☢ test - Í

Mangrum v. State, 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Officers’ “‘[e]xhortations to tell the truth are not a hope of benefit that renders a confession inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cit.]’ Foster v. State, [283 Ga. 484, 487(2) (660 S.E.2d 521) (2008)]. Moreover, ‘a statement by police that makes the defendant “aware of potential legal consequences” is “in the nature of a mere truism” that does not constitute a ... promise of benefit within the meaning of this Code section. [Cit.]’ Smith v. State, 291 Ga.App. 535, 537 (662 S.E.2d 305) (2008).” Accord, Cantrell v. State , 299 Ga.App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (August 18, 2009) (officer’s statement that he would charge defendant with a particular crime based on co-defendants’ statements was a mere truism); Munoz (October 2, 2013), above; Burden v. State , 332 Ga.App. 811, 775 S.E.2d 183 (July 7, 2015) (“while the detective interviewing Burden told him that he might garner sympathy by being honest and forthcoming, the officer did not promise a lighter sentence or reduced charges.”). Overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406, 677 S.E.2d 120 (May 18, 2009). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Defendant’s Mirandized statement was not made under hope of benefit because defendant “was told by investigators that he was not a suspect.” “The investigators' alleged deception regarding whether they had articulated a belief as to Marcus [Daniel’s] participation in the crimes, or indeed had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, has no bearing on the voluntariness of his statement in the absence of any evidence that the investigative technique was designed to procure a false statement. See Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422(3) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001) (overstatement by the investigators as to how much inculpatory evidence they presently possessed does not affect the admissibility of statement). Moreover, we agree with the trial court's determination that the description of Marcus as ‘not a suspect’ offered no hope of benefit because it offered no potential future outcome. Compare Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484(2) (660 S.E.2d 521) (2008) (promise not to press charges related to weapon provided hope of receiving no punishment related to possession of weapon); Richardson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 711, 712(1) (595 S.E.2d 565) (2004) (suggestion that defendant would not be charged based on ‘how the interview went’ constituted forbidden false hope of benefit).” Accord, Soilberry (October 3, 2011), above. Henry v. State, 295 Ga.App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (January 28, 2009). Defendant’s statement was not procured by hope of benefit through deceit practiced by detective. Officer told defendant he was being interviewed to determine if he raped 12- year old victim and was the father of victim’s child. Defendant agreed to make statement and to give blood sample, which showed that he was the father. Defendant was charged with statutory rape. Defendant complains that officer didn’t tell him he could be accused of statutory rape even if sex was consensual. Distinguishing State v. Ritter , 268 Ga. 108, 486 S.E.2d 492 (1997) (“the employment of deceit may render a statement inadmissible where the particular deception used, by constituting a slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury under OCGA § 24-3-50, has induced a party to confess”). “[T]he trial court was authorized to find that no promise, express or implied, was made to Henry that he would face a rape charge only if the investigation revealed he had committed forcible rape. … Thus, the fact that Henry may have been ignorant of the statutory rape proscription did not, in and of itself, afford him any basis to claim that the police impermissibly tricked him into incriminating himself.” Also irrelevant that victim may have lied about her age to defendant, as “the principles underlying Ritter address ‘the behavior of the interrogator. ’ Ritter, supra at 110 (emphasis supplied).” State v. Lee, 295 Ga.App. 49, 670 S.E.2d 879 (December 2, 2008). Trial court erred in suppressing statements of defendant “made prior to the time when the detective promised Lee that he was not being charged with an offense that would require sex offender registration. [fn: the State does not contest that the statements made by Lee after the detective’s erroneous promise were inadmissible. ] … Notably, any hope of benefit given by the police to a defendant after the defendant has already confessed cannot be said to have induced the confession and thus does not affect its voluntary nature. See Getkate v. State, 269 Ga.App. 558, 560 (604 S.E.2d 611) (2004); Chandler v. State, 261 Ga.App. 639, 640(1) (583 S.E.2d 494) (2003).” Accord, Cantrell v. State , 299 Ga.App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (August 18, 2009). Overton v. State, 295 Ga.App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (November 26, 2008). Hope of being released from jail was not a “hope of benefit” which would make defendant’s statement inadmissible as involuntarily given under “OCGA § 24-3-50 (‘To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.’) [Defendant Coleman] alleges that he made the statement so that he would be released from jail where he was being held on other charges. The ‘hope of benefit’ to which this section refers, however, is usually a hope of lighter punishment. Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 757(3) (279 S.E.2d 678) (1981); Burton v. State, 212 Ga.App. 100, 102(2) (441 S.E.2d 470) (1994). Consequently, being released is not a hope of benefit that would implicate this code section. Further, even if we were to find that the GBI agent said that Coleman would be released if he