☢ test - Í

someone to destroy physical evidence which the GBI was trying to collect.] (2) the statement was not recorded it in its entirety; [fn: It is standard GBI practice not to tape-record a custodial statement until the interviewee is comfortable and willing to talk on tape. ] or (3) Agent Parker stopped the recording and brought [co-defendant] into the interview room to determine if defendant was the person [co-defendant] claimed to be with at McDonald’s on the night in question.” Elliott v. State, 275 Ga.App. 359, 620 S.E.2d 584 (September 1, 2005). Defendant moved for mistrial, alleging that prosecutor improperly informed jury of court’s ruling that defendant’s custodial statement was voluntary. “Elliott cites Dean v. State, 168 Ga.App. 172, 174(3) (308 S.E.2d 434) (1983), in which we held that the trial court erred by telling the jury that a police officer ‘did comply with the constitution and the statute’ in obtaining the defendant’s statement. Id. Because the voluntariness of a statement is ultimately a question of fact for the jury, we concluded that the court had improperly commented on the evidence in violation of OCGA § 17-8-55. Id. at 176. Dean does not apply here because the prosecutor, not the court, made the comments to which Elliott objects. Moreover, the prosecutor did not disclose the court’s Jackson-Denno findings to the jury; she merely commented that she did not believe there was any evidence of threats, harassment, or intimidation.” Awolusi v. State, 273 Ga.App. 332, 615 S.E.2d 177 (May 20, 2005). “No indication exists in [OCGA § 24-3-50] that it applies only to confessions made to State actors or agents. The statute therefore applies to private actors as well as to government entities and officers. Griffin v. State, 230 Ga.App. 318, 320 (496 S.E.2d 480) (1998). ‘[E]ven when made to a witness who is not a [S]tate agent, as in this case, a confession must be voluntary to be admissible for any purpose under OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cits.]’ Id.” Statements here made to store personnel during theft investigation. Note, private actors are not required to read Miranda warnings. Accord, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008) (non-custodial statements to police must still be voluntary). Pasuer v. State, 271 Ga.App. 259, 609 S.E.2d 193 (January 7, 2005), OVERRULED on this point , see Vergara (February 25, 2008), above . “OCGA § 24-3-50 does not apply to Pasuer’s custodial statement in this case. Although the statement was an incriminating admission regarding his general, drug-related activities, Pasuer did not admit to selling cocaine to the informants on July 11, 2000, nor did he refer to the transaction or the informants in any way. Therefore, Pasuer’s statement was not a confession to the crimes for which he was charged. See Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 270(1) (39 S.E.2d 478) (1946) (‘A confession is an admission freely and voluntarily made by the accused whereby he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act, and the share and participation he had in it.’) (citation omitted). The safeguards of OCGA § 24-3-50 do not apply to incriminating statements which fall short of confessions. Jewett v. State, 264 Ga.App. 571, 572(1) (591 S.E.2d 459) (2003).” Jewett also overruled by Vergara, above, on this point. Garlington v. State, 268 Ga.App. 264, 601 S.E.2d 793 (July 1, 2004). “ Miranda's primary concern is whether there was a knowing and voluntary statement made after someone is informed of their rights. ‘Once Miranda warnings are given and a person in custody gives a statement to police without invoking his right to remain silent and without requesting an attorney, he has in effect waived his rights.’ Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424(3) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001), quoting Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75, 76(3) (365 S.E.2d 111) (1988) ( the defendant’s refusal to sign a waiver of rights form before speaking to police did not render his statement involuntary and inadmissible ) (overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 263 Ga. 224, 226(4) (430 S.E.2d 579) (1993)). The fact that the officers did not ask the suspects if they still wanted to talk to the police after the suspects indicated that they understood their rights does not render their statements involuntary. The trial court was authorized to believe Officer Langley and Investigator Plock’s testimony that both defendants were advised of their rights, that they stated that they understood their rights, and that their statements were not coerced or obtained upon the promise of reward. [Cit.]” Accord, Rose (February 9, 2012), above. Livingston v. State, 267 Ga.App. 875, 600 S.E.2d 817 (June 15, 2004). “At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made a preliminary finding that Livingston’s statement was voluntary, without explanation, but the court made no specific findings that, after being advised of Miranda rights, Livingston understood them and knowingly and voluntarily waived them prior to giving the statement. Where there is evidence which could authorize the exclusion of the statement on these grounds, and the trial court fails to make specific findings on the issue, a remand is necessary for the trial court to enter findings on this issue. Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101, 104 (326 S.E.2d 748) (1985).” Richardson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 880, 595 S.E.2d 678 (February 27, 2004). Armed robbery conviction affirmed. “[T]he trial court did not err in failing to hold a Jackson-Denno hearing regarding the rebuttal evidence. A trial court need not conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing before admitting a custodial statement for purposes of impeachment. ‘What is