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authorized to retry him on his original indictment following a mistrial is without merit. See, e. g., State v. Lane, 218 Ga.App. 126 (460 S.E.2d 550) (1995) (since jury had not entered verdict on murder charge prior to mistrial, State could retry defendant on both murder charge and lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under original indictment).” L. RETURN OF INDICTMENT Thomas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; defendant couldn’t challenge return of indictment after trial. “‘A demurrer to the indictment, motion to quash or plea in abatement must be entered before trial.’ Sheffield v. State, 235 Ga. 507(1) (220 S.E.2d 265) (1975) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 751(2)(b) (130 S.E.2d 709) (1963) (contention that indictment was not returned in open court waived when not challenged before trial). Thomas therefore waived this alleged error by going to trial under the indictment without raising the objection that the indictment was not returned in open court. Sheffield, 235 Ga. at 507(1).” State v. Brown, 293 Ga. 493, 748 S.E.2d 376 (September 9, 2013). Affirming 315 Ga.App. 282, 726 S.E.2d 764 (2012), trial court properly dismissed indictment, finding that it was not returned in open court. “The term ‘open court,’ as far as returning the indictment is concerned, means that the indictment is returned in a ‘place where court [is] being held open to the public with the judge and the clerk present.’ [ Zugar v. State, 194 Ga. 285, 289 (21 S.E.2d 647) (1942)]. See also Cadle [ v. State, 101 Ga.App. 175, 180 (113 S.E.2d 180) (1960)] (‘the place of the reception of the indictment must be one where the court is being held open to the public.’). A failure to return the indictment in open court is per se injurious to the defendant. Zugar, 194 Ga. at 291.” Facts here support finding that indictment was not returned in open court. New Cobb County courthouse was under construction, not yet open to the public. “As a result, the sheriff posted deputies in the breeze way connecting the old and new courthouses. The front entrance to the new courthouse on Haynes Street (Haynes Street entrance) was locked because there was no security personnel to post there as of January 6. Thus, on that date, anyone who wanted to access Judge Kreeger's courtroom in the new courthouse had to go through security in the old courthouse and cross over the breeze way to where the deputies were posted at the entrance to the new courthouse. The sheriff stated he did not want anyone in the new courthouse without ‘proper badge and identification.’ He confirmed that anyone wanting to enter the new court house was required by the sheriff's office to state his/her business and anyone who could not articulate his/her business for being there would not be allowed into the new courthouse. The sheriff agreed that on January 6, the new courthouse was the only building in the judicial complex that could not be entered into without further inquiry after having gone through the regular security checkpoint in the old courthouse.” Four witnesses testified to their difficulty gaining entry into the building. Walker v. State, 310 Ga. 223, 713 S.E.2d 413 (June 22, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to quash indictment. Contrary to defendant’s argument, grand jury bailiff could return indictment in open court while grand jury was in recess, as long as it hadn’t been discharged. “Walker argues that, because the grand jury had not been resummoned by court order and was temporarily absent at the time the bailiff presented it in open court, the indictment was invalid. We disagree. ‘While an indictment must be returned into open court[,] it is not ground for quashing an indictment that the indictment is returned by the grand jury bailiff rather than the grand jury itself in the absence of allegations that the bailiff making the return was not the duly qualified officer of the grand jury or that the indictment was tampered with. However, what the grand jurors could not legally do can not be done by the grand-jury bailiff. A grand jury after adjourning or recessing for the night, or for a stated time set by themselves, could return and deliver the indictment to the judge in open court; thus, the bailiff could do the same. After the grand jury is discharged by the court[,] it could do no further act as such body, however, and it follows that the bailiff could not appear to deliver indictments in open court as a substitute for the grand jury after that body had been formally dispersed or adjourned by the court so that it would take an order of court to reconvene it.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Dalton v. State, 100 Ga.App. 732, 732–733(2), 112 S.E.2d 446 (1959).” M. RIGHT TO INDICTMENT Steillman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (January 29, 2009). Trial court has no obligation to inquire into voluntariness of defendant’s waiver of grand jury presentment and indictment. “Here, the record shows that Steillman filed a signed waiver of formal indictment and arraignment and pled not guilty. There is no requirement that the trial court conduct further inquiry.” Pruitt v. State, 245 Ga.App. 801, 538 S.E.2d 874 (September 7, 2000). Theft by taking and related convictions affirmed; State was authorized to proceed by accusation rather than indictment. “Pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1, the district