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Finley showed no indication that he interpreted the detective’s statement as an offer of reduced punishment. He continued to ask the detective for a ‘deal’ even after the statement was made, and those requests included questions about whether there was ‘any way of out of this,’ if there was ‘anything [he] could do’ to reduce the charges, if his sentence would change if he pled guilty, and if he could ‘set people up.’ The detective repeatedly told Finley that he could not make a deal with him and that he did not know what effect a guilty plea would have, and a second detective told Finley that only a jury could set him free.” State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015). In murder prosecution, trial court properly suppressed defendant’s non-custodial statements as being obtained by hope of benefit in violation of OCGA § 24-8- 824. FBI agent Jackson twice got Chulpayev to give him statements by promising that he would “keep the murder warrant off” if Chulpayev made truthful statements, and that “as much as you do for me, … I will make sure nothing happens to you … I got you. Just come and do what I’m asking you to do.” At the second statement, the local detective didn’t read Miranda or tell defendant he was suspected as a party to the murder; rather, assured defendant he was “not in any trouble whatsoever,” and affirmed Agent Jackson’s role in the investigation. Chulpayev then gave the detective the same incriminating information he had previously given Jackson – namely, that as the owner of the rental car the victim was driving, Chulpayev could and did access its GPS tracker and gave the information to White, who was suspected of shooting the victim. “[T]he record supports the conclusion that Chulpayev's statements during the first two interviews were induced by promises related to the potential criminal charges he faced, and the trial court did not err in suppressing those statements pursuant to OCGA § 24–8–824. See Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484, 487–488, 660 S.E.2d 521 (2008) (holding that a promise not to press additional charges against a defendant was an impermissible hope of benefit rendering his subsequent confession inadmissible).” Eason v. State, 331 Ga.App. 59, 769 S.E.2d 772 (March 10, 2015). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; defendant’s custodial statement wasn’t tainted by impermissible hope of benefit despite defendant’s statement to detective, “I need your help.” “Detective Thorp testified at the Jackson–Denno hearing that he responded to this statement by explaining that he was not in a position to offer him any sort of deal, and that all he wanted was for Eason to tell him the truth. He also told Eason that whether he cooperated or not, he would pass along whatever information he obtained from Eason during the interview to the district attorney's office or the trial court. … Clearly, an investigator does not make an offer of hope of benefit simply by telling a defendant that he will make the prosecutor aware of his or her cooperation. Edwards [ v. State, 312 Ga.App. 141, 146(3), 717 S.E.2d 722 (2011)]. And the fact that Eason may have hoped the police would offer him something more if he confessed did not render the statement inadmissible. Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 553, 559(1), 300 S.E.2d 301 (1983) (where the hope or fear is the product of defendant's own mind, rather than the result of inducement by others, the statement is admissible).” Browner v. State, 296 Ga. 138, 765 S.E.2d 348 (November 3, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement despite defendant’s claim that offering him “water and a cigarette after the first interview began, but not during the time he spent waiting for the interview to begin, demonstrates an improper benefit was offered that renders his statement involuntary and inadmissible. Appellant points to no evidence that he asked for, but was denied, water or any other comfort accommodations while he was waiting for the interview to begin. Providing them during the in-custody interview does not rise to the level of a hope of benefit that will prevent a confession from being admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24–3–50.” Edison v. State, 327 Ga.App. 366, 759 S.E.2d 247 (May 29, 2014). DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress “concerning a drug recognition examination because the arresting officer offered her a ‘hope of benefit,’ in violation of former OCGA § 24–3–50, by telling her that she would not be taken to jail if she submitted to the examination.” 1. Drug recognition examination results aren’t testimonial or communicative in nature; OCGA § 24- 3-50 thus doesn’t apply to them. 2. Even if defendant had challenged a statement, officer’s offer not to take defendant to jail wasn’t a “hope of benefit.” “[T]he evidence plainly shows that the officer made no offer relating to the charges facing Edison, and certainly did not offer a reduced criminal punishment. On the contrary, the officer clearly explained that Edison's consent to the drug recognition examination would not affect the fact that she had been arrested and charged with DUI. Rather, the officer merely told Edison that she would be taken home after the examination. … [S]uch a promise to take a defendant home does not implicate the provisions of OCGA § 24–3–50. See Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 869(2)(b), 725 S.E.2d 320 (2012) (promise regarding release after questioning has been held to constitute only a collateral benefit that does not mandate exclusion of the evidence); In re: D.T., 294 Ga.App. 486, 488–489(2), 669 S.E.2d 471 (2008) (officer's promise to suspect that he would drive him home once he gave a statement was only a collateral benefit that did not implicate OCGA § 24–3–50); Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 140(3), 603 S.E.2d 445