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policy stated in the manual before or during the interview; he was not ordered by anyone at the Sheriff’s Department to go to the interview; no one at the Sheriff’s Department spoke to him about the investigation prior to the interview; and the agent told him before each interview that he did not have to stay, that he did not have to speak with the agent and that he was free to leave and go about his business anytime he wanted. The State also points to the fact that Stanfield believed he was being questioned as part of a criminal investigation, not an internal affairs investigation.” State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 646 S.E.2d 222 (June 4, 2007). Affirming 281 Ga.App. 415, 636 S.E.2d 156 (September 1, 2006); trial court properly suppressed statement given by defendant, a state probation officer, “as part of a criminal investigation into his conduct” in sexually assaulting probationers. Based on Garrity v. New Jersey , 385 U.S. 493 (87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562) (1967), where U.S. Supreme Court held that totality of circumstances required suppression of statements given by defendants/police officers under express threat of job loss if they refused to respond. Question here is analysis where threat of sanction against public employee is implied, not express. Nationally, two lines of authority have emerged: United States v. Friedrick , 842 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir., 1988) (a subjective-objective “analysis that examines whether the employee subjectively believed that he would be fired if he did not answer questions and whether that subjective belief was objectively reasonable”) and United States v. Indorato , 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir., 1980) (declining to extend Garrity to “an implied threat of dismissal” even though defendant police officer contended that “departmental rules, with which he was familiar, provided ‘for dismissal of any officer who refused to obey the lawful orders of superiors.’”) “Having examined the foregoing authority, we conclude that it is unnecessary to adopt the two- part test of Friedrick or the more narrow interpretation of Garrity espoused by other courts. Instead, because the Supreme Court in Garrity employed the totality-of-the-circumstances test for evaluating whether the defendant’s statement was coerced, and because this State’s courts have vast experience applying this test, [cits.] we hereby adopt that test for determining whether the statements that a public employee makes during an investigation into his activities is voluntary. Factors that a court may consider include those discussed in the foregoing cases, including whether the State actor made an overt threat to the defendant of the loss of his job if he did not speak with investigators or whether a statute, rule, or ordinance of which the defendant was aware provided that the defendant would lose his job for failing to answer questions. [Cit.] If no express threat is present, the court may examine whether the defendant subjectively believed that he could lose his job for failing to cooperate and whether, if so, that belief was reasonable given the State action involved. In determining whether the defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable, the court may examine whether the defendant was aware of any statutes, ordinances, manuals, or policies that required cooperation and provided generally, without specifying a penalty, that an employee could be subject to discipline for failing to cooperate. The court may also consider whether the investigator implicitly communicated any threat of dismissal either in written or oral form; whether, before the interrogation began, the defendant was told he was free to leave at any time; and whether the defendant was told he had the right to have a lawyer present. [fn] A trial court, of course, is free to consider any other factor that it determines is relevant to the determination of voluntariness. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances test is in keeping with the spirit of Garrity and with the discretion our courts have historically enjoyed in determining whether a defendant’s statement is voluntary.” Totality of circumstances here support finding of subjective belief that defendant could be fired for refusing to cooperate, and objective reasonableness of that belief, and thus requires suppression of defendant’s statement. Circumstances include department standard operating procedures requiring cooperation with law enforcement investigations; superiors’ directives to speak with investigator; investigator’s warning that he was subject to dismissal if he interfered with investigation by discussing it with anyone other than investigative staff or department legal office; and defendant’s testimony “that he thought that he could be fired if he did not answer the investigator’s questions.” “[C]onsidered in isolation, the fact that Aiken’s supervisor and his supervisor’s boss both told Aiken to meet with the investigator would not support a finding that it was objectively reasonable for Aiken to believe that he was coerced into answering the investigator’s questions. [Cit.] However, considering the directive from Aiken’s superiors in combination with the form that the investigator had Aiken sign that provided that he could be fired if he interfered with the investigation ‘in any manner,’ we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for a person in Aiken’s position to believe that he could be fired if he did not cooperate with the investigator. [fn] Moreover, other factors that might lead to a finding of voluntariness are not present. For example, the investigator did not inform Aiken of his Miranda rights and did not inform Aiken that he was free to the stop the interview at any time.” Despite Court’s statement to the contrary, this is clearly an adoption of the Friedrick subjective/objective analysis, with more detailed description of what factors the trial court may shed light on defendant’s subjective belief, or the reasonableness thereof. Accord, Stanfield (March 5, 2008), above; State v. Thompson , 288 Ga. 165, 702 S.E.2d 198 (November 8, 2010) (trial court properly suppressed defendant police officer’s statement given during internal investigation; officer reasonably believed that he was compelled to cooperate “for fear of losing his job.”). Compare Lengsfeld (November 18, 2013), above.