☢ test - Í

Brown would soon be released, while questioning continued; nothing suggested that freedom would be forthcoming if Brown confessed to committing crimes.” Jones v. State, 270 Ga.App. 233, 606 S.E.2d 288 (October 29, 2004). Officers gave defendant no “hope of benefit:” “The officers made no promise to Jones that he would not go to jail. In fact, they said they could make no such promise. Nor was there any representation that he might receive a lighter sentence. They only indicated that they would note his cooperation and his efforts to straighten his life out. We find no violation of OCGA § 24-3-50. [Cits.]” Starr v. State, 269 Ga.App. 466, 604 S.E.2d 297 (September 3, 2004). Defendant’s statements given to state’s investigator were induced by hope of benefit where investigator told defendant that state was seeking counseling rather than incarceration. While defendant “did not confess to the crime in this case…. he admitted that he was alone with the victim only after [investigator] initiated discussions concerning counseling.” “The taped interviews were not voluntary; they were erroneously admitted and should not be admitted on retrial.” Overruled on other grounds, Hatley v. State , 290 Ga. 480, 722 S.E.2d 67 (February 6, 2012). Jones v. State, 266 Ga.App. 717, 598 S.E.2d 366 (April 1, 2004). “‘[C]onfessions made under a promise of collateral benefit are not for that reason excludable.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 71, 72(2) (316 S.E.2d 160) (1984). … Any benefit to be derived by the hope that the police officers would put in a good word for [defendant’s girlfriend] was purely collateral. There was no promise of a lighter punishment for Jones. Riviera v. State , 190 Ga.App. 823, 826, 380 S.E.2d 353 (1989) (‘[a]ny benefit to be derived by the hope that defendant's wife would not be taken to jail was purely collateral. It did not contemplate the hope of lighter punishment’).” Accord,Clark v. State , 279 Ga. 243, 611 S.E.2d 38 (March 28, 2005). Richardson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 711, 595 S.E.2d 565 (February 19, 2004). Defendant’s statement was obtained by ‘hope of benefit,’ and thus should have been suppressed, where officer told defendant “he would ‘see how the interview went before a decision was made as to whether or not he would be taken into custody,’” when in fact he already had an arrest warrant and had already decided to arrest defendant regardless of his statement. Note, “during the course of the interview, Officer Benning never gave Richardson the impression that he was under arrest or in police custody. On the interview tape, Richardson specifically apparently stated he did not believe he was in custody or under arrest.” Neither officer’s unstated intentions, nor mere existence of arrest warrant, unbeknownst to defendant, is determinative. “Save as they are communicated or otherwise manifested to the person being questioned, an officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry. The threat to a citizen's Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspicions. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324-325 (114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293) (1994). Thus, under circumstances similar to those presented here, it has been held that Miranda warnings are not required because the ‘compulsive’ aspect of custodial questioning is not present. Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2) (463 S.E.2d 16) (1995). Nor are we troubled that Officer Benning had already obtained arrest warrants for Richardson. Probable cause to arrest, whether demonstrable by warrant or knowledge of an officer, [cit.] does not require arrest and Miranda . [Cit.]” Further, trickery and deceit alone do not require suppression, “‘so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” “While the term ‘hope of benefit’ contained in OCGA § 24-3-50 has been interpreted generally as a reward of lighter punishment on the charges, [cit.] we find that ‘hope of benefit’ may also include, as in this case, the reward of no charges at all.” Error was harmless, however, because defendant’s statement was cumulative of other evidence. Distinguished, Daniel (May 18, 2009), above (no hope of benefit where defendant told he wasn’t a suspect – defendant wasn’t promised an outcome). Pittman v. State, 277 Ga. 475, 592 S.E.2d 72 (January 12, 2004). Officer’s statements did not negate voluntariness of defendant’s statement. Officer’s “suggestion that Pittman may not have intended to kill the victim did not amount to a hope of benefit.” Compare State v. Ritter , 268 Ga. 108, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997), where “the police purposely misrepresented to the defendant that the victim was alive and actively recovering, thereby implicitly promising that the defendant would not be charged with murder.” Here, by comparison, officer made plain that the victim was dead. Also, officer’s urging defendant “to tell the truth so that [officer] could ‘work this’” was a mere admonition to tell the truth, not a promise of benefit. Finally, comment that there would be no drug charges was explicitly based on lack of evidence, and did not implicitly convey “that [officer] had authority to make decisions regarding the charges against Pittman” (thus holding out hope of benefit of reduced charges “to induce an inculpatory statement”). “The fact that Pittman was not initially informed that he was being arrested for murder does not render his statement involuntary, so long as he was made aware of the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney.” Possible illegality of arrest –