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comment was … an exhortation to be truthful and could not reasonably be interpreted as a threat of the type that would render Sosniak's statement involuntary.” 2. “We also find no merit to Sosniak's contention that his statement was induced by a threat of injury because Detective Cox told him and [his attorney] that the prosecution was ‘already looking at a death penalty case’ and that Sosniak could ‘get a needle.’ Detective Cox's statements ‘amounted to no more than an explanation of the seriousness of [Sosniak]'s situation.’ Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 212(2) (647 S.E.2d 260) (2007) (upholding the admissibility of a defendant's statement where the officer discussed the death penalty and asked the defendant to permit him to help him).” Accord, Funes v. State , 289 Ga. 793, 716 S.E.2d 183 (October 3, 2011); Johnson v. State , 295 Ga. 421, 761 S.E.2d 13 (June 30, 2014) (“Detective Thompson's statement that Johnson could be charged with murder was a true statement that emphasized the gravity of the situation Johnson faced.”); Rivers v. State , 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015) (similar to Johnson ). State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 686 S.E.2d 244 (November 2, 2009). Trial court’s suppression of defendant’s custodial statement affirmed; court could credit defendant’s “testimony that he was left in a cell without clothes for a couple of hours prior to the interview. Lynch also testified that he had visible injuries from being beaten and that the detectives promised that he would receive medical attention and be taken from Nash County [North Carolina] only if he gave them a statement.” Nahmias concurs specially, criticizing State’s failure to rebut defendant’s testimony and trial court’s refusal to re-open the record or reconsider its ruling. Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009). Defendant’s statement was not procured by fear of injury. “Although the police did not threaten Mangrum with any physical or mental harm, he contends that a detective violated the ‘fear of injury’ prohibition by saying, ‘If you lie to us and we put you back out there on the street and they, then you're dead. How's your mama going to feel? We can't help you.’ Contrary to Mangrum's contention, the suggestion by the detective that Mangrum might be safer remaining in police custody did not render the custodial statements involuntary. See Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 533(2) (491 S.E.2d 343) (1997) (investigators did not exercise undue influence by suggesting defendant would be better off in police custody because community members had threatened to harm the murderer).” Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 428, 677 S.E.2d 82 (April 28, 2009). Statement was not product of “threat of injury based on ‘threats, including that the investigation would turn to her boyfriend, so as to run afoul of OCGA § 24-3-50 [fn] … . “Under OCGA § 24-3-50, the ‘remotest fear of injury’ that renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible is ‘physical or mental torture.’”’ Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 675 S.E.2d 11 (February 23, 2009).” Wilkins v. State, 285 Ga. 164, 675 S.E.2d 18 (March 9, 2009). No “threat of punishment” in defendant’s statement: “the officer told Wilkins he did not want to go to the courthouse with all the evidence the police had gathered against him and say that he ‘didn't know what [was] ... going on. Because everybody can look at this ... right here and can say that you know something.’ Viewing these comments in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, [fn: See Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 800 (514 S.E.2d 1) (1999) (in determining if state has proven confession to be voluntary, court must consider the totality of the circumstances). Accord Norris v. State, 282 Ga. 430, 431 (651 S.E.2d 40) (2007). ] we conclude they did not constitute a threat to Wilkins but were, instead, the officer's candid ‘assessment that the defendant's credibility [would be] destroyed ... by insisting on a version of the facts which was so dramatically contrary to the evidence gathered by the police.’ Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 755 (533 S.E.2d 718) (2000).” Wilson v. State, 285 Ga. 224, 675 S.E.2d 11 (February 23, 2009). “A detective's statement of opinion as to how a judge and jury might view a suspect's lack of cooperation does not ‘relate to the charge or sentence facing the suspect’ ( White v. State, [266 Ga. 134(3), 465 S.E.2d 277 (1996)], and does not constitute physical or mental torture which makes a statement involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50. [ State v. Roberts, 273 Ga. 514(3), 543 S.E.2d 725 (2001)].” Accord, Turner v. State , 296 Ga. 394, 768 S.E.2d 458 (January 20, 2015) (no fear of injury where officer told defendant she should “should tell the investigator how the baby received the injuries discovered on her body because it would be more difficult for appellant to explain them later to a jury or judge and that the court would ‘drill’ appellant on such issues.”). Smith v. State, 291 Ga.App. 535, 662 S.E.2d 305 (May 15, 2008). During defendant’s custodial interview, “the investigator told Smith that his wife was a target of a police investigation. In fact, Smith’s wife was not a target of the specific investigation involving the methamphetamine found in the black box. Instead, she was the confidential informant who had provided the tip that led to Smith’s arrest.” “Smith argues that his statement was involuntary because it was induced by a threat that his wife was being ‘target[ed] ... for arrest.’ But a statement by police that makes the defendant ‘aware of potential legal consequences’ is ‘in the nature of a mere truism’ that does not constitute a threat of injury or