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promise of benefit within the meaning of [OCGA § 24-3-50].” “ While there may be circumstances in which a police suggestion during an interrogation that a suspect’s family member is the target of an investigation could create a fear of injury that invalidates a confession, the facts of this case do not require that conclusion. Here, the investigator expressed interest in Smith’s wife to deflect attention away from her role as the tipster; Smith’s wife, in fact, was involved in other illegal drug activities; rather than seeking to exonerate her, Smith actually implicated his wife in the other illegal activities during his interview; and Smith later claimed that he gave the statement so that he could get out of jail and help his wife flee the county. An indication by the police that they are considering charging a defendant’s girlfriend or wife with a crime does not necessarily render a confession involuntary, see Anderson v. State, 224 Ga.App. 608, 610(1) (481 S.E.2d 595) (1997); Riviera v. State, 190 Ga.App. 823, 825-826(1) (380 S.E.2d 353) (1989); Sampson v. State, 165 Ga.App. 833, 835(9) (303 S.E.2d 77) (1983); Copeland v. State, 162 Ga.App. 398, 400(3) (291 S.E.2d 560) (1982), and under these circumstances, even if the investigator feigned an interest in Smith’s wife, the trial court was authorized to find that Smith’s statement was voluntary and admissible. See State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758, 549 (632 S.E.2d 654) (2006) (use of trickery or psychological ploy does not make confession involuntary unless means are reasonably calculated to procure untrue statement from defendant); DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8) (493 S.E.2d 157) (1997) (same).” See also Wright (April 28, 2009), above (threat to investigate defendant’s boyfriend categorically called not “fear of injury”). Rollinson v. State, 276 Ga.App. 375, 623 S.E.2d 211 (November 15, 2005). “Contrary to Rollinson’s contention, the fact that he was told he would be arrested if he refused to talk to the police officers does not amount to coercion making his statements inadmissible. Such statements are ‘in the nature of a mere truism’; they simply made Rollinson ‘aware of potential legal consequences.’ Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 508, 509, 538 S.E.2d 159 (2000). See Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 533(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997).” Accord, Munoz (October 2, 2013), above. State v. Johnson, 273 Ga.App. 324, 615 S.E.2d 163 (May 19, 2005). Trial court could find that defendant’s “incriminating statements were induced by the hope of benefit and thus involuntary. Specifically, the trial court determined that [officer] told Johnson he ‘would hold her in jail for a year without bond unless she confessed to intentionally setting the fire.’ And it found that [Officer] Harris’ ‘definite and categorical commitment to make sure Johnson did not stay in jail a year pending trial if she confessed’ constituted a hope of benefit that caused Johnson to inculpate herself against her will.” “We recognize that a mere promise to reduce bond does not constitute a ‘hope of benefit’ under OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cit.] Instead, such promise, which does not implicate the sentence or charge at issue, is ‘a collateral benefit that does not make an otherwise admissible confession involuntary.’ [Cits.] This case, however, involves more than a promise of reduced bond. As found by the trial court, [officer] told Johnson that she would be held in jail for one year without any opportunity for bond if she did not confess. If she confessed, however, she would be released the next day.” Trial court was authorized to find that officer’s “statements – which related to pre-trial incarceration and his alleged authority to hold Johnson in jail for a full year – were more akin to a fear of injury or a sentencing issue than a collateral benefit such as bond reduction, the promise of a solitary cell, or communication with the judge about cooperation. See Green [ v. State, 154 Ga.App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980)]. Cf. State v. Todd, 250 Ga.App. 265, 267 (549 S.E.2d 821) (2001) (officer’s statement to defendant that if police had no probable cause, then he would have no basis for keeping defendant under arrest was a ‘mere truism, [a] mere explanation[ ] of [the defendant’s] arrest and of the law, [and did] not constitute an improper offer of some hope of benefit’); Pounds v. State, 189 Ga.App. 809, 810(1) (377 S.E.2d 722) (1989) (officer’s discussion of reduced bond, by itself, was ‘in the same class of collateral benefits as ... the promises of a solitary cell, a psychiatric examination and communication to the judge of the defendant’s cooperation’).” Dyer v. State, 278 Ga. 656, 604 S.E.2d 756 (October 25, 2004). “Dyer contends that both of his statements to [detective] were involuntary because the detective told him that he was going to have blood ‘sucked’ out of Dyer’s arm and that, if Dyer’s blood matched the blood other than [victim’s] blood that was found at Dowsari’s apartment, the detective was going to arrest Dyer for murder. We conclude that these statements did not render Dyer’s statements involuntary. Although the detective used descriptive language regarding how blood would be taken from Dyer’s arm, the detective initially told Dyer that the detective had a search warrant for Dyer’s blood and that the detective was going to take Dyer to a hospital to have his blood drawn. Because it is common knowledge how a hospital draws blood from a patient, we cannot conclude that the detective’s use of the word ‘suck’ would have conveyed any threat of bodily harm. Moreover, the detective’s warning that he would arrest Dyer if his blood matched that found at [victim’s] apartment was not a threat of personal harm and did not render Dyer’s statements involuntary. [Cits.] For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that Dyer’s statements were voluntary.”