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attorney has the authority to prefer accusations in felony cases involving violations of certain Code sections, including OCGA § 16-8-2 (theft by taking), in which defendants have either been bound over to the superior court or have expressly waived a commitment hearing. Pruitt waived his right to a commitment hearing when he posted bond. Lynn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 600, 601(1), 512 S.E.2d 695 (1999). Therefore, the State was authorized to proceed to trial on the accusation despite Pruitt’s objection. See McNair v. State, 240 Ga.App. 324(1), 523 S.E.2d 392 (1999).” Contrary to defendant’s argument, court wasn’t required to conduct a hearing “to determine the applicability of OCGA § 17-7-70.1.” Distinguishing Chadwick v. State , 236 Ga.App. 199, 202(3), 511 S.E.2d 286 (1999) “because it involved a felony not listed in OCGA § 17-7-70.1, for which an accusation could not be brought without the assent of accused.” Lynn v. State, 236 Ga.App. 600, 512 S.E.2d 695 (February 22, 1999). Defendant could be tried on accusation for felony shoplifting pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a). “On the date the accusation was filed, OCGA § 17-7-70.1(a) provided, inter alia, that in felony cases involving theft by shoplifting, in which defendants either have been bound over to the superior court or have expressly waived a commitment hearing, the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the defendant shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. On December 11, 1997, Lynn posted bond on the shoplifting and criminal trespass counts. In State v. Gilstrap, 230 Ga.App. 281, 282, 495 S.E.2d 885 (1998), this Court held that Gilstrap waived his right to a preliminary hearing by posting bond and, pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1, was not entitled to indictment by a grand jury on the offense of habitual violator. We find that Gilstrap, which involved an interpretation of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 prior to its amendment effective March 27, 1998, is persuasive. The state could have proceeded to trial on the accusation because Lynn had posted bond. Id. at 282-283, 495 S.E.2d 885. … Lynn also waived any right of indictment when she originally entered a plea of not guilty to all counts, without first having filed a written objection to proceeding under the accusation. Crowder v. State, 218 Ga.App. 630, 631(1), 462 S.E.2d 754 (1995).” N. UNIFORM TRAFFIC CITATIONS Switlick v. State, 295 Ga.App. 849, 673 S.E.2d 323 (February 9, 2009). Errors in completion of UTC – transposition of defendant’s middle and last names, failure to list a court date – did not invalidate prosecution proceeding on accusation prepared by solicitor. OCGA § 17-7-71 allows prosecution of traffic offenses in State Court on either UTC or on accusation prepared by the solicitor. Although defendant argues that the code section limits the ways in which the UTC can be amended, “even if the accusation did not serve as an amendment of the UTC, the State was allowed to proceed with the case solely on the accusation signed by the solicitor. Furthermore, as we held in a similar case involving a failure on the part of the officer to complete a portion of a UTC, ‘a defendant who was not misled to his prejudice by any imperfection in the indictment or accusation or citation cannot obtain reversal of his conviction on that ground.’ (Punctuation omitted.) King v. State, 176 Ga.App. 137, 139-140(2) (335 S.E.2d 439) (1985), overruled on other grounds, Copeland v. White, 178 Ga.App. 644 (344 S.E.2d 436) (1986).” No prejudice to defendant here – he clearly understood that the citation was issued to him, and he appeared on his court date even though not noted on his citation. Pruitt v. State, 289 Ga.App. 307, 656 S.E.2d 920 (January 25, 2008). Defendant waived error in code section citation on traffic ticket by failing to raise it before arraignment. “Pruitt complains that the charging instrument was defective because it cited OCGA § 40-6-181 (speeding) rather than OCGA § 40-6-391(DUI). ‘[Pruitt’s] objection to the improper code citation in the [charging instrument] was a special demurrer, and his failure to challenge [it] before entering his plea constitutes a waiver of his right to be tried on a perfect [charging instrument].’ Nye v. State, 279 Ga.App. 347, 349(1) (631 S.E.2d 386) (2006) (citation omitted).” Walker v. State, 280 Ga.App. 393, 634 S.E.2d 177 (July 11, 2006). “Walker contends that the trial court should have dismissed the accusation as defective because it was inconsistent with the uniform traffic citation. But a prosecuting attorney is not bound by the uniform traffic citation initially issued and may file an accusation on a different charge. Smith v. State, 239 Ga.App. 515, 516(2) (521 S.E.2d 450) (1999). The accusation ‘supersede[s] any uniform traffic citation as the charging instrument.’ Id. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the accusation on improper lane change. Id.” Taylor v. State, 265 Ga.App. 637, 595 S.E.2d 344 (February 17, 2004). UTC which charged defendant with “‘DUI… in Violation of Code Section 40-6-391 A-4’” and noted a breath test result of “.223” was sufficient to place defendant on notice that he could be convicted of less-safe DUI under (a)(1),(2), (3) or (4) or per se DUI under (a)(5). “Under Georgia law, ‘the description of the offense charged prevails over any Code section cited.’ (Punctuation omitted.) In re: B.C.G., 235 Ga.App. 1, 3 (508 S.E.2d 239) (1998). Here, the description of the offense was ‘DUI’ or driving under the influence.”