☢ test - Í

another indictment against an accused, even though an indictment is pending, where there has been no jeopardy upon the first indictment. ’ (Punctuation omitted.) Montgomery v. State, 259 Ga.App. 153, 155-156(1) (575 S.E.2d 917) (2003). Importantly, ‘[a] defendant is not placed in jeopardy until, in a court of competent jurisdiction with a sufficient indictment, he has been arraigned, has pled, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Armstrong v. State, 281 Ga.App. 297, 298 (635 S.E.2d 880) (2006). Here, Hayward El was first indicted on October 12, 2004 and was later re-indicted on slightly different charges on February 7, 2006. He was not placed in jeopardy, however, until July 12, 2006, which was well after the superseding indictment was returned. Furthermore, the trial court entered an order of nolle prosequi as to the 2004 indictment on March 3, 2006, which was well before he was placed in jeopardy. Because no jeopardy ever attached to the first indictment, the State was not even required to dismiss it before proceeding to trial on the second indictment, but could have nolle prossed the first indictment at any time. See Montgomery, supra, 259 Ga.App. at 156(1). Thus, the superseding indictment in this matter did not subject Hayward El to double jeopardy.” Maddox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 838, 598 S.E.2d 105 (April 7, 2004). No error where trial court ordered that re-filed accusation (following nolle pros of prior accusation) be assigned a new case number. “Maddox was originally charged in Accusation No. 02SR03371, filed in the January Term of 2002. A nolle prosequi was entered on that action, apparently because Trooper Wynn could not be located. Thereafter, Maddox was arraigned under a new accusation which was filed during the January Term of 2003. The new accusation had been given the same case number as the original action. Maddox moved to dismiss the case as proceeding under the old, nolle prossed accusation. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the case was proceeding under a new accusation, albeit the case number was the same. The trial court determined that, ‘Although the controlling case law does not place importance upon the case number given to the new accusation, in the Court's opinion the better practice would be to assign a new case number to the new accusation to avoid any confusion.’ Pursuant to the trial court's direction, the new accusation was assigned a new case number, Case No. 03SR05614. Maddox, rightly, does not challenge the State's authority to file a new accusation. [fn: See McGahee v. State, 133 Ga.App. 964, 966(3), 213 S.E.2d 91 (1975) (‘A nolle prosequi is a cessation of prosecution for the nonce, but it may spring into life again and be continued again with all of the fervor and energy at the command of the prosecuting officers. A new indictment may be returned or a new accusation may be filed, and the earlier nolle prosequi can in no sense be pleaded as autrefois acquit or former jeopardy, or res judicata.’) (Citation omitted); accord Buice v. State, 239 Ga.App. 52, 53(1), 520 S.E.2d 258 (1999). ] And the trial court's direction that the new accusation be given a different case number in order to “avoid any confusion” was an administrative act that Maddox has not shown affected her substantive rights. [fn] While Maddox appears to claim that a new accusation did not, in fact, issue because of the concordance of case numbers, the record factually belies such assertion since it contains both the old and the new accusations, one filed in 2002 and the other in 2003; no order was entered ‘reviving’ the old accusation. Moreover, the jury's verdict was clearly returned on the new accusation. Thus, there is no evidence that the State tried Maddox on the old, nolle prossed accusation. Since the State did not proceed on the old accusation, Maddox's claim that the trial court ‘attempted to correct the state's error in proceeding on an accusation that had been nol prossed’ is factually baseless and does not authorize reversal.” Sanchez v. State, 242 Ga.App. 686, 530 S.E.2d 775 (March 9, 2000). Cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking convictions affirmed; no “prosecutorial vindictiveness” shown by re-indictment to a higher charge after mistrial. After first trial ended in hung jury, State re-indicted from cocaine trafficking – 28-grams or more, to cocaine trafficking – 400-grams or more. “Sanchez argues that, by reindicting him for the larger amount, he faced a significantly increased punishment which is ‘presumed to be prosecutorial vindictiveness,’ as proscribed by the United States Supreme Count in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 24(I), 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). This issue has been decided adversely to Sanchez by the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision in Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. 115, 119-120, 464 S.E.2d 371 (1995). In Griffin, the Supreme Court noted that the ‘presumption’ of prosecutorial vindictiveness discussed in Blackledge focused on a prosecutor's motivation to discourage other defendants from exercising their right to appeal, a constitutionally protected right. However, ‘[t]he reasoning of Blackledge is inapplicable in the context of jury deadlock. Here, as the State points out, what provided the State an opportunity to “up the ante” was not a successful appeal of a conviction, but rather a mistrial. The appeal of the plea of former jeopardy, had it been successful, would have created no opportunity for enhancement of charges or penalty. A mistrial resulting from an inability of a jury to reach a verdict, especially when entered on the trial court's own motion, is not subject to chilling as is the exercise of the right to appeal. Therefore, no presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises.’ (Citations omitted.) Griffin v. State, supra at 120, 464 S.E.2d 371. The trial court did not err in denying Sanchez's plea in abatement.” K. RE-TRIAL Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 620 S.E.2d 792 (October 3, 2005). “Alexander’s contention that the State was not