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probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if trial counsel had objected to the trial court's reading of the unredacted indictment to the jury. See Favors v. State, 182 Ga.App. 179, 180(1) (355 S.E.2d 109) (1987) (the trial court's failure to redact indictment's reference to prior convictions ‘was of little if any consequence’ where the jury was legitimately made aware of the prior convictions).” Evidence of the prior offense was properly admitted through victim’s testimony as a prior difficulty. O’Donnell v. Smith, 294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (November 18, 2013). Following defendant’s malice murder conviction, habeas court erred in granting relief; no ineffective assistance based on allowing unredacted indictment to go to jury, showing two dead-docketed charges. No prejudice shown, given that jury acquitted on three of four remaining charges. “There is no showing that the jury would not have convicted appellee of murder had they been unaware of the two extra charges erroneously listed on the face of the indictment.” Anderson v. State, 236 Ga.App. 679, 513 S.E.2d 235 (February 26, 1999). No error in manner by which trial court presented redacted indictment to jury. “The severed offenses were Counts 1 and 2 on the indictment. Before the indictment was permitted to go out with the jury, it was redacted by removing the pages containing these counts and by blacking out portions of the cover page which referenced the severed offenses and also the names of witnesses on the severed counts as well as four similar transaction witnesses who did not testify. The jury was instructed that ‘Counts 1 and 2 are not before you and they are of no concern to you and you should draw no inferences either for or against the state or for or against the defendant or in any way. Those are just matters that have been removed totally from your consideration.’ Defendant maintains that the effect of the absent Counts 1 and 2, along with the blacking out with a marker made it apparent that additional criminal charges had been removed from the indictment thereby putting defendant’s character in issue. However, we find the trial court’s removal of all references to the severed charges along with instructions to the jury that they were to draw no inference from the redacting of the indictment to be sufficient to avoid any impermissible reflection on defendant’s character. Defendant’s reliance upon Morrow v. State, 229 Ga.App. 242, 245(4), 493 S.E.2d 616 (1997), is misplaced as there is no indication that the indictment in that case was redacted. The present case does not address whether an indictment should be redacted or which information should be removed, but involves the trial court’s range of discretion with regard to the manner in which such is accomplished. Undoubtedly, the circumstances will vary widely, but we are aware of no requirement that a document be redacted in such a fashion as to obscure the fact that it has been redacted.” J. RE-INDICTMENT State v. Outen, 296 Ga. 40, 764 S.E.2d 848 (October 20, 2014). Affirming 324 Ga.App. 457, 751 S.E.2d 109 (2013); 1. trial court properly granted plea in bar finding that felony vehicular homicide charge was time-barred. “OCGA § 17–3–3, which extends the statute of limitations for six months after a timely filed indictment is quashed,” doesn’t provide extra time following ruling by an appellate court; rather the six months begins from the date of the trial court’s action quashing the indictment. “The text of the statute is clear. OCGA § 17–3–3 says that the six-month extension of the statute of limitations runs ‘from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered.’ The statute does not say, as the State would have it, ‘from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered or, in the event the State seeks an appeal, from the time the appellate court issues the remittitur. ’ See Duncan v. State, 193 Ga.App. 793, 794, 389 S.E.2d 365 (1989) (holding that an appeal does not toll the statute of limitations under OCGA § 17–3–2 because the pendency of an appeal is not among the exceptions listed in § 17–3–2 and ‘[i]n a criminal statute of limitation only an exception or condition contained within the statute will toll its operation’).” State’s argument that this is bad public policy is unavailing; “this Court has no authority to substitute its own notions of optimal public policy for the policy clearly delineated in OCGA § 17–3–3.” And if reindictment is followed by appellate reversal of the quashing of the first indictment, the State can simply move to nolle prose the “superfluous” indictment. 2. Second indictment didn’t “relate back” to the first, because the first charge of felony vehicular homicide had already been quashed before the second was filed. “[A] superseding indictment brought after the statute of limitation has run is valid as long as (i) the original indictment is still pending; (ii) the original indictment was timely; and (iii) the superseding indictment does not broaden or substantially amend the original charges,” quoting Wooten v. State , 240 Ga.App. 725, 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999). Court of Appeals erroneously held that second indictment didn’t relate back because it gave defendant notice for the first time as to the specific allegations of reckless driving against him. “However, the FVH [felony vehicular homicide] count of the second indictment was narrower than the original FVH count; it specified the particular theory of reckless driving that the State intended to pursue, thereby limiting the range of evidence and arguments that Outen previously would have had to confront at trial. From a notice standpoint, the additional allegations in the second indictment made it easier, rather than harder, for Outen to prepare his defense.” Correct rationale for rejecting relation- back here is that the remaining count of misdemeanor vehicular homicide couldn’t save the FVH count. “Compared