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by constituting a slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury under OCGA § 24-3-50, has induced a party to confess”). “[T]he trial court was authorized to find that no promise, express or implied, was made to Henry that he would face a rape charge only if the investigation revealed he had committed forcible rape. … Thus, the fact that Henry may have been ignorant of the statutory rape proscription did not, in and of itself, afford him any basis to claim that the police impermissibly tricked him into incriminating himself.” Also irrelevant that victim may have lied about her age to defendant, as “the principles underlying Ritter address ‘the behavior of the interrogator. ’ Ritter, supra at 110 (emphasis supplied).” Dexter v. State, 293 Ga.App. 388, 667 S.E.2d 172 (August 22, 2008). Officer’s statement to defendant “that she was ‘not saying this is all [Dexter's] fault,’” did not make defendant’s subsequent statement involuntary. “Police can … encourage a defendant to tell the truth without rendering a confession involuntary. See Stinski v. State, 281 Ga. 783, 784-785(2)(a) (642 S.E.2d 1) (2007). Even an emotional appeal does not make a confession involuntary as long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. See State v. Woods, 280 Ga. 758, 759 (632 S.E.2d 654) (2006). Here, Carr may have, to some extent, coaxed Dexter into providing the statement. In so doing, however, she did not offer any hope of benefit or fear of injury. Given these facts, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding Dexter's statement to be voluntary. See Valentine v. State, 289 Ga.App. 60, 62(2) (656 S.E.2d 208) (2007).” Wright v. State, 279 Ga.App. 155, 630 S.E.2d 656 (May 2, 2006). Trial court properly admitted statement despite police trickery. “Wright contends his statement should have been excluded because the investigator lied to him throughout the interview. The investigator acknowledged lying to Wright as part of an interview technique to get Wright to talk. He lied about having found Wright’s pubic hair in the victim’s guest bedroom, about having a specimen of Wright’s urine, and about the neighbors having called police to complain about noise coming from the victim’s apartment on the night in question. However, it is well-established that a mere overstatement by the investigators as to how much inculpatory evidence they presently possessed does not affect the admissibility of a defendant’s statement. See Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 424(3) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001). The use of trickery and deceit to obtain a confession does not render the confession inadmissible, as long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. See Richardson v. State, 265 Ga.App. 711, 715(1) (595 S.E.2d 565) (2004). And, absent any evidence that the police investigative techniques were designed to induce the slightest hope of benefit or fear of injury, the resulting statements are not rendered involuntary and inadmissible. See DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8) (493 S.E.2d 157) (1997).” No evidence here that hope of benefit or fear of injury were used, or that means were calculated to procure an untrue statement. Accord, Vergara v. State , 283 Ga. 175, 657 S.E.2d 863 (February 25, 2008); Edwards v. State , 312 Ga.App. 141, 717 S.E.2d 722 (October 19, 2011) (apology letter officer had defendant write to robbery victims as “an investigative tool to obtain more facts and details about the crimes” was properly admitted). Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (November 23, 2004). “Brown … claims that [officer] intended for Brown to overhear [co-defendant’s] statements implicating him in the shooting so that he would confess. However, the use of trickery by police does not render a confession inadmissible, so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789 (8) (493 S.E.2d 157) (1997). Even if [officer] allowed Brown to overhear [co-defendant’s] implication of him, there is no evidence that he was attempting to procure an untrue statement from Brown. Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s findings that Brown’s statements were freely and voluntarily given.” Getkate v. State, 269 Ga.App. 558, 604 S.E.2d 611 (September 13, 2004). “Getkate claims that the trial court erred by admitting his confession because the detectives tricked him into believing that his actions were not serious. He argues that the detectives led him to believe that he would be released after the interview to go to work and that they intimated that if the sexual contact with [minor victim] was consensual, it did not constitute a crime…. In fact, the detectives never said that a consensual act would not constitute a crime and told Getkate that they were interested in knowing if the acts were consensual only after he had confessed. Thus, the detectives’ statements cannot be construed as offering a reward of lighter punishment if Getkate confessed.” Distinguished from State v. Ritter , 268 Ga. 108, 485 S.E.2d 492 (1997), where “the detective who interrogated Ritter told him that the victim was going to be okay and would likely only have a bad headache when, in fact, the detective knew the victim had died from his injuries. The detective testified that he was afraid if he told Ritter the truth, he would not talk to the police. Based on the detective’s misrepresentations, Ritter confessed to what he thought was an aggravated assault charge. The court held that the detective’s deception was intended and did induce Ritter to confess in the hope of receiving lighter punishment and that his confession would not have been made if he knew he faced a possible death sentence.” Detectives’ misstatement of possible punishment here did not require suppression because it came after defendant made his statement.