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defendant’s Miranda rights were duly explained to the defendant and that the defendant understood such rights, an imperfect translation thereof will not foreclose a valid rights waiver. Tieu v. State, 257 Ga. 281, 284(2) (358 S.E.2d 247) (1987).” Accord, Duran v. State , 274 Ga.App. 886, 619 S.E.2d 388 (August 3, 2005). Fitz v. State, 275 Ga. 349, 566 S.E.2d 668 (July 15, 2002). Police officer conducted a custodial interview of Defendant, who was not fluent in English, in Spanish. Initially, defendant was told to remain silent until Miranda warnings were given. After defendant’s rights were read in Spanish, Defendant asked, “Can I talk now?” The officer first ascertained that defendant understood his rights, and then inquired whether defendant wanted to talk about the three murder victims. Defendant answered affirmatively and executed a written waiver in Spanish. The officer remarked that they wanted the truth and defendant stated: “Well, the real truth, ah, I have nothing to say to you. If you are going to take me to jail, take me, and best with my attorney. With him I can talk a little better.” To clarify defendant’s intent, the officer asked, “So then you don’t want to talk to us?” Defendant replied: “Well, I have nothing to say to you because simply I am the guilty one and that’s it.” The officer attempted further clarification and told defendant, “if you want an attorney, you tell me ... and we’ll end now. But if you want to talk to me, if you want to talk to us to see if we can come to the bottom of what happened, we can do that too. But the right that you have is an attorney.” Defendant replied, “the real truth, I’m going to tell you the real truth ... because I am going to talk.” Again the officer elicited defendant’s response that defendant wanted to talk “without an attorney,” and the interview proceeded until defendant admitted his participation in the three murders. Held, defendant’s response to being told that his response must be truthful was ambiguous and may have implicated the right to remain silent. Thus, the officer’s follow-up questions were directed at seeking clarification of defendant’s intentions and accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress on 5 th Amendment grounds. “‘If the request is equivocal, the police may ask questions designed to clarify whether the suspect intended to invoke his right to remain silent, but they may not simply continue the interrogation.’” Jaxo v. State, 272 Ga. 355, 528 S.E.2d 807 (May 1, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. “Appellant's native language is Spanish, but evidence showed that he demonstrated to the interviewing officers his ability to converse in and understand English.” Nhek v. State, 271 Ga. 245, 517 S.E.2d 521 (June 1, 1999). Evidence supported finding that defendant’s statement was voluntary: “the videotape of Nhek's custodial interview shows Nhek stating that although he had been born in Cambodia, he came to the United States as a very young child and has no trouble understanding or speaking English. The tape shows Nhek appropriately answering questions and verbally interacting with the officers in a normal manner, in English. During the interview, Nhek stated that he was in the ninth grade and made grades of C or sometimes B.” 42. VOLUNTARINESS – GENERALLY See also ATTORNEYS – RIGHT TO COUNSEL , above, and PROCEDURE – JACKSON-DENNO HEARING, below Rose v. State, 314 Ga.App. 79, 722 S.E.2d 898 (February 9, 2012). Convictions for child molestation and statutory rape affirmed; trial court properly found that defendant’s custodial statement was admissible. “Rose argues that his statements were not freely and voluntarily made because the investigator did not answer questions Rose asked about whether his statements would be used against him. … While the investigator did not directly respond to Rose's questions about whether statements Rose made to police would be used against him, the investigator was not required to do so. ‘[A]n interrogating officer has no duty (or authority) to advise a suspect of the consequences of a particular admission; nor does the officer have an obligation under Miranda v. Arizona ... to advise a suspect against custodial interrogation without a lawyer.’ (Citations omitted.) Williams v. State, 214 Ga.App. 423, 424 (447 S.E.2d 716) (1994). It is sufficient if the interrogating officer fully advises the suspect of the specific rights and options prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona [cit.] before questioning, allowing the suspect to select the options independently without ‘coercion, trickery or device of any kind.’ Williams, supra.” “‘A suspect's failure to appreciate incriminating elements in a statement has little bearing on the knowing, intelligent and voluntary nature of the suspect's waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney.’ (Citation omitted.) Williams, supra.” “‘The refusal to sign a waiver form does not constitute an invocation of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.’ (Citation omitted.) Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 76(3) (365 S.E.2d 111) (1988) (overruled on other grounds by Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 447–448(1) (405 S.E.2d 660) (1991)).” State v. Floyd, 306 Ga.App. 402, 702 S.E.2d 467 (October 13, 2010). In defendant’s rape prosecution, trial court properly granted motion to suppress custodial statement; trial court could find that defendant didn’t understand his Miranda rights. Video of interrogation supported trial court’s findings “that the officer ‘read the Miranda warnings in a cursory manner , resulting in [Floyd's] failure to understand those rights’; instead of ascertaining whether Floyd understood those