the detective expressed nothing more than a truism. See Cantrell v. State, 299 Ga.App. 746, 749(1) (683 S.E.2d 676) (2009) (‘A statement by police that makes the defendant aware of the potential legal consequences is in the nature of a mere truism and does not constitute a threat of injury or promise of benefit within the meaning of OCGA § 24–3–50.’ (punctuation omitted)); Rollinson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 375, 379(1)(d) (623 S.E.2d 211) (2005) (‘[T]he fact that [the defendant] was told he would be arrested if he refused to talk to the police officers does not amount to coercion making his statements inadmissible.’); Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 508, 509 (538 S.E.2d 159) (2000) (holding that interrogating officer's statements to suspect that he was in ‘big trouble’ and that the offense alleged was punishable by 20 years confinement were mere truisms and not threats). The crime was originally reported as such by P.G.'s mother, and it is apparent that throughout the detective's investigation up to and including her interview with Munoz, the detective was attempting to determine whether the evidence gathered supported a claim of forcible, as opposed to statutory, rape. [fn] Moreover, to the extent that the detective encouraged Munoz to present his version of events so as to dispel allegations that he forcibly raped P.G., the questioning was not improper.” Thomas v. State, 317 Ga.App. 729, 732 S.E.2d 559 (September 28, 2012). Shoplifting and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Contrary to defendant’s argument, her statement couldn’t have been the product of “fear of being taken to jail,” inasmuch as she had already been arrested. “‘Whether or not [Thomas] had been formally charged with the crime[s] for which [s]he was tried at the time h[er] statement[ ] w[as] taken would not affect [its] admissibility or voluntary character, but was simply a circumstance to be taken into consideration by the jury in weighing such statements....,’” quoting Mungin v. State, 183 Ga.App. 290, 291(1), 358 S.E.2d 673 (1987). Sosniak v. State, 287 Ga. 279, 695 S.E.2d 604 (June 7, 2010). Interim review of death penalty prosecution. 1. “Sosniak … contends that Detective Cox's remark that one of Sosniak's co-defendants wanted to cooperate and would throw his co-defendants ‘under the ... bus’ was a threat about what would happen to Sosniak if he did not cooperate. This