☢ test - Í

Griffin v. State, 257 Ga.App. 167, 570 S.E.2d 611 (August 23, 2002). “‘To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury .’ The Supreme Court of Georgia has construed ‘slightest hope of benefit’ to mean the hope of a lighter sentence. ‘Insofar as the “remotest fear of injury” is concerned, any confession obtained through physical or mental torture is inadmissible.” Officer’s vague offers to “help” defendant do not convey hope of a lighter sentence. Reference to possible charges against defendant’s girlfriend does not invoke physical or mental torture. Compare to Baker (June 30, 1999), below (threat to arrest defendant’s relatives contributed to coercion making defendant’s statements inadmissible). Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 533 S.E.2d 718 (September 11, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Statement wasn’t “obtained by a threat of an increased punishment, in violation of OCGA § 24–3–50. A review of appellant’s statement reveals that the interrogating officer told appellant that ‘[y]ou are lying. You are making it a whole hell of a lot worse on yourself. You are hanging yourself with your lies. Don’t do it.’ The officer also told appellant that the jury at his trial after hearing ‘all the evidence that [the officer has] and you start giving them this statement, it is just going to hang you.’ In the context of the interrogation, there was no reasonable possibility that appellant would have considered the officer’s comments to constitute a veiled threat and we find instead that the challenged words could only have been construed as the officer’s assessment that appellant was destroying his credibility and imperiling his claim of innocence by insisting on a version of the facts which was so dramatically contrary to the evidence gathered by the police.” Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 508, 538 S.E.2d 159 (August 9, 2000). Cocaine trafficking and selling convictions affirmed; no hope of benefit or threat of injury made defendant’s custodial statement involuntary. “The transcript of defendant's suppression hearing reveals that the interrogating officer told him he was in big trouble; that the offense of trafficking was punishable by 20 years confinement; and, in effect, that he could help the defendant if he cooperated. However, that the interrogating officer told the defendant he was in trouble is in the nature of a mere truism, rather than an offer of hope of benefit or threat of injury. See Sampson v. State, 165 Ga.App. 833, 835(9), 303 S.E.2d 77 (1983); Copeland v. State, 162 Ga.App. 398, 400(3), 291 S.E.2d 560 (1982). The interrogating officer did not threaten defendant with harm in advising him that trafficking in cocaine involved the possibility of a significant sentence to confinement. Rather, this simply made the defendant aware of potential legal consequences associated therewith. Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 532–533(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997). Finally, an investigator does not make an offer of hope of benefit upon telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution, Leigh v. State, 223 Ga.App. 726, 727(1), 478 S.E.2d 905 (1996); Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga.App. 70, 72–73(5), 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997), or by offering help to the defendant. Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234, 235(2), 347 S.E.2d 553 (1986) (The ‘slightest hope of benefit’ means the hope of a lighter sentence.).” Adams v. State , 243 Ga.App. 858, 534 S.E.2d 538 (May 10, 2000). Armed robbery and kidnapping convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement despite his contention that he feared reprisal from his co- defendant. “[E]ven if Adams had confessed because he feared Whitlock: ‘[t]he coercion proscribed by Miranda must be caused by the police. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted). Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 826(2), 514 S.E.2d 657 (1999) [quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)].” Martin v. State, 271 Ga. 301, 518 S.E.2d 898 (July 6, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, custodial statement was not procured by hope of benefit or fear of injury. Evidence showed that “the investigators made statements about the possibility of the death penalty, the difference between armed robbery and murder, and that Clay had given a detailed statement; they urged Martin to tell the truth and not to lie about his presence at the crime scene. Martin then stated, ‘I'll take the robbery.’ The investigators cautioned that they did not want Martin ‘to take anything,’ that all they wanted was for him to tell the truth and that they were ‘not in a position to do that, that's the district attorney's office decision.’ Martin then raised the specter of a deal if he could show the police ‘something.’ The investigators again mentioned the death penalty, the possible treatment of the shooter, and asked Martin to tell them the truth.” “The interviewing officers' statements did not constitute the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury so as to have induced or coerced Martin's statement. The investigators did not threaten Martin with personal harm in their comments about the death penalty, but were merely discussing the potential legal consequences of the killing. Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 533(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997). Nor is there any indication that they were intending to mislead Martin about legal punishment by the comment that there was a difference between armed robbery and murder. The officers repeatedly told Martin that they had no power to promise him a lighter sentence or to affect his punishment, that it was a matter for the district attorney.