☢ test - Í

Selley v. State, 237 Ga.App. 47, 514 S.E.2d 706 (March 16, 1999). “‘Merely telling a defendant that his or her cooperation will be made known to the prosecution does not constitute the “hope of benefit” sufficient to render a statement inadmissible under OCGA § 24-3-50.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lawrence v. State, 227 Ga.App. 70, 73(5), 487 S.E.2d 608 (1997).” Lee v. State, 270 Ga. 798, 513 S.E.2d 1 (March 1, 1999). Asked to give a recorded statement, defendant “agreed, but when the recording began Lee asked the officer, ‘What should I do? Should I talk?’ The officer replied, ‘That’s up to you, man. All you’re going to do is help yourself out.’ Contrary to Lee’s assertion, the officer’s comment was not a ‘hope of benefit’ that would render Lee’s statement involuntary under OCGA § 24-3-50. See Gilliam v. State, 268 Ga. 690, 692(3), 492 S.E.2d 185 (1997) ( encouraging a suspect to tell the truth is not a ‘hope of benefit’ under OCGA § 24-3-50); Gober [ v. State, 264 Ga. 226, 228(2)(b), 443 S.E.2d 616 (1994)]; Caffo v. State, 247 Ga. 751, 756-757(3), 279 S.E.2d 678 (1981) ( telling a suspect he would ‘feel better’ if he confessed is not a ‘hope of benefit’ under OCGA § 24- 3-50). Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that Lee’s incriminating statements on May 26-27, 1994, were voluntary and admissible. Gilliam, supra at 692-693(3), 492 S.E.2d 185; Gober, supra.” Accord, Ramirez v. State , 288 Ga.App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (November 6, 2007); Wilson v. State , 285 Ga. 224, 675 S.E.2d 11 (February 23, 2009); Currier v. State , 294 Ga. 392, 754 S.E.2d 17 (January 21, 2014). 44. VOLUNTARINESS – ILLITERACY, LOW INTELLIGENCE, OR MENTAL ILLNESS Colton v. State, 296 Ga. 172, 766 S.E.2d 38 (November 17, 2014). Murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly denied motion to suppress custodial statement of mentally retarded 17-year old. “Even though Colton's academic records may have reflected a less-than-average intellectual range, they by no means established that Colton was incapable of understanding and knowingly waiving his Miranda rights. Nor did Colton present any expert testimony at the Jackson v. Denno hearing that demonstrated such incapacity. See Flowers v. State, 265 Ga. 688, 689(2) (461 S.E.2d 533) (1995) (even a defendant's offer of expert testimony that his mental age was that of an eight-year-old and prevented him from making a valid waiver of his Miranda rights, without more, was insufficient).” Hunstein, joined by Benham, dissents. Fife v. State, 306 Ga.App. 425, 702 S.E.2d 454 (October 13, 2010). Conviction for child molestation affirmed; no error in finding that defendant’s custodial statement was voluntary although court also determined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. “[T]he fact that Fife was initially found incompetent to stand trial does not demand the conclusion that he lacked the mental capacity to knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights. See Griffin v. State, 285 Ga. 827, 828(2), 684 S.E.2d 621 (2009), and citations therein. ‘A trial court may be authorized to find that an individual is capable of waiving his rights even though there is evidence to the effect that he is moderately retarded.’ (Citations omitted.) Hampton [ v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 861(4), 670 S.E.2d 502 (2008)]. This holds true even if a defendant is initially found incompetent to stand trial. Id. The true analysis is whether the totality of the circumstances show that the statement was free and voluntary.” Hampton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (November 25, 2008). No error where trial court admitted defendant’s statement to police despite his mental retardation and difficulty understanding rights against self- incrimination. “Hampton contends that the trial court erred in allowing his statement to the investigator to be admitted in evidence because, as found by Gunnin, he lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights against self-incrimination. “‘ A trial court may be authorized to find that an individual is capable of waiving his rights even though there is evidence to the effect that he is moderately retarded. The question of whether or not a defendant is capable or incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights is to be answered by the trial judge and will be accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous. Considering all the evidence presented at the hearing on this issue, we find no error in the trial court's ruling admitting [defendant's] confession into evidence.’ [ Reynolds v. State, 188 Ga.App. 721, 723-724(1) (374 S.E.2d 341) (1988)] (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Kerr v. State, 194 Ga.App. 604, 605(2) (391 S.E.2d 449) (1990) (law does not require high or average degree of intelligence to validate waiver of right to counsel).” Accord, Fife (October 13, 2010), above. Hendricks v. State, 284 Ga. 470, 660 S.E.2d 365 (April 21, 2008). “‘A person who is mentally ill can be competent to make a voluntary confession. [Cit.]’ Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 259, 260(4) (347 S.E.2d 584) (1986). However, ‘[a] confession made by one who is insane is not the product of “a rational intellect and a free will,” and is, thus, not voluntarily made. [Cits.]’ State v. Gardner, 254 Ga. 264, 265 (328 S.E.2d 546) (1985).” No evidence here, however, that defendant was even mentally ill at time he made his statement to police; rather, evidence only shows that he began exhibiting signs of mental illness later, after he had been incarcerated for an extended time. Accord, Lewis (September 19,