☢ test - Í

Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 657 S.E.2d 213 (February 11, 2008). Defendant’s indictment was defective where a person not selected for service served on the grand jury (here, father instead of son, both sharing same name). Grand jury defect: “Assuming that the wrong person actually served on the grand jury, a timely challenge would be valid. Turner v. State, 78 Ga. 174, 180(2) (1886).” Harbuck v. State, 280 Ga. 775, 631 S.E.2d 351 (June 12, 2006). Trial court properly denied defendant’s “motion to quash the accusation for alleged prosecutorial misconduct [fn]. ‘[A] motion to quash is not a proper method for attacking an indictment or accusation for any defect not appearing on its face.’ Hughes v. State, 266 Ga.App. 652(3b) (598 S.E.2d 43) (2004). Inasmuch as [defendant’s] motion to quash contested the authenticity of the State’s evidence and did not attack the accusation for a defect appearing on its face, the trial court did not err when it denied the motion.” Accord, Shafer v. State , 285 Ga.App. 748, 647 S.E.2d 274 (May 9, 2007) (motion to quash was not proper vehicle to challenge protective order underlying indictment for aggravated stalking). Polk v. State, 275 Ga.App. 467, 620 S.E.2d 857 (September 9, 2005). “Polk … argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the indictment as a whole on the grounds that it was not received in open court. In support thereof, Polk points out that the indictment was blank as to the date it was received in open court and did not contain the signature of the clerk of court. We find no error. The trial court concluded that there was no evidence that the indictment had not been returned in open court. Additionally, on its face, the indictment bore the signature of the grand jury foreperson, the handwritten entry of the word ‘true’ in the space before the word ‘bill,’ and the handwritten case number. Finally, the minutes of the criminal court docket showed that the indictment was filed. Therefore, even though the indictment did not have a date or the clerk of court’s signature on its face, other indicia contributed to its stamp of authenticity.” Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 612 S.E.2d 521 (March 21, 2005). “The disqualification of a grand juror under OCGA § 15-12-70 ‘is not a viable ground for quashing the indictment.’ [Cits.]” Haska v. State, 240 Ga.App. 527, 523 S.E.2d 589 (October 15, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for sexual battery affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s untimely motion to quash accusation filed the morning of trial. Selley v. State, 237 Ga.App. 47, 514 S.E.2d 706 (March 16, 1999). Indictment presented chage of theft by bringing stolen property into state, but language of indictment tracked theft by receiving. Held, defendant’s failure to timely object to the defect in the indictment constituted a waiver. “‘An alleged variance between the offense as named or the Code section cited and the allegations specified in the indictment goes only to the form of the indictment. Where the accused desires to take exception to the form of an indictment, it is essential that he should do so by a demurrer or motion to quash, made in writing and before entering a pleading to the merits.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bentley v. State, 210 Ga.App. 862(1), 438 S.E.2d 110 (1993); see also Phillips v. State, 215 Ga.App. 526(2), 451 S.E.2d 517 (1994). Since the record does not show that Selley objected to the form of the indictment in a timely, written pretrial motion, he waived any exception to the form of the indictment. OCGA §§ 17-7-111; 17-7-113; Mullinax v. State, 231 Ga.App. 534(1), 499 S.E.2d 903 (1998); Bentley, supra.” Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 512 S.E.2d 241 (February 8, 1999). “A plea in abatement on the ground that the indictment was found upon insufficient evidence will not be sustained where, as here, a competent witness appears before the grand jury. Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 366(2)(a), 314 S.E.2d 621 (1984).” I. REDACTION Palmer v. State, 330 Ga.App. 679, 769 S.E.2d 107 (February 12, 2015). Family violence battery and child cruelty convictions affirmed. No prejudice shown where unredacted indictment was read to jury, including allegation that the family violence battery was a “second or subsequent offense.” “The indictment was properly worded because, where ‘the nature of the offense changes from a misdemeanor to a felony through repetition, ... the indictment must reflect the maximum punishment to which the defendant can be sentenced.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted .) White v. State, 265 Ga.App. 302, 303(1) (596 S.E.2d 9) (2003). However, the recidivism allegation was not an element of the crime of family violence battery,[fn] and ‘it is error for the jury to be made aware of the prior convictions during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial where there is no other legal basis for the consideration thereof.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) White v. State, 265 Ga.App. at 304(1) (finding that the trial court erred in reading the indictment to the jury without redacting the references to the appellant's prior convictions).” No prejudice, however: “[b]ecause the jury was legitimately made aware that Palmer had previously been convicted of family violence battery, there is no reasonable