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rights, Tyus simply instructed Floyd to sign the waiver form; Floyd signed the form ‘as a consequence of being told to do so and not as an indication that he understood those rights and wished to waive them.’” “Compare State v. Hardy, 281 Ga.App. 365 (636 S.E.2d 36) (2006) (reversing grant of motion to suppress where investigator testified without challenge that during the Miranda process, defendant appeared to understand what was read to him).” Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554, 697 S.E.2d 811 (July 12, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, hijacking a motor vehicle, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to detectives. “At one point during the interview, one of the detectives confirmed Heard's belief in God and knowledge of the Ten Commandments, called murder a mortal sin to be answered for, and implied the need to confess while he has the chance. Heard argues that these statements constituted coercive interrogation tactics which induced his confession by ‘the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury’ in violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. However, ‘[t]he fact that a confession has been made under a spiritual exhortation ... or a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it.’ OCGA § 24-3-51. See also State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758 (632 S.E.2d 654) (2006); Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591, 592(3) (1876).” Flournoy v. State, 299 Ga.App. 377, 682 S.E.2d 632 (July 9, 2009). Trial court properly admitted recording of statement defendant made to victim, secretly recorded by victim after consulting with police. “The evidence showed that in 2007, the victim purchased a digital recorder, concealed it on her person and confronted Flournoy about the incidents in this case. The conversation occurred in the yard at her aunt's house. The victim testified that Flournoy spoke to her willingly, that she did not promise him anything to make the statement, and she did not threaten him into making it. … The trial court concluded, considering the totality of the circumstances, that Flournoy's statement was voluntary and thus admissible. Because evidence in the record supported the trial court's conclusion, we affirm. Hall v. State, 176 Ga.App. 428, 429(1) (336 S.E.2d 291) (1985) (‘Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court's findings as to factual determinations and credibility relating to admissibility will be upheld on appeal. [Cits.]’).” Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). “ It has long been the law in this State that the rule as to the admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that applied to a confession. Turner v. State, 203 Ga. 770, 771(3) (48 S.E.2d 522) (1948). See also Fuller v. State, 109 Ga. 809, 811-812(1) (35 SE298) (1900); Fletcher v. State, 90 Ga. 468, 469(1) (17 SE 100) (1892). To the extent that Carruthers v. State, 272 Ga. 306, 313(5) (528 S.E.2d 217) (2000); Hill v. State, 279 Ga.App. 402, 405(3)(a), fn. 4 (631 S.E.2d 446) (2006); Pasuer v. State, 271 Ga.App. 259, 261(1) (609 S.E.2d 193) (2005); and Jewett v. State, 264 Ga.App. 571, 572(1) (591 S.E.2d 459) (2003) hold otherwise, they are overruled.” Spence v. State, 281 Ga. 697, 642 S.E.2d 856 (April 10, 2007). Trial court erred by failing to suppress defendant’s statement, made after officer promised it would be “confidential.” Based on Hopkins v. Cockrell , 325 F.3d 579 (5 th Cir., 2003) (similar facts, similar holding); Foster v. State , 258 Ga. 736, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988). “In Foster, the defendant made a confession ‘after he was told repeatedly that it was not going to hurt “a thing,” and that it would be “as much for your benefit as ours.”’ Foster , 258 Ga. at 742. We held that ‘[a]n accused must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him in court. Telling him that a confession is not going to hurt and, on the contrary, will benefit him as much as the police, is not consistent with the warnings required by Miranda.’ Id . (citation omitted). We find that the present case is controlled by the rationale of the foregoing cases.” Carley dissents on this point. But see OCGA § 24-3-51 (“The fact that a confession has been made under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy , or a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it”). Distinguished, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008) (applies OCGA § 24-3-51, quoted above; defendant’s statement made before he was a suspect, officer promised not to reveal defendant’s identity or statement to other suspect, statement not inadmissible on this basis). Givens v. State, 281 Ga.App. 370, 636 S.E.2d 94 (August 30, 2006). “It is well-settled that ‘a defendant who objects to the admissibility of a custodial statement, but receives an unfavorable ruling at a Jackson-Denno hearing, need not renew the objection at trial to preserve it for appellate review.’ Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 480, 482 (606 S.E.2d 671) (2004). However, ‘ affirmatively stating there is no objection in effect concedes the point.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Dyer v. State, 233 Ga.App. 770, 771 (505 S.E.2d 71) (1998).” Defense counsel having made such an affirmative statement, “this enumeration presents no basis for reversal.” Ward v. State, 279 Ga. 581, 619 S.E.2d 638 (September 19, 2005). Trial court did not err in finding defendant’s statement to be voluntary. “Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the statement was not rendered inadmissible simply because (1) Agent Parker instructed officers at the jail not to allow defendant to have any visitors or make any phone calls; [footnote: Agent Parker put this instruction into effect for a short time because he was concerned that Defendant would try to get