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you your rights, OK?’” Miller v. State, 323 Ga.App. 412, 744 S.E.2d 926 (July 3, 2013). Conviction for attempted theft by receiving affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his statement wasn’t prompted by hope of benefit based on “comments made by the interrogating officer that he would ask the prosecuting attorney about various plea bargain possibilities concerning the charges and punishments imposed, including, at Miller's request, possible dismissal of the charges in exchange for Miller closing his pawn shop.” “As this court has held, ‘a hope of benefit may be dispelled by a statement that an officer has no influence over an accused's possible punishment.’ State v. Brown, 308 Ga.App. 480, 484(1), 708 S.E.2d 63 (2011) (citations omitted).” Recording here showed that officer gave such a warning. Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013). Capital murder conviction and death sentence affirmed; statement to police wasn’t procured by hope of benefit based on “the suggestion that Edenfield might help [his adult son] George get mental health treatment by giving a truthful account of what George had done[;] that suggestion did not relate in any way to any charges against Edenfield himself, and it, therefore, is not one from which a ‘hope of benefit’ might have arisen.” Pulley v. State, 291 Ga. 330, 729 S.E.2d 338 (July 2, 2012). Murder and related theft convictions affirmed; 1. custodial statement wasn’t the product of “hope of benefit” despite improper promises made by Mississippi police chief. “‘[T]he fact “that a law enforcement officer promises something to a person suspected of a crime in exchange for the person's speaking about the crime does not automatically render inadmissible any statement obtained as a result of that promise.” ... [T]he key inquiry is whether the alleged promise actually induced the statement that [Appellant] seeks to suppress. [Cit.]’ United States v. Prince, 157 F.Supp.2d 316, 328–329(II)(B)(3) (D.Del., 2001). ‘[A] promise alone is not sufficient to render a confession involuntary. There must also be a causal connection between the police conduct and the confession.’ Blake v. State, 972 S2d 839, 844(II)(A) (Fla., 2007). As the record shows, after the statements above were made by the Water Valley [Mississippi] police chief, the Gwinnett County detective specifically informed Appellant that he was not there to give him any deals, that he could make no promises with regard to his sentence, and that the district attorney who would be in charge of the case is in Georgia, not Mississippi. Thus, the Gwinnett County detective immediately let Appellant know that any promises made by the Water Valley police chief were not valid. Moreover, Appellant did not make his inculpatory statements until a significant time after the police chief made his assertions that he could help him get a shorter sentence, and during this time, the Gwinnett County detective repeatedly informed Appellant that they could make no promises to him. In fact, before Appellant made any inculpatory statements, he specifically told his interviewers that he did not care if they were going to help him or not, he was going to tell them what happened anyway. This statement by Appellant not only shows that he did not rely on any inducements of a lighter sentence but also reveals that he believed that such promises by the Water Valley police chief were not truthful and were simply a tactic by the police to get him to talk, a belief that Appellant admitted to having during his testimony at trial. Therefore, although the statements made by the police chief may constitute an improper hope of benefit, ‘they, nevertheless, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, did not actually induce [Appellant's] confession. [Cits.]’ (Emphasis in original.) State v. Brown, 308 Ga.App. 480, 486(2), 708 S.E.2d 63 (2011).” Accord, Munoz (October 2, 2013), above. 2. Offer to “talk to some folks” to try to get defendant sent to a prison near his family wasn’t “hope of benefit.” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 865, 725 S.E.2d 320 (April 24, 2012). Affirming 308 Ga.App. 480, 708 S.E.2d 63 (2011); in defendant’s prosecution for aggravated child molestation and related offenses, trial court erred in holding that defendant’s statement to police was the product of hope of benefit. Officers stressed to defendant that he wasn’t under arrest, which defendant acknowledged. “A few minutes into the interview, Appellant asked the officers what the consequences would be if he did touch the child as alleged. One officer replied, ‘I'm not gonna sit here and tell you what a judge is going to do.... I can't tell you what the penalties are because I'm not the judge. And I'm not even going to go out on that limb.’ The other officer then said, ‘I mean, we can't sit here and promise you anything or tell you anything.... What I can tell you is that when you leave here, no matter what you tell me or say, you're going home.’” After defendant confessed, however, officers arrested defendant without letting him go home as promised. “A promise not relating to charges or sentences, including a promise regarding release after questioning, has been held to constitute only a ‘collateral benefit,’ as that phrase is used in § 24–3–51, and even if it induces a confession, it does not require the automatic exclusion of that evidence. See In re: D.T., 294 Ga.App. 486, 489 (669 S.E.2d 471) (2008) (holding that an officer's promise to a juvenile suspect that he would ‘drive [him] home’ once he gave a statement, ‘even if this could be construed as the promise of a benefit for D.T.'s confession, was only a collateral benefit that would not implicate the provisions of