☢ test - Í

Robbins v. State, 290 Ga.App. 323, 659 S.E.2d 628 (February 20, 2008). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; defendant’s statements to his wife, a police officer, were properly admitted. “Robbins … complains that his statement was not voluntary because it was made through ‘the hope of no divorce.’ OCGA § 24-3-50 provides that ‘[t]o make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury.’ A governmental actor is not required for a confession to be involuntary for purposes of this statute. Griffin v. State, 230 Ga.App. 318, 320 (496 S.E.2d 480) (1998). Nevertheless, ‘[t]he phrase “hope of benefit” generally means the reward of a lighter sentence. Thus, confessions made under a promise of collateral benefit are not for that reason excludable.’ (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Jackson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 716, 720(2) (634 S.E.2d 846) (2006). We conclude that Robbins’s wife’s promise not to divorce her husband, which did not bear on the question of punishment, was a promise of collateral benefit. Pasuer v. State, 271 Ga.App. 259, 261-262(1) (609 S.E.2d 193) (2005) (‘hope of benefit’ does not refer to a reduction in bond); Frei v. State, 252 Ga.App. 535, 537-538(2)(b) (557 S.E.2d 49) (2001) (letting district attorney know of defendant’s cooperation not hope of benefit); Tucker v. State, 231 Ga.App. 210, 214(1)(c) (498 S.E.2d 774) (1998) (informing judge of defendant’s cooperation not hope of benefit); Burton v. State, 212 Ga.App. 100, 102(2) (441 S.E.2d 470) (1994) (statement to the accused that substance abuse counseling was available was an offer of a collateral benefit); Riviera v. State, 190 Ga.App. 823, 826(1) (380 S.E.2d 353) (1989) (benefit to be derived by the hope that defendant’s wife would not be taken to jail was purely collateral). It follows that the trial court did not err in finding Robbins’s statement to be voluntary and in denying the motion to suppress.” Accord, Millsaps (July 13, 2011), above (officers’ alleged promise not to report defendant’s arrest for enticing a child to defendant’s wife were a collateral benefit ). Rubia v. State, 287 Ga.App. 122, 650 S.E.2d 797 (August 7, 2007). No evidence of “hope of benefit”: “In questioning Rubia, Agent Arroyo told Rubia that if adults were arrested, their children would routinely be taken to the Clayton County Department of Family and Children Services (‘Clayton DFACS’). Rubia then told Arroyo that the drugs belonged to him. … Agent Arroyo’s statement that the police as a matter of policy placed children in the custody of Clayton DFACS upon the arrest of their parents ‘was a mere “truism” or recounting of fact[ ] rather than a threat of injury or promise of hope of benefit within the meaning of OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cits.]’ Anderson v. State, 224 Ga.App. 608, 610(1) (481 S.E.2d 595) (1997). “ Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355, 647 S.E.2d 70 (June 25, 2007). Trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement where he re-initiated further communication with the police after invoking his right to counsel. During his initial interview, “after signing a waiver of counsel form, Rivera ‘stated that he thought he might need a lawyer’ when he learned that Barton had survived his attack on her. [Cit.] Police then advised Rivera that they could no longer speak with him because he had invoked his right to counsel and that, in the event Rivera decided that he wanted to speak further with them, he would have to reinitiate contact with them. Rivera then requested to talk with his wife, stating that he would decide about speaking further with the police after speaking with her. The investigators arranged for Rivera to speak with his wife by telephone and then exited his room. Subsequently, they were informed by the deputy guarding Rivera that he wished to speak with them again. … When the police returned to Rivera’s room, Rivera confirmed that he had sent for them and that he desired to reinitiate contact with them. The investigators re-read the Miranda rights to Rivera, Rivera himself read them aloud, and Rivera then re-signed a waiver of rights form. At no point did police make any promises to Rivera or attempt to coerce him in any way. We find no merit in Rivera’s contention that the investigators’ accommodation of Rivera’s request to speak to his wife in some way undermined the Edwards rule by prompting Rivera’s request to reinitiate contact with the police. This is not the ‘slightest hope of benefit’ that would render Rivera’s statement involuntary and inadmissible. See Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843, 844(2) (452 S.E.2d 115) (1995) (the ‘slightest hope of benefit’ in OCGA § 24-3-50 is construed to mean the hope of a lighter sentence). Moreover, it is not uncommon for a suspect in custody to be allowed to speak with a family member. See Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 826(2) (514 S.E.2d 657) (1999) (‘Numerous cases hold that Miranda is not implicated when a suspect in custody is questioned or encouraged to confess by a father, mother, wife, or girl friend’). See also Harvell v. State, 275 Ga. 129 (562 S.E.2d 180) (2002) (accused’s statement was admissible where his request to speak with his mother, made at the same time that he invoked his right to counsel, was accommodated by the police, his mother subsequently informed police that he wished to reinitiate contact, and accused signed waiver form witnessed by his mother).” Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (June 25, 2007). No error in trial court’s finding that defendant’s statement was not “induced by promise of benefit.” “Conceding there were no explicit promises of a lighter sentence, Preston points to the interrogating officer’s discussion of the death penalty and life without parole and the officer’s statement that the district attorney based the charges brought on a recommendation from the police, and argues that the comments would be meaningless if they did not amount to a promise of a lighter sentence than death or life without parole. Our review of the