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required is that the court make a determination as to the voluntariness of the statement,’” quoting Robles v. State , 277 Ga. 415, 589 S.E.2d 566 (November 26, 2003). Dukes v. State, 264 Ga.App. 820, 592 S.E.2d 473 (December 17, 2003). “‘It is well settled that where there is no challenge to the voluntariness of a statement the court is under no duty to sua sponte call for a separate hearing.’ Wilson v. State , 254 Ga. 679, 681(2) (333 S.E.2d 589) (1985).” Thomas v. State, 264 Ga.App. 389, 590 S.E.2d 778 (November 26, 2003). Quoting Sims v. Georgia , 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967): “ Although the judge need not make formal findings of fact or write an opinion, his conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” Trial judge made such a record, via comments in open court at the conclusion of the Jackson-Denno hearing. Court’s comment that the “jury… will decide the issue of voluntariness” is incorrect as a matter of law – the court decides voluntariness as a part of its ruling on admissibility, while the jury decides what weight and credit to give the statement if admitted. “Despite the fact that the trial court stated that the jury would decide the issue of voluntariness, in the absence of a contention on the part of Thomas that his statement was not in fact voluntary, the trial court’s offer to receive evidence on this matter, and its ruling that the statement was admissible when no such evidence was forthcoming, amounts ‘with unmistakable clarity’ to a showing that he had concluded the confession was voluntary.” McClendon v. State, 264 Ga.App. 174, 590 S.E.2d 189 (November 14, 2003). Police officer suspected of certain offenses invited his police chief (to whom he was related by marriage) to his home to explain his actions. Chief did not interrogate or go there to make an arrest, and no charges were pending. Trial court’s ruling that the statement was voluntary and non- custodial “was not clearly erroneous.” Ruffin v. State, 263 Ga.App. 618, 588 S.E.2d 802 (October 14, 2003). “‘In ruling that the in-custody statement given by the accused was admissible, the trial court must upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was freely and voluntarily given,’ … Although the State had the burden to prove the statement was voluntary, ‘there is no absolute requirement that all law enforcement officers present when in- custody statements are made must be called by the state during a Jackson-Denno hearing.’ Connerly v. State , 207 Ga.App. 498, 499, 588 S.E.2d 802 (1993).” State v. Pinkerton, 262 Ga.App. 858, 586 S.E.2d 743 (August 22, 2003). Pro se defendant’s statements to prosecutor during plea negotiations were not admissible because trial court failed to adequately advise defendant of his right to counsel. Court advised defendant of right to counsel and to appointed counsel. “[T]he court must do more than simply inform defendant of his right to counsel; the court must give the defendant sufficient information and guidance for him to make a voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision about whether to proceed pro se. The accused should understand, for example, the nature of the charges against him, any statutory lesser included offenses, the range of possible punishments for the charges, possible defenses, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts necessary for a broad understanding of the matter. Otherwise there is no valid waiver.” Based on Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Para. 14; makes no reference to U.S. Const., Amend. 6. Comment: although Pinkerton speaks in terms of right to counsel at arraignment, real issue addressed is not entering a plea without counsel, but making incriminating statements to prosecutor. Generally, nothing more than Miranda warnings is required under Sixth Amendment when defendant is questioned by state’s attorney post-indictment – see Patterson v. Illinois , 487 U.S. 285, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (Type of “rigorous” waiver warning called for in Pinkerton is only required at trial. “Because the role of counsel at questioning is relatively simple and limited, we see no problem in having a waiver procedure at that stage which is likewise simple and limited. So long as the accused is made aware of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’ during post-indictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is ‘knowing and intelligent.’”). Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450 (January 13, 2003). Custodial statements of adult defendant were not “rendered involuntary and inadmissible because the interrogating officer failed to comply with his request to speak with his mother.” Accord, Brannon v. State , 268 Ga.App. 847, 602 S.E.2d 865 (July 30, 2004). Campbell v. State, 255 Ga.App. 502, 565 S.E.2d 834 (May 22, 2002). Defendant sat alone in the back of a patrol car and talked to himself, making incriminatory statements while he watched officers find marijuana as they searched his car. He didn’t know there was a microphone in the car recording his statements. “[Defendant]’s numerous obscene comments,