☢ test - Í

Boone v. State, 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008). Defendant’s non-custodial statement, made before his arrest, did not require Miranda warnings: “‘Where an accused is neither in custody nor so restrained as to equate to a formal arrest, any statements made to an investigating officer are made under noncustodial circumstances and Miranda warnings are not required.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted) Heckman v. State, 276 Ga. 141, 143(1), 574 S.E.2d 834 (2003).” 46. VOLUNTARINESS – POLICE TRICKERY/DECEPTION Johnson v. State, 295 Ga. 421, 761 S.E.2d 13 (June 30, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s statement, though obtained by police trickery. “[T]he detective's false claim that Johnson's DNA was found on the brass knuckles does not affect the admissibility of the confession, as deception by interrogating officers does not render a confession involuntary unless it is ‘calculated to procure an untrue statement.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8) (493 S.E.2d 157) (1997).” Futch v. State, 326 Ga.App. 394, 756 S.E.2d 629 (March 20, 2014). Physical precedent only. Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted defendant’s custodial statement despite admitted police trickery in obtaining it. “During his testimony, [GBI] Agent Shoudel acknowledged that he had used trickery during the interview when he told Futch that the police had conducted a forensic interview/polygraph test of the victim and that the results revealed with certainty that she was telling the truth about being sexually abused by Futch, that the victim's brother had witnessed an incident where Futch had sexually abused the victim, and that there was an audio recording of the victim's father confronting Futch about the sexual abuse. Agent Shoudel further testified that his representations to Futch were untrue and that he had used such trickery in an attempt to elicit a truthful response from Futch. Ultimately, when confronted with the possibility that something could have happened between Futch and the victim while Futch was intoxicated, Futch stated that ‘anything is possible.’” Based on Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424(3), 554 S.E.2d 458 (2001). Dennis v. State, 293 Ga. 688, 748 S.E.2d 390 (September 9, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted custodial statement. “The officers' erroneous statements that Dennis's co-defendant had cooperated with them and taken responsibility for his actions by telling the truth did not render Dennis's statement inadmissible. See Daniel v. State, 285 Ga. 406(5) (677 S.E.2d 120) (2009) (use of trickery and deceit to obtain a confession does not make it inadmissible when the means employed were not calculated to procure an untrue statement).” Bobby v. Dixon, 10-1540, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (November 7, 2011). Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas petition following Dixon’s Ohio murder conviction. Sixth Circuit erred in ruling “that police violated the Fifth Amendment by urging Dixon to ‘cut a deal’ before his accomplice Hoffner did so. [fn] The Sixth Circuit cited no precedent of this Court — or any court — holding that this common police tactic is unconstitutional. Cf., e.g., [ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)] (‘[T]he Court has refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after being falsely told that his codefendant has turned State's evidence, does so involuntarily’). Because no holding of this Court suggests, much less clearly establishes, that police may not urge a suspect to confess before another suspect does so, the Sixth Circuit had no authority to issue the writ on this ground.” Thorpe v. State, 285 Ga. 604, 678 S.E.2d 913 (June 29, 2009). Murder and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly admitted telephone conversation between defendant and informant cooperating with police. “[Defendant] asserts that because Thorpe was acting as an agent of the State unbeknownst to appellant at the time of the conversation, the statement was involuntarily made and thus inadmissible under the due process clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions, respectively, and under OCGA §§ 24-3-50 and 24-9-20.” Supreme Court disagrees, finding that State’s deception does not render statement involuntary, as “the elicitation of [defendant's] unguarded response to a perceived confidante regarding the circumstances of the crimes in which they had both participated was clearly designed to procure an unfiltered, genuine statement from [defendant].” Miranda not required here because defendant was not in custody. Henry v. State, 295 Ga.App. 758, 673 S.E.2d 120 (January 28, 2009). Defendant’s statement was not procured by hope of benefit through deceit practiced by detective. Officer told defendant he was being interviewed to determine if he raped 12- year old victim and was the father of victim’s child. Defendant agreed to make statement and to give blood sample, which showed that he was the father. Defendant was charged with statutory rape. Defendant complains that officer didn’t tell him he could be accused of statutory rape even if sex was consensual. Distinguishing State v. Ritter , 268 Ga. 108, 486 S.E.2d 492 (1997) (“the employment of deceit may render a statement inadmissible where the particular deception used,