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simply made the defendant aware of potential legal consequences associated therewith. Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 532–533(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997). Finally, an investigator does not make an offer of hope of benefit upon telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution, Leigh v. State, 223 Ga.App. 726, 727(1), 478 S.E.2d 905 (1996); Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga.App. 70, 72–73(5), 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997), or by offering help to the defendant. Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234, 235(2), 347 S.E.2d 553 (1986) (The ‘slightest hope of benefit’ means the hope of a lighter sentence.).” State v. Ray , 272 Ga. 450, 531 S.E.2d 705 (June 5, 2000). In murder prosecution, trial court properly excluded defendant’s confession as being involuntary “because the detectives questioning him raised the issue of punishment and impliedly promised Ray that he could receive a life sentence rather than the death penalty if he cooperated and confessed to the crime.” “Approximately two hours into the interview, the officer told Ray ‘[g]ive us the facts and we will become easy to get along with you and it might possibly....’ Ray interrupted, to ask, ‘what would I get if I give the other guy up?’ The officer replied, ‘Possibly—here's what I can tell you. Years of freedom.’ Ray, who had been reduced to tears by this time, shortly thereafter told police that the ‘other guy’ was Jason Johnson. It was at this point that the officer first read Ray his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and obtained a waiver of those rights and a statement from Ray confessing his participation in the crimes.” “Our review of the interrogation fails to support the State's claim that the trial court distorted the effect of a few isolated comments in order to conclude that the officers held out a hope of benefit to Ray. Rather, looking to the totality of the circumstances, State v. Ritter, [268 Ga. 108, 110, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997)], we find the record supports the trial court's determination that the officers induced Ray into confessing by holding out a hope of benefit in the form of a lesser punishment. We reject the State's contention that the promise of ‘years of freedom’ by the officer was a slip of the tongue since the record reveals that the promise was not a mere verbal inaccuracy, compare LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73(3), 453 S.E.2d 737 (1995), but rather was a deliberate investigative technique employed by the officer to obtain a confession from Ray.” Moss v. State , 244 Ga.App. 295, 535 S.E.2d 292 (May 31, 2000). Convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress statement given by defendant to DFACS and police. No hope of benefit where DFACS caseworkers “told defendant's mother that DFACS would not press charges in the event that defendant gave DFACS a statement[;] this was a proper statement in that as a child welfare agency, DFACS is required by law not to press charges upon a report of child abuse but to give immediate notice thereof to the appropriate police authority or district attorney. [fn] Moreover, that defendant and his mother understood that the police would be present at the time defendant was interviewed may not reasonably be construed as an offer of benefit for defendant's statement. If anything, the presence of the police served only to underscore the potential for disposition in the criminal justice system upon the admission of a serious felony, namely all that has occurred in the case sub judice.” Martin v. State, 271 Ga. 301, 518 S.E.2d 898 (July 6, 1999). At defendant’s murder trial, custodial statement was not procured by hope of benefit or fear of injury. Evidence showed that “the investigators made statements about the possibility of the death penalty, the difference between armed robbery and murder, and that Clay had given a detailed statement; they urged Martin to tell the truth and not to lie about his presence at the crime scene. Martin then stated, ‘I'll take the robbery.’ The investigators cautioned that they did not want Martin ‘to take anything,’ that all they wanted was for him to tell the truth and that they were ‘not in a position to do that, that's the district attorney's office decision.’ Martin then raised the specter of a deal if he could show the police ‘something.’ The investigators again mentioned the death penalty, the possible treatment of the shooter, and asked Martin to tell them the truth.” “The interviewing officers' statements did not constitute the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury so as to have induced or coerced Martin's statement. The investigators did not threaten Martin with personal harm in their comments about the death penalty, but were merely discussing the potential legal consequences of the killing. Carswell v. State, 268 Ga. 531, 533(2), 491 S.E.2d 343 (1997). Nor is there any indication that they were intending to mislead Martin about legal punishment by the comment that there was a difference between armed robbery and murder. The officers repeatedly told Martin that they had no power to promise him a lighter sentence or to affect his punishment, that it was a matter for the district attorney. And they explained to Martin that those involved in a crime leading to a fatal shooting were as culpable as the person pulling the trigger. What is more, neither the investigators' encouraging Martin to tell the truth nor their telling him that his cooperation would be made known amounts to the hope of benefit that would run afoul of OCGA § 24-3-50. Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 692(3), 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997); Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732, 736(4)(c), 462 S.E.2d 737 (1995); Arline v. State, 264 Ga. 843, 844(2), 452 S.E.2d 115 (1995). Martin's statement that he had discussed with his mother taking ‘robbery’ indicates that any hope of benefit originated in his own mind. Shelton v. State, 196 Ga.App. 163, 164(3), 395 S.E.2d 618 (1990).”