☢ test - Í

(2004) (OCGA § 24–3–50 did not require exclusion where officer said he would ‘see about getting [defendant] home’).” Futch v. State, 326 Ga.App. 394, 756 S.E.2d 629 (March 20, 2014). Physical precedent only. Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. No improper hope of benefit where “[GBI] Agent Shoudel told Futch repeatedly during the interview that he was there to help Futch … . Agent Shoudel testified that he was merely offering to help Futch get the guilt off of his chest.” State v. Robinson, 326 Ga.App. 63, 755 S.E.2d 869 (March 7, 2014). In armed robbery prosecution, trial court properly suppressed part of defendant’s custodial statement. “As the trial court found, this is not a case where Robinson was merely encouraged to ‘help himself’ by telling the truth. Rather, the officer told Robinson that ‘[t]he person that cooperates is the person that gets help.’ At the time the officer made this statement, Robinson had been arrested with at least two accomplices, and the video shows that Robinson was aware that these individuals were in custody and at the police station. Thus, viewing the officer's statement under the totality of the circumstances, as the trial court was obligated to do, that statement does appear to offer Robinson some hope of benefit—i.e., it indicates that if Robinson cooperated truthfully with police, he would get a lighter sentence than his accomplices. See Askea v. State, 153 Ga.App. 849, 851(3), 267 S.E.2d 279 (1980) (‘the interrogating officer's remark that “it (i.e., telling the truth) would probably help [the defendant] in court” holds out at least some hope for reward by special consideration if the suspect cooperates’); Robinson v. State, 229 Ga. 14, 14–15(1), 189 S.E.2d 53 (1972).” Distinguished, State v. Jackson , 332 Ga.App. 356, 772 S.E.2d 804 (May 14, 2015) (no hope of benefit in exhortation to tell the truth, outside Robinson’s context of implied lighter sentence for first co-defendant to talk) ( Jackson overruled on other grounds, State v. Andrade , 335 Ga.App. 464, 782 S.E.2d 665 (February 8, 2016)). State v. Munoz, 324 Ga.App. 386, 749 S.E.2d 48 (October 2, 2013). Physical precedent only on this point. Interlocutory appeal in rape prosecution; trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s statement to police. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, statement was neither product of threats or hope of benefit. Trial court found “that the statement was induced by ‘a threat that if [Munoz] denied having sexual intercourse with [P.G.] he would be charged with forcible rape, and a promise that if he admitted to having sexual intercourse with ... her he would not be charged with forcible rape, that he would not be thrown in jail[,] and that he would not have to register as a sex offender.’” No improper hope of benefit here: “Accepting the inferences drawn by the trial court that the detective promised Munoz ‘that he would not be charged with forcible rape, that he would not be thrown in jail and that he would not have to register as a sex offender’ if he confessed to having sex with P.G., the recorded interview shows unequivocally that Munoz's statement, nevertheless, was not actually induced by any such belief. Indeed, immediately before his admission, Munoz expressly acknowledged that his statement would result in him being sent to ‘jail for a long time [and being] registered as a rapist,’ and the detective conceded, ‘[i]f it gets to that, yes.’ And immediately after the confession, the detective informed Munoz that she could make no promises with regard to the outcome of the case, and Munoz responded ‘I know’ before expressing that he knew ‘something [was] gonna happen.’ Thus, even if the statements made by the detective ‘constitute[d] an improper hope of benefit, they nevertheless, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, did not actually induce [Munoz's] confession.’ Pulley [ v. State, 291 Ga. 330, 333(2) (729 S.E.2d 338) (2012)] (punctuation omitted) (holding improper hope of benefit by police chief did not induce defendant's confession when defendant admitted immediately prior to making the statement that he ‘did not care’ if the interrogators were going to help him or not and ‘he was going to tell them what happened anyway’); see [ State v. Brown, 308 Ga.App. 480, 486(2) (708 S.E.2d 63) (2011)] (holding that investigator's promise that defendant would be going home regardless of what he said during the interview did not render his subsequent confession inadmissible in part because, under the totality of the circumstances, it was apparent that defendant knew and understood that not to be true). It follows, then, that the trial court erred in suppressing Munoz's statement.” Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 748 S.E.2d 390 (September 9, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted custodial statement. “We agree with the trial court that the officers' statements during the course of the interview that Dennis could help himself by clearing his conscience, could ‘do something big’ by being honest, and should think how he could get back on his career path were statements encouraging him to tell the truth and not promises of a hope of benefit. Furthermore, when Dennis asked the officers about the charge or sentence he was facing, they said they did not know, told him that they could not say, or made no direct response.” Wilson v. State, 293 Ga. 508, 748 S.E.2d 385 (September 9, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s statement to police was properly admitted. No hope of benefit “when, in response to Wilson's plea at the outset of the interview to ‘help me out,’ the detective stated: ‘All right. What I've got to do before I can talk to you is read