☢ test - Í

Pinckney v. State, 259 Ga.App. 309, 576 S.E.2d 574 (January 9, 2003). Use of trickery or deceit does not make a confession inadmissible. Trejo v. State, 245 Ga.App. 316, 537 S.E.2d 755 (July 25, 2000). Convictions for statutory rape and child molestation affirmed; no error in admitting defendant’s custodial statement. “Assuming arguendo that the officers lied to Trejo in an effort to elicit incriminating comments, the use of trickery does not render a confession inadmissible so long as the means used are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789(8), 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997).” No such circumstances here. “Although noting that some of the language used by one detective ‘may not have been the best,’ the court determined that Trejo had been neither threatened nor coerced.” Davis v. State, 271 Ga. 527, 520 S.E.2d 218 (September 13, 1999). Trial court properly declined to suppress defendant’s custodial statement on grounds that “the officers failed to inform him that the interview was being taped, used a hidden camera to videotape him, and left him alone in the room in the hope of inducing him to make an incriminating statement. … [T]he officers' action in this case did not give Davis any hope of a benefit or fear of an injury. See DeYoung v. State, 268 Ga. 780, 789, 493 S.E.2d 157 (1997).” 47. VOLUNTARINESS – PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AS DEFENDANTS Seminal case: Garrity v. New Jersey , 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). Lengsfeld v. State, 324 Ga.App. 775, 751 S.E.2d 566 (November 18, 2013). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied police officer/defendant’s motion to suppress statement given to GBI as part of criminal investigation into defendant’s behavior with underage girl. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence showed no express or implied threat to defendant’s public employment if he refused to give statement; rather, defendant was expressly told that he could refuse, and in fact did refuse a requested polygraph. “Notably, there was no evidence that the State coerced Lengsfeld to speak with the GBI agent. Lengsfeld contends that Chief Meadows encouraged him to speak to the GBI agent and that this amounted to coercion. Such encouragement, however, does not rise to the level of coercion. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Chief Meadows ordered Lengsfeld to speak to the GBI agent, a direct order to speak to an investigator does not, by itself, show coercion unless that order is coupled with the threat of termination for failing to follow such order,” citing Aiken (June 4, 2007), below, at 137(3). “Here, Chief Meadows's letter, while encouraging Lengsfeld to cooperate with the GBI's criminal investigation, made no threat, either implicit or explicit, that Lengsfeld would suffer a consequence for declining to do so. Additionally, the deputy chief testified that he would not have considered any refusal by Lengsfeld to speak with the GBI agent as an act of insubordination.” 2. Defendant was expressly told that the statement was part of a criminal investigation, not an internal affairs investigation. Departmental policy here required officers to cooperate with internal investigations; defendant was expressly told this was not an internal investigation. 3. Defendant was free to leave at any time. “At the time of the interview, Lengsfeld was neither handcuffed, physically restrained, nor placed under arrest. Additionally, the GBI interview ended at Lengsfeld's request based upon his desire to consult an attorney. Although Lengsfeld argues that he was without a vehicle and, therefore, was confined, the record shows that his state-issued vehicle had not yet been confiscated when the interview started; his vehicle was not confiscated until after he terminated the interview; and he was informed in advance of the interview that he was required to turn in all government property as part of his administrative leave. Additionally, nothing prevented Lengsfeld from leaving the police department by simply walking out.” State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga.App. 62, 658 S.E.2d 837 (March 5, 2008). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant/sheriff’s deputy’s statement should be suppressed based upon defendant’s “subjective belief that he would be terminated if he did not cooperate with the GBI Agent conducting the investigation” into defendant’s rape, child molestation and related charges. Department policy required deputies to cooperate with internal investigations. “Even though that policy on its face did not apply to criminal investigations, we conclude, considering the totality of the circumstances, that Stanfield’s belief was objectively reasonable. Although the investigating agent told Stanfield he did not have to talk to him and was free to leave, the record shows that the investigating agent believed there was a departmental policy that required Stanfield to cooperate with him. Moreover, the Sheriff who promulgated that policy testified that it was generally applicable to all investigations and that Stanfield could have faced termination pursuant to the policy if he did not answer the agent’s question. Thus, both the agent who questioned Stanfield and Stanfield’s boss believed that the policy required Stanfield to answer the agent’s questions. That Stanfield would interpret the policy in a like manner is objectively reasonable under these circumstances.” This despite countervailing considerations: “Stanfield was not told before he was interviewed that he would be fired if he did not give a statement; he was not reminded of the