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conclusion that Hardy’s Miranda waiver was not voluntary, the trial court erred in ruling that Hardy’s Miranda waiver was not voluntary.” Distinguished, State v. Floyd , 306 Ga.App. 402, 702 S.E.2d 467 (October 13, 2010) (video of interrogation allowed trial court to find that defendant didn’t understand that he didn’t have to talk to detective, whereas in Hardy , investigator’s testimony that defendant appeared to understand waiver of rights was “unchallenged.”). Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 620 S.E.2d 778 (September 19, 2005). In sentencing phase of capital murder trial, court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. “Even if Lewis is mentally ill as alleged, mental illness does not make a defendant incapable of making a voluntary statement. See Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3, 3, 463 S.E.2d 472 (1995) (well- settled that a mentally ill person can be competent to make a voluntary confession); Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 259, 260(4), 347 S.E.2d 584 (1986).” Accord, Hendricks (April 21, 2008), above; Griffin v. State , 285 Ga. 827, 684 S.E.2d 621 (October 5, 2009). Evans v. State, 277 Ga. 51, 586 S.E.2d 326 (September 15, 2003). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement to police. “[T]he fact Evans had earned only a GED is insufficient to make his statement involuntary. In fact, this Court has relied on the fact that a defendant has obtained a GED to hold that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. In addition, we cannot conclude that the fact that the officer truthfully informed Evans about finding his fingerprints makes the statement involuntary.” Robinson v. State, 272 Ga. 752, 533 S.E.2d 718 (September 11, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement. “The fact that an individual may be moderately retarded is not alone sufficient to exclude his statement, Moody v. State, 205 Ga.App. 376(1), 422 S.E.2d 70 (1992), and the trial court was entitled to credit the interrogating officer’s assessment of appellant’s sobriety and general demeanor.” Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 698, 523 S.E.2d 866 (November 15, 1999). Defendant’s malice murder conviction reversed on other grounds; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement despite her claim that “she was insane when she spoke with the police. It is well settled that a person who is mentally ill can be competent to make a voluntary confession. Johnson v. State, 256 Ga. 259(4), 347 S.E.2d 584 (1986). Further, ‘[a] mere showing that a person who confessed to a crime may have suffered from some mental disability is not a sufficient basis on which to exclude the statement. [Cits.]’ Marlowe v. State, 187 Ga.App. 255, 257, 370 S.E.2d 20 (1988).” Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 522 S.E.2d 225 (October 18, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement despite evidence that his intelligence was below average, but not in the range of mental retardation. “A defendant may be capable of understanding and waiving his Miranda rights even where there is evidence of moderate retardation. Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833(6), 426 S.E.2d 559 (1993). ‘Retardation, and the extent of the same as presented by the ambit of the evidence ... is one of the facts that had to be determined by the trial court at the Jackson v. Denno hearing. Once the determination is made it will be approved by this [C]ourt unless we find that it is clearly erroneous.’ Id. at 835, 426 S.E.2d 559. See also Dixon v. State, 267 Ga. 136(3), 475 S.E.2d 633 (1996). Applying a totality of the circumstances test, the trial court found that Lyons understood his rights, and that his statements were the product of free will. See Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126, 231 S.E.2d 744 (1977) (burden is on the State to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the voluntariness of custodial statements). The court's findings are supported by the record. Accordingly, there was no error in admitting the statements at trial.” Fuss v. State, 271 Ga. 319, 519 S.E.2d 446 (July 6, 1999). Finding of guilty, but mentally ill, to malice murder and armed robbery affirmed. “Fuss asserts that it was error to admit his inculpatory custodial statements into evidence, because he was insane at the time of his post-arrest interviews. Whether Fuss was insane when he made the statements in Arkansas is a separate issue from his insanity at the time he committed the acts in Georgia. See Kimbell v. State, 252 Ga. 65, 66(1), 311 S.E.2d 465 (1984). Likewise, the question of his sanity when he gave the statements is distinct from the traditional inquiry into whether he made them voluntarily. See Kimbell v. State, supra at 67(2), 311 S.E.2d 465. Fuss cites nothing in the record to show that, during the course of his bench trial, he specifically advised the trial court of an objection to the introduction of the statements on the basis of his insanity at the time of his arrest and interrogation in Arkansas. Compare Nelms v. State, [255 Ga. 473, 474(1), 340 S.E.2d 1 (1986)]; Kimbell v. State, supra at 66(1), 311 S.E.2d 465. Moreover, it does not appear that Fuss proffered any evidence as to that particular issue. Instead the defense focused exclusively on Fuss's insanity at the time of the homicide and robbery. See Kimbell v. State, supra at 66(1), 311 S.E.2d 465. Compare Nelms v. State, supra at 474(1), 340 S.E.2d 1.” 45. VOLUNTARINESS – NON-CUSTODIAL STATEMENTS