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with the sole pending charge of misdemeanor vehicular homicide, this felony count alleged a violation of a different statute, contained different elements, relied on different evidence, and exposed Outen to a potentially far greater sentence. [Cit.] Consequently, the FVH count of the second indictment did not relate back to the date of the then-pending indictment for misdemeanor vehicular homicide.” Hicks v. State, 315 Ga.App. 779, 728 S.E.2d 294 (May 3, 2012). RICO conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar, based on statute of limitation. Re-indictment within six months of nolle pros of timely first indictment was timely. “Under Georgia law, if the State obtains an indictment within the time allowed, and a nolle prosequi is later entered as to the first indictment, the State may re-indict the defendant within six months after the entry of nolle prosequi, regardless of the intervening expiration of the initial limitation period. Carlisle v. State, 277 Ga. 99, 100–101 (586 S.E.2d 240) (2003); Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 513–514(12) (578 S.E.2d 444) (2003). See OCGA § 17–3–3 (‘If an indictment is found within the time [allowed by law], and is quashed or a nolle prosequi entered, the limitation shall be extended six months from the time the first indictment is quashed or the nolle prosequi entered.’). Because the State re-indicted Hicks within six months of the entry of the nolle prosequi, the trial court did not err in denying his plea in bar. Alexander v. State, 192 Ga.App. 211, 212 (384 S.E.2d 436) (1989).” State v. Bair, 303 Ga.App. 183, 692 S.E.2d 806 (March 26, 2010). Trial court properly granted defendant’s plea in bar to second indictment based on statute of limitation; statute of limitation wasn’t tolled by first indictment which was fatally defective. Trial court had granted demurrer to first indictment alleging that defendant committed theft by taking “between the 1 st day of August, 1999, and the 1 st day of February, 2002.” Indictment was filed in June 14, 2005. Trial court granted the demurrer on grounds that some of the dates in question fell outside the four year statute of limitation for felony theft by taking. State then re-indicted, alleging 31 separate counts of theft by taking, and alleging that the new indictment was timely because the crimes were previously unknown. Second indictment was issued on June 10, 2008, well outside statute of limitation but within six months of the dismissal of the first indictment. Trial court found that that second indictment was barred by the statute of limitation, holding that the State couldn’t “renew” the first prosecution under OCGA § 17-3-3 because it was void. Court of Appeals agrees: “Because of the second indictment, we now know that, without question, the first indictment did not inform Bair of all the charges she must defend against at trial and was not specific enough to protect her from multiple prosecutions. The indictment apparently was intended to include 31 separate acts and to allege all events that occurred on 31 different dates, not one crime on one date. Moreover, the indictment did not inform Bair of the manner in which she was alleged to have committed the crimes. As in D'Auria [ v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 512 S.E.2d 266 (1999)] , we find that the first indictment was not sufficient to enable Bair to prepare for trial and respond to the charges against her, or to protect her against multiple prosecutions. The State cannot allege a single defective charge of theft by taking that may have been barred by the statute of limitation, and upon its dismissal, inflate that single, defective one count indictment to one alleging 31-counts. Therefore, no valid indictment was filed within four years of the date the alleged victim learned of Bair's actions, and the trial court did not err by granting Bair's plea in bar based on the statute of limitation. See Newsome v. State, [296 Ga.App. 490, 492-493(1), 675 S.E.2d 229 (2009)]. Moreover, this second indictment would impermissibly broaden and substantially amend the first indictment. See Wooten v. State, 240 Ga.App. 725, 726(2)(a), 524 S.E.2d 776 (1999).” Metts v. State, 297 Ga.App. 330, 677 S.E.2d 377 (April 6, 2009). Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by re- indictment. “‘ A prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future conduct.... [T]he initial charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution.’ (Footnotes omitted). United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382(III) (102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74) (1982). An exception to this general rule exists where the subsequent indictment increases the severity of the charges in response to the defendant's exercise of certain procedural rights, which raises the appearance of retaliation or prosecutorial vindictiveness. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25-28(I) (94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628) (1974); Larochelle [ v. State, 219 Ga.App. 792, 794(2) (466 S.E.2d 672) (1996)]. That, however, is not the case here, since the third indictment did not increase the severity of the charges against Metts. Nor was the third indictment filed in response to Metts's exercise of any of his procedural rights. Rather, the state reindicted Metts a third time in response to the [co-defendant] mother's Alford plea and in order to clarify the possible time period of the victimization.” Hayward El v. State, 284 Ga.App. 125, 643 S.E.2d 242 (February 16, 2007). No double jeopardy where defendant was tried on second indictment, regardless of when the first was dismissed, if jeopardy never attached to first indictment. “‘An indictment obtained without the dismissal of a prior indictment is a superseding indictment.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Larochelle v. State, 219 Ga.App. 792, 794(2) (466 S.E.2d 672) (1996). ‘ A grand jury is not prevented from returning