☢ test - Í

Based on Kevinezz v. State , 265 Ga. 78, 81 (454 S.E.2d 441) (1995). “See Clarington v. State, 178 Ga.App. 663, 667 (344 S.E.2d 485) (1986) (‘“After conviction, an indictment will be construed most strongly in favor of the State”’).” Fluellen v. State, 264 Ga.App. 19, 589 S.E.2d 847 (November 6, 2003). “The citation informed Fluellen that he was charged with violating OCGA § 40-6-391, and that he was ‘stopped for weaving and speeding, strong odor of alcohol on his person, [and] admitted to drinking 6 beers....’ The citation further provided that a DUI breath test was administered and the results showed an alcohol level of .175/.18 grams. That Fluellen was not charged with violating a specific subsection of OCGA § 40-6-391 does not render the citation vague; the citation put Fluellen on notice that he could be convicted under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(5) . ” Based on Shelton v. State, 216 Ga.App. 634, 455 S.E.2d 304 (1995). Cotton v. State, 263 Ga.App. 843, 589 S.E.2d 610 (October 30, 2003). UTCs could not be used to commence prosecutions in State Court for allowing livestock to run at large. “Trials in state court based on UTC's are authorized only for misdemeanor cases arising out of violations of certain traffic laws, OCGA § 17-7-71(b), and allowing livestock to run at large is not one of the violations authorized. Therefore, UTCs may not be used to prosecute these offenses. State v. Rustin, 208 Ga.App. 431, 435, 430 S.E.2d 765 (1993). As a consequence, the State court had no jurisdiction to try the offenses brought by UTC. See also Bush v. State, 273 Ga. 861, 862, 548 S.E.2d 302 (2001) (city court did not have jurisdiction over misdemeanor offense that was not traffic-related).” English v. State, 261 Ga.App. 157, 582 S.E.2d 136 (May 6, 2003). The exact location of a traffic offense [here, reckless driving] is not a material element of the offense, so long as it occurred within the jurisdiction. City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298, 578 S.E.2d 409 (March 10, 2003). Municipal court could properly use UTC to charge defendant with underage possession of alcohol under OCGA § 3-3-23.1(d). Overrules Shaver v. City of Peachtree City, 253 Ga.App. 212, 558 S.E.2d 409 (2001); casts doubt on State v. Rustin , 208 Ga.App. 431, 430 S.E.2d 765 (1993) (“a uniform traffic citation and complaint may serve as an accusation only for traffic offenses” in state and superior courts under OCGA § 17-7-71). Slinkard v. State, 259 Ga.App. 755, 577 S.E.2d 825 (February 3, 2003). Defendant was properly tried and convicted for both less-safe and per-se DUI on UTC charging him with violating “OCGA § 40-6-391(a)(1)—(5).” “A single statutory offense was charged on the face of the UTC, i.e., a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a); the various subsections under OCGA § 40-6-391(a) are not different ‘offenses’ in and of themselves, but different methods of proving a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391(a), which may be charged in one count.” In any event, “[i]f the indictment was void for any reason, the question should have been raised by demurrer before pleading to the merits, or by motion in arrest of judgment after conviction.” Accord, Rigdon v. State , 270 Ga.App. 217, 605 S.E.2d 903 (October 28, 2004) (citation charging defendant with “DUI” under “Code section 40-6-391” put defendant on notice of “less safe” charge; defendant conceded that reference to pending blood test put him on notice of potential “per se” charge). Note different result if two charges under two different subsections of 40-6-391, see Lockett (September 17, 2002), below. Jones v. State, 258 Ga.App. 337, 574 S.E.2d 398 (November 12, 2002). References to speeds on a speeding ticket are not “allegations,” nor essential averments, but mere references to evidence, and need not be proven at trial. Speeding can only be committed in one manner, “i.e., exceeding the designated speed limit.” Accord, Nye v. State , 279 Ga.App. 347, 631 S.E.2d 386 (April 19, 2006) (trial court did not err “by limiting the jury to finding only whether he exceeded the speed limit or not, and by making its own determination of how fast he was going for punishment purposes.”). Lockett v. State, 257 Ga.App. 412, 571 S.E.2d 192 (September 17, 2002). Defendant was tried in probate court on a single traffic citation that attempted to charge him with DUI under two different definitions - less safe (a)(1) and commercial driver (i). Trial court erred in not granting defendant’s special demurrer - a UTC may contain only one charge. However, error was not harmful because “the record shows that Lockett understood he was charged with [both offenses] and that he was prepared to defend against those charges.” Note different result if both charges under 40-6-391(a), see Slinkard (February 3, 2003), above. Walker v. State, 258 Ga.App. 354, 574 S.E.2d 317 (August 23, 2002). Charge of giving a false name to an officer cannot be made on a uniform traffic citation. (Trial held prior to HB1169 and its enactment of OCGA § 36-32-10.2). Beaman v. City of Peachtree City, 256 Ga.App. 62, 567 S.E.2d 715 (June 21, 2002). Cites OCGA § 36-32-10.2, signed into law on May 9, 2002: “‘Notwithstanding any other contrary provision of law, in municipal courts which have