☢ test - Í

480) (1998).this court held that OCGA § 24-3-50 is not limited to confessions made to state actors. [footnote: See also Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 828(2) (514 S.E.2d 657) (1999) (citing Griffin, supra, for rule that when confession is made to a witness who is not a state agent, it must still be voluntary under OCGA § 24-3-50).] The voluntariness standard set forth in OCGA § 24-3-50 is also applicable when a confession is induced by someone other than a state actor. See Wiley v. State, 245 Ga.App. 580, 582(3) (538 S.E.2d 483) (2000) [ Wiley : defendant’s statement to victim’s parents ruled admissible despite their offer to work things out if defendant told the truth.].” Here’ sister-in-law’s letter urging defendant to tell police the truth did not, as defendant alleged, promise that he would be reconciled with his family. State v. Johnson, 273 Ga.App. 324, 615 S.E.2d 163 (May 19, 2005). Trial court could find that defendant’s “incriminating statements were induced by the hope of benefit and thus involuntary. Specifically, the trial court determined that [officer] told Johnson he ‘would hold her in jail for a year without bond unless she confessed to intentionally setting the fire.’ And it found that [Officer] Harris’ ‘definite and categorical commitment to make sure Johnson did not stay in jail a year pending trial if she confessed’ constituted a hope of benefit that caused Johnson to inculpate herself against her will.” “We recognize that a mere promise to reduce bond does not constitute a ‘hope of benefit’ under OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cit.] Instead, such promise, which does not implicate the sentence or charge at issue, is ‘a collateral benefit that does not make an otherwise admissible confession involuntary.’ [Cits.] This case, however, involves more than a promise of reduced bond. As found by the trial court, [officer] told Johnson that she would be held in jail for one year without any opportunity for bond if she did not confess. If she confessed, however, she would be released the next day.” Trial court was authorized to find that officer’s “statements – which related to pre-trial incarceration and his alleged authority to hold Johnson in jail for a full year – were more akin to a fear of injury or a sentencing issue than a collateral benefit such as bond reduction, the promise of a solitary cell, or communication with the judge about cooperation. See Green [ v. State, 154 Ga.App. 295, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980)]. Cf. State v. Todd, 250 Ga.App. 265, 267 (549 S.E.2d 821) (2001) (officer’s statement to defendant that if police had no probable cause, then he would have no basis for keeping defendant under arrest was a ‘mere truism, [a] mere explanation[ ] of [the defendant’s] arrest and of the law, [and did] not constitute an improper offer of some hope of benefit’); Pounds v. State, 189 Ga.App. 809, 810(1) (377 S.E.2d 722) (1989) (officer’s discussion of reduced bond, by itself, was ‘in the same class of collateral benefits as ... the promises of a solitary cell, a psychiatric examination and communication to the judge of the defendant’s cooperation’).” Compare Overton (November 26, 2008), above (release from pre-trial detention not a “hope of benefit.”). Clark v. State, 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (March 28, 2005). “[T]he statements attributed to the detective that he knew that Clark was not the triggerman and that triggermen receive harsher sentencing did not constitute the hope of a lighter sentence. Thus, any such comments were not sufficient to taint the voluntariness of Clark’s statements. Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843(2), 452 S.E.2d 115 (1995). See also Jones v. State, 266 Ga.App. 717, 720, 598 S.E.2d 366 (2004) (hope of benefit which will render a confession involuntary cannot relate to the sentence of another person).” Accord, Jackson v. State , 284 Ga. 484, 668 S.E.2d 700 (October 27, 2008). High v. State, 271 Ga.App. 388, 609 S.E.2d 722 (January 25, 2005). “‘ Merely telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution does not constitute the “hope of benefit” sufficient to render a statement inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50. ’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Leigh v. State, 223 Ga.App. 726, 727(1) (478 S.E.2d 905) (1996). We have also held that telling a suspect that ‘judges love to hear that defendants helped the police’ was not a ‘hope of benefit.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stephens v. State, 164 Ga.App. 398, 399(3) (297 S.E.2d 90) (1982).” Accord, Nowell v. State , 312 Ga.App. 150, 717 S.E.2d 730 (October 19, 2011); Lane v. State , 324 Ga.App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (October 23, 2013). Pasuer v. State, 271 Ga.App. 259, 609 S.E.2d 193 (January 7, 2005), overruled on other grounds, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008). “ [T]he phrase, ‘the slightest hope of benefit,’ does not refer to a reduction in bond. Tillman v. State, 251 Ga.App. 330, 332(2) (554 S.E.2d 305) (2001). The promise of a reduction in bond is a collateral benefit that does not make an otherwise admissible confession involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50. Pounds v. State, 189 Ga.App. 809, 810(1) (377 S.E.2d 722) (1989); see also OCGA § 24-3-51 (‘The fact that a confession has been made under ... a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it.’).” Accord, Gonzalez v. State , 283 Ga.App. 843, 643 S.E.2d 8 (March 1, 2007). Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (November 23, 2004). “While the ‘slightest hope of benefit’ can mean hope of a lighter sentence, State v. Ray, 272 Ga. 450 (531 S.E.2d 705) (2000), there is no evidence that [officer] led Brown to believe that he would receive a lighter sentence, or immediate freedom, if he confessed to the crimes. In his testimony, Brown does not contend that [officer] mentioned a confession or sentence, only that [officer] periodically stated that