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out of state, with a Georgia warrant, no extradition proceedings – is also no bar to admission of the statement made at police station. “When probable cause exists, even an illegal, warrantless arrest in a suspect’s home does not render inadmissible subsequent statements made outside the premises.” Accord, Preston (June 25, 2007), above; Lane v. State , 324 Ga.App. 303, 750 S.E.2d 381 (October 23, 2013) (“permissible admonition to tell the truth”: “the investigator made it clear that the district attorney's office would listen if [defendant] wanted to ‘tell the truth’ and that the district attorney would ‘deal with it’ if [defendant] continued to deny the charges.”). Porter v. State, 264 Ga.App. 526, 591 S.E.2d 436 (December 3, 2003). “[T]he offer by [officer] to ‘help’ Porter if he told the truth did not render Porter’s statement inadmissible. [Cits.] We also conclude [officer]’s statement to Porter that he would face a jury trial if he lied was not a promise of an improper benefit.” Jackson v. State, 262 Ga.App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (July 18, 2003). “[T]he promise of a reduced bond is a ‘collateral benefit’ that will not bar a confession under OCGA § 24-3-51 [‘The fact that a confession has been made under a spiritual exhortation, a promise of secrecy, or a promise of collateral benefit shall not exclude it.’]. Moreover, it is well-established that a police officer is not offering a hope of benefit by telling a suspect that his cooperation and truthfulness will be made known to others.” Griffin v. State, 257 Ga.App. 167, 570 S.E.2d 611 (August 23, 2002). “‘To make a confession admissible, it must have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury .’ The Supreme Court of Georgia has construed ‘slightest hope of benefit’ to mean the hope of a lighter sentence. ‘Insofar as the “remotest fear of injury” is concerned, any confession obtained through physical or mental torture is inadmissible.” Officer’s vague offers to “help” defendant do not convey hope of a lighter sentence. Reference to possible charges against defendant’s girlfriend does not invoke physical or mental torture. See also Smith v. State , 276 Ga. 97, 575 S.E.2d 450 (January 13, 2003). Taylor v. State, 274 Ga.App. 269, 553 S.E.2d 598 (October 1, 2001). Interim review in defendant’s capital murder prosecution. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress custodial statement; defendant’s question “Can I have a lawyer present when I do that?” “was an unambiguous request for counsel that required the cessation of all questioning.” However, statement was otherwise voluntary; officer’s offer to “help her ‘in every way [he could],’ telling her it might look good to a judge if she admitted her role in the crimes rather than lie, and also telling her that she had a ‘golden opportunity’ to help herself” didn’t constitute improper “hope of benefit.” “It is not improper for the police to encourage a suspect to help herself by telling the truth. See Lee [ v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 800, 514 S.E.2d 1 (1999); Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690(3), 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997). It also does not render a statement involuntary for the police to tell a suspect that the trial judge may consider her truthful cooperation with the police. See Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997); Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843(2), 452 S.E.2d 115 (1995); Leigh v. State, 223 Ga.App. 726(1), 478 S.E.2d 905 (1996). Captain Simmons's comment that he would try to help Taylor in every way he could came in the context of Taylor's concerns over the custody of her children and did not refer to any possible sentence she might receive. The videotape also reveals that Taylor was not threatened or coerced and that the interview lasted only one hour. Taylor asked for medication during the interview and said she was manic-depressive, but she appeared to be lucid and sober and Captain Simmons sent an officer to retrieve her medicine. The trial court did not err by ruling that the State had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor's statement was voluntary. See Lee, 270 Ga. at 800, 514 S.E.2d 1; Carswell, 268 Ga. at 533, 491 S.E.2d 343.” Thus, evidence found as a result of the statement – the gun used to kill victim – was not suppressible. Accord, State v. Jackson , 332 Ga.App. 356, 772 S.E.2d 804 (May 14, 2015) (exhortation to tell the truth was not a hope of benefit) ( Jackson overruled on other grounds, State v. Andrade , 335 Ga.App. 464, 782 S.E.2d 665 (February 8, 2016)). Taylor disapproved “to the extent that [it] can be read as indicating that the fruits of statements obtained in violation of § 24–8–824 must be suppressed,” State v. Chulpayev , 296 Ga. 764, 770 S.E.2d 808 (March 27, 2015)). Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 508, 538 S.E.2d 159 (August 9, 2000). Cocaine trafficking and selling convictions affirmed; no hope of benefit or threat of injury made defendant’s custodial statement involuntary. “The transcript of defendant's suppression hearing reveals that the interrogating officer told him he was in big trouble; that the offense of trafficking was punishable by 20 years confinement; and, in effect, that he could help the defendant if he cooperated. However, that the interrogating officer told the defendant he was in trouble is in the nature of a mere truism, rather than an offer of hope of benefit or threat of injury. See Sampson v. State, 165 Ga.App. 833, 835(9), 303 S.E.2d 77 (1983); Copeland v. State, 162 Ga.App. 398, 400(3), 291 S.E.2d 560 (1982). The interrogating officer did not threaten defendant with harm in advising him that trafficking in cocaine involved the possibility of a significant sentence to confinement. Rather, this