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gave him information, this would be an offer of a collateral benefit which does not invalidate the statement. Head v. State, 180 Ga.App. 901(1) (350 S.E.2d 854) (1986). The trial court did not err by allowing these statements to be introduced in evidence.” Compare Johnson (May 19, 2005), below (threat to hold in jail pre-trial for one year if defendant didn’t confess, but promise to release next day if she did, was a “fear of injury” sufficient to make confession inadmissible). In re: D.T., 294 Ga.App. 486, 669 S.E.2d 471 (November 10, 2008). No improper hope of benefit where officer promised to take juvenile home after talking with him. “‘The officer's promise was a collateral benefit, as it did “not relate to either the charge or sentence [the defendant] was facing, nor [did] the officer give [the defendant] a hope of a lighter sentence in return for his testimony. Accordingly, OCGA § 24-3-50 is not implicated,’” quoting Smith v. State , 269 Ga.App. 133, 140(3) (603 S.E.2d 445) (2004) (“officer's promise to the defendant that the officer would see about getting the defendant home once defendant made a statement” was collateral benefit). Accord, Edison (May 29, 2014), above (promise not to take DUI defendant to jail, without dropping charges, if she performed drug recognition examination, wasn’t hope of benefit). Boone v. State, 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008). No hope of benefit made defendant’s statement involuntary: “During that interview Boone asked Askey for assistance in having a warrant against him dismissed, and Investigator Askey replied that he would talk to the District Attorney's office about doing so at a later time. This response was no more than a promise of a collateral benefit, and accordingly did not render Boone's custodial statement inadmissible. See Evans v. State, 248 Ga.App. 99, 545 S.E.2d 641 (2001) (a promise to talk to the prosecutor is one promising a collateral benefit not rendering statement inadmissible).” Simpson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 760, 668 S.E.2d 451 (September 18, 2008). No hope of benefit where officer told defendant he had “already interviewed the other men involved in the robbery. The officer said that one of the men had told him the truth but the other two did not, so they would get no ‘favors’ from him. When asked about this statement during the hearing, the officer denied that he was telling Simpson that, if Simpson told him the truth about the robbery, he (Simpson) would get a favor. The officer testified that, instead, he was telling Simpson that the other men would no longer have the chance to talk to him and ‘come clean’ because they had lied to him and ‘wasted [his] time.’ … Having reviewed the record, we find that it supports a conclusion that the officer's reference to ‘favors’ did not suggest that Simpson might receive a lighter sentence or otherwise render Simpson's statement inadmissible.” Foster v. State, 283 Ga. 484, 660 S.E.2d 521 (April 14, 2008). One of defendant’s statements was procured by hope of benefit, one wasn’t. Hope of benefit : “When [defendant] was not forthcoming about the location of the [murder] weapon, the detectives executed a document in which they promised not to press additional charges related to the weapon against [defendant]. Thereafter, [defendant] admitted he had provided the co-indictees with the murder weapon and told the detectives the gun could be found at his father’s home.” The statement was the only evidence tying defendant to the gun. “When [defendant] told the detectives the location of the gun and his role of providing the gun to his co-indictees, he did so in the hope of receiving no punishment for crimes related to his possession of the weapon. Just as holding out a hope of benefit in the form of lesser punishment is an impermissible hope of benefit that renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50 ( State v. Ray, [272 Ga. 450, 452 (531 S.E.2d 705) (2000)]; State v. Ritter, [268 Ga. 108, 110 (485 S.E.2d 492) (1997)]), the ‘reward’ of facing no charges in connection with the weapon is an impermissible hope of benefit that rendered [defendant]’s incriminating statements inadmissible. Richardson v. State, [265 Ga.App. 711, 716 (595 S.E.2d 565) (2004)].” Compare Daniel (May 18, 2009), above (no hope of benefit where defendant Mirandized but told he was not a suspect); Chulpayev (March 27, 2015), above (promises to protect defendant from murder charges were hope of benefit). No hope of benefit: “the detectives confronted [defendant] with his telephone records which were at odds with [defendant]’s earlier statements concerning his contact with the victim the day of the shooting. During that interview, the detectives twice told [defendant] he could be a witness or a defendant. Each time, [defendant] made an incriminating statement shortly thereafter.” “[Defendant] contends the interrogators’ statements in the second interview that [defendant] could be a witness or a defendant were implied promises of lighter punishment, including the possibility of escaping punishment altogether. See State v. Ritter, supra, 268 Ga. 108(1). However, in Duke v. State, 268 Ga. 425(2) (489 S.E.2d 811) (1997), where interrogating officers described the defendant’s situation as one in which he could be a witness or a defendant, this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the officers ‘clearly did not imply that [the defendant] would not be charged if he was himself involved in the murder[,]’ but were only encouraging him to tell the truth. Exhortations to tell the truth are not a hope of benefit that renders a confession inadmissible under § 24-3-50. Id.” Accord, Mangrum v. State , 285 Ga. 676, 681 S.E.2d 130 (June 15, 2009); Cantrell v. State , 299 Ga.App. 746, 683 S.E.2d 676 (August 18, 2009).