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And they explained to Martin that those involved in a crime leading to a fatal shooting were as culpable as the person pulling the trigger. What is more, neither the investigators' encouraging Martin to tell the truth nor their telling him that his cooperation would be made known amounts to the hope of benefit that would run afoul of OCGA § 24-3-50. Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 692(3), 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736(4)(c), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995); Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843, 844(2), 452 S.E.2d 115 (1995). Martin's statement that he had discussed with his mother taking ‘robbery’ indicates that any hope of benefit originated in his own mind. Shelton v. State, 196 Ga.App. 163, 164(3), 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990).” Baker v. State, 238 Ga.App. 802, 521 S.E.2d 24 (June 30, 1999). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s statements as being the product of police coercion where officers threatened to arrest defendant and two others if defendant didn’t admit to owning drugs found in house. 1. Statements resulted from custodial interrogation. “ Handcuffed and surrounded by several police officers, [Defendant's] freedom of action was clearly curtailed so as to establish custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097-1098(V)(A) (7th Cir., 1993); see Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 302-303(2)(c), 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997). While [defendant] was in custody, Officer Davis interrogated him by express questions and also by words and actions designed to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 240, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997). Because Officer Davis failed to warn [defendant] of his Miranda rights, his oral statements were inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Metheny v. State, 197 Ga.App. 882, 884-885(1)(b), 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990).” 2. Oral statement was product of coercion and thus involuntary. “In light of the handcuffing of Matthew, the direct threats to Matthew that they would jail his relatives if he did not confess, the spontaneous observation by a third party that the police were pressuring Matthew to confess, and the actions of the officer in beginning to pull a gun in the emotionally charged and volatile atmosphere where police were demanding that Matthew confess, evidence supported the court's finding that under the totality of the circumstances police coercive activities resulted in an involuntary confession.” 3. Reading Miranda prior to later, written statement didn’t remove taint from prior involuntary statement. “At this point a presumption arose that the coerced admission tainted the subsequent written confession. This presumption is overcome only if there was a break in the stream of events between the coerced statement and the subsequent confession such that the coercion surrounding the first statement sufficiently dissipated so as to make the second statement voluntary. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).” “The Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), that an unwarned admission does not automatically bar a later confession preceded by proper warnings. However, if actual coercion attended the first statement, then the subsequent confession is normally rendered inadmissible under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 928 (11th Cir.1985); cf. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285.” “Evidence supported the court's finding that same coercion also attended the subsequent written confession. Not only did the written confession immediately follow the coerced admission, but it took place at the same location under the watchful eye of the officers who had just forced the first confession. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1467-1468. Moreover, before reading him Miranda rights, Officer Davis had wrested a commitment from Matthew that he would put the just stated admission in writing. Cf. Mobley v. State, 164 Ga.App. 154, 158(6), 296 S.E.2d 617 (1982). The reading of the Miranda rights did little to dissipate the coercion present throughout the encounter.” 41. VOLUNTARINESS – FOREIGN LANGUAGES/TRANSLATION OF MIRANDA WARNING Milinavicius v. State, 290 Ga. 374, 721 S.E.2d 843 (January 23, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion in finding that defendant, a Lithuanian, sufficiently understood Miranda warnings to make custodial statement admissible. At Jackson-Denno hearing, defendant presented evidence of his limited English proficiency, including an expert who “reviewed the video-tape of appellant's in-custody interview and testified that she believed appellant did not understand his Miranda rights.” Evidence supported a contrary finding, however: “Appellant knew enough about American criminal procedure to turn himself in to police. During the interrogation, officers answered appellant's questions and appellant told them that he understood what was being said to him. At no time did appellant invoke his right to silence or right to counsel, but only told authorities he was tired and wanted to see a doctor in order to be medicated for stress. In addition, the trial court, as the fact-finder, had the discretion not to credit the opinions of appellant's expert and to weigh her expert opinion less heavily than the police officer's testimony about appellant's waiver of his Miranda rights. See Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53(3) (440 S.E.2d 646) (1994). The trial court's decision was not clearly erroneous.” Amador v. State, 310 Ga. 280, 713 S.E.2d 423 (June 23, 2011). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly ruled that custodial statement was voluntary. Defendant contended he didn’t understand his rights due to poor translation into Spanish by police officer. “There is no dispute that the waiver form read by Amador accurately set