☢ test - Í

2005), below; Williams v. State , 287 Ga. 199, 695 S.E.2d 246 (May 17, 2010). Boseman v. State, 283 Ga. 355, 659 S.E.2d 364 (March 31, 2008). Malice murder conviction affirmed; no error in trial court’s finding that defendant’s statement was voluntary. “[Defendant] asserts that his statement was not knowing and voluntarily, in that it was the result of his prolonged [four-plus hour] and coercive detention compounded by his limited intellect, which rendered him unable to understand the critical language in the rights read to him, and by his susceptibility to police pressure. ‘Whether a defendant’s waiver of rights is knowing and intelligent is to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances. [Cit.] The mere fact of below average intelligence or even moderate mental retardation is not by itself sufficient to justify exclusion of an inculpatory statement, without additional evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity to understand and knowingly waive his rights. [Cits.]’ Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 728(2) (642 S.E.2d 812) (2007). In support of his assertion, [defendant] adduced the testimony of a licensed psychologist. … The psychologist, however, found that [defendant] was not mentally retarded but was instead in the borderline range of intelligence. While the expert opined that [defendant] was not able to fully understand all of the rights read to him, was emotionally immature and was susceptible to influence by others, [fn] the trial court had before it [defendant]’s taped statement, in which [defendant] was able to provide some involved explanations to the police as to the activities occurring in the crime; the testimony by Walden, who questioned [defendant] and saw no confusion in [defendant] about his rights; and the testimony by [defendant]’s uncle that [defendant] never indicated he felt that he had to talk to the police. … ‘This Court is to accept a trial court’s factual and credibility findings as to the voluntariness of custodial statements unless they are clearly erroneous, and in this case, there is evidence to support the trial court’s determination that [defendant]’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made. [Cit.]’ Lyons v. State, 282 Ga. 588, 596(6) (652 S.E.2d 525) (2007). We find no error in the trial court’s denial of [defendant]’s motion to suppress and the admission of his confession.” Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 642 S.E.2d 812 (March 26, 2007). Murder conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. “The mere fact of below average intelligence or even moderate mental retardation is not by itself sufficient to justify exclusion of an inculpatory statement, without additional evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity to understand and knowingly waive his rights. Coppock v. State, 273 Ga. 324(2) (540 S.E.2d 187) (2001); Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833(6) (426 S.E.2d 559) (1993).” Accord, Boseman (March 31, 2008), above; Barrett v. State , 289 Ga. 197, 709 S.E.2d 816 (May 16, 2011); Colton (November 17, 2014), above. Hicks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 461, 636 S.E.2d 183 (September 6, 2006). Aggravated assault conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. “ Illiteracy … ‘does not dictate a determination that there has been no voluntary knowledgeable waiver.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Watson v. State, 159 Ga.App. 618, 620(2) (284 S.E.2d 636) (1981).” Accord, White v. State , 281 Ga. 20, 635 S.E.2d 720 (October 2, 2006). State v. Hardy, 281 Ga.App. 365, 636 S.E.2d 36 (August 8, 2006). In prosecution for aggravated child molesetation and related offenses, trial court erred in finding that defendant’s statement was not voluntary. “The trial court based its ruling on three faulty premises. 1. First the trial court found significant that Hardy’s waiver was not written down or recorded electronically. However, ‘the mere fact that there was no written waiver of Miranda rights or other written record of such waiver did not render his statement inadmissible.’ Thomas v. State, 268 Ga. 135, 138(8) (485 S.E.2d 783) (1997). Likewise, the officer’s failure to electronically record Hardy’s waiver does not render Hardy’s waiver involuntary. See Coleman v. State, 189 Ga.App. 366(1) (375 S.E.2d 663) (1988).” Accord, Martinez v. State , 314 Ga.App. 551, 724 S.E.2d 851 (March 2, 2012) (statement admissible despite absence of written waiver and electronic recording). 2. “Second, the trial court based its ruling on the fact that the investigator did not inquire into Hardy’s education level or literacy. However, the investigator testified that Hardy appeared to be educated ‘enough to understand what I had read to him,’ and there was no evidence that Hardy was illiterate or uneducated. Moreover, the fact that Hardy ‘“(may have been) illiterate does not render him incapable of making a valid confession,”’ particularly because the Miranda warning was read to Hardy. Frymyer v. State, 179 Ga.App. 391, 392(1) (346 S.E.2d 573) (1986).” 3. “Third, the trial court’s order notes that the interrogation occurred before formal charges were filed and that the officer did not explain the nature of the charges to the defendant. However, the record shows that Hardy had already been told that he was being detained so that officers could further investigate his relationship with M.H. Moreover, as the Georgia Supreme Court noted in Peebles v. State, 260 Ga. 430, 431(1) (396 S.E.2d 229) (1990) (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576- 577(III)(A) (107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954) (1987)), ‘ a law enforcement officer’s failure to advise a suspect as to the crimes about which he is to be questioned prior to the suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights is not relevant to the question of whether the suspect’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. The additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Therefore, in light of the totality of the circumstances in this case, and in light of the lack of any basis in the record supporting the