☢ test - Í

OCGA § 24–3–50’); Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 140 (603 S.E.2d 445) (2004) (holding that § 24–3–50 did not require exclusion where the defendant told an officer that he just wanted to go home, and the officer replied, ‘let's straighten this out and we'll see about getting you home,’ because the officer did not offer the hope of lighter or no charges or a shorter sentence in return for the defendant's confession).” Disapproves Richardson v. State , 265 Ga.App. 711 (595 S.E.2d 565) (2004) “to the extent Richardson could be read to hold that § 24–3–50 requires suppression of a confession whenever an officer tells a suspect that a decision on whether to arrest and charge him will depend on what he tells the officer.” Here , “[t]he officers never said or implied to Appellant that if he confessed what he had done to the child, no criminal charges would ever be filed against him, nor did they promise him reduced punishment. To the contrary, there were several references to potential criminal sanctions, and Appellant acknowledged that there should be criminal consequences if he had in fact molested the child. Moreover, when Appellant asked what would happen to him if the allegation against him was true, one officer responded, ‘I can't tell you what the penalties are because I'm not the judge,’ and the other officer added, ‘we can't sit here and promise you anything or tell you anything.’” In “a cautionary note” not joined by a majority of the court, Nahmias comments that “a police officer's promise to let a suspect leave after questioning … could be one of the totality of circumstances that renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible as a violation of constitutional due process. See Watkins v. State, 289 Ga. 359, 363 (711 S.E.2d 655) (2011). In this case, however, the totality of circumstances does not suggest a constitutionally involuntary confession, and Appellant has not raised any constitutional challenge, relying solely on the Georgia statute.” Accord, In re: D.T. (November 10, 2008), below; Duncan v. State , 315 Ga.App. 67, 726 S.E.2d 558 (March 22, 2012) (“promises of being allowed to go free or go home are not prohibited”); Edenfield v. State , 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013) (defendant couldn’t reasonably have understood the promise that “he could go home and care for his elderly mother” if he told the truth to be a promise that he wouldn’t be charged with crimes he admitted); Sparrow v. State , 324 Ga.App. 163, 748 S.E.2d 518 (October 8, 2013); Woodall v. State , 294 Ga. 624, 754 S.E.2d 335 (January 27, 2014); Edison (May 29, 2014), above (promise not to take DUI defendant to jail, without dropping charges, if she performed drug recognition examination, wasn’t hope of benefit); State v. Jackson , 332 Ga.App. 356, 772 S.E.2d 804 (May 14, 2015) (“[E]ven if the officer's statement that ‘the only way out of here is to be honest’ could be construed as a promise that if Jackson were honest he would be released, ‘such statement[ ] in context did not constitute a hope of benefit because no one promised [Jackson] that he would not be charged with a crime or that he would receive reduced charges, sentencing or punishment if he made incriminating statements,’ quotiong Woodall .) ( Jackson overruled on other grounds, State v. Andrade , 335 Ga.App. 464, 782 S.E.2d 665 (February 8, 2016)). Soilberry v. State, 289 Ga. 770, 716 S.E.2d 162 (October 3, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; custodial statement was properly admitted despite defendant’s contention “that he was tricked into confessing because the interviewing officers downplayed the gravity of the interview by telling him that ‘he was not under arrest’ and that there was no need to ‘freak out.’ Even if these statements were intended to deceive, as Soilberry contends, they have ‘no bearing on the voluntariness of [Soilberry’s] statement in the absence of any evidence that the investigative technique was designed to procure a false statement. See Harris v. State , 274 Ga. 422 (3), 554 S.E.2d 458 (2001) (overstatement by the investigators as to how much inculpatory evidence they presently possessed does not affect the admissibility of statement). Moreover, [the officer’s statements] offered no hope of benefit because it offered no potential future outcome.’ Daniel v. State , 285 Ga. 406, 410 (5), 677 S.E.2d 120 (2009).” Millsaps v. State, 310 Ga.App. 769, 714 S.E.2d 661 (July 13, 2011). Convictions for enticing a child and related offenses affirmed; custodial statement was properly admitted, not a product of “hope of benefit.” Defendant contends he talked based on officers’ promise not to tell his wife of his arrest. “‘[T]he phrase “hope of benefit” generally means the reward of a lighter sentence. Thus, confessions made under a promise of collateral benefit are not for that reason excludable.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Robbins v. State, 290 Ga.App. 323, 328(3) (659 S.E.2d 628) (2008) (concluding that the defendant's “wife's promise not to divorce her husband, which did not bear on the question of punishment, was a promise of collateral benefit” and therefore was not an offer or hope of benefit). Protecting Millsaps's relationship with his wife was a collateral benefit. ” Clark v. State, 309 Ga.App. 749, 711 S.E.2d 339 (June 2, 2011). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; no improper hope of benefit accompanied defendant’s statement where officer offered to get him counseling if he told the truth. “Here, the evidence presented at the Jackson–Denno hearing was certainly sufficient for the trial court to have concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer did not make a promise or offer of a special benefit or a lighter sentence in exchange for his testimony, but rather only an offer for help addressing his psychological issues. Compare Askea v. State, 153 Ga.App. 849, 851(3) (267 S.E.2d 279) (1980) (‘interrogating officer's remark that “it (i.e., telling the truth) would probably help him in court” holds out at least some hope for reward by special