☢ test - Í

State v. Stinson , 244 Ga.App. 622, 536 S.E.2d 293 (June 26, 2000). In prosecution for sexual battery and related offenses, trial court erred in excluding statements of defendant police officer, accused of forcing victim to perform sexual acts. Defendant moved to suppress statements given during internal investigation, contending the statements were obtained under duress in that he faced adverse administrative action if he failed to give the statements. Held, evidence failed to support defendant’s contention of duress, under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967) (police officers’ statements given under express threat of discharge if they remained silent should have been suppressed). “Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Garrity , federal and state courts asked to apply its holding to the facts before them have developed two distinct lines of authority, one requiring an explicit threat of termination and mandatory termination for a failure to cooperate [ United States v. Indorato , 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir., 1980)] and the other requiring an objectively reasonable, subjective belief on the part of the officer that he must answer questions or lose his job [ United States v. Friedrick , 842 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir., 1988)].” “No evidence establishes the Indorato requirement of an overt threat to terminate Stinson's employment or the Friedrick requirement that Stinson subjectively believed he would be terminated if he failed to answer questions. See State v. Lacaillade, 266 N.J.Super. 522, 630 A.2d 328, 332 (1993) (subjective belief requirement of Friedrick analysis not met in the absence of testimony by the defendant). Thus, we need not choose which analysis should have been applied by the trial court.” Georgia Supreme Court rejects both tests in Aiken (September 1, 2006) , above. 48. VOLUNTARINESS – STATEMENT GIVEN BEFORE/AFTER POLYGRAPH Legan v. State, 289 Ga.App. 244, 656 S.E.2d 879 (January 18, 2008). “‘[A]dmissions which are otherwise competent and admissible are not to be excluded simply because the admissions were made after the taking of a lie detector test. The same rule applies to admissions made before commencement of the test.’ (Footnote omitted.) Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255, 258-259(5) (455 S.E.2d 27) (1995).” 49. VOLUNTARINESS – STATEMENT GIVEN PRIOR TO MIRANDA WARNING/ “TWO- STAGE” STATEMENT Seminal case: Missouri v. Seibert , (June 28, 2004), below. Fennell v. State, 292 Ga. 834, 741 S.E.2d 877 (April 29, 2013). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no improper “two-stage” interrogation. “The focus of appellant's initial interview with police was on the victims, the conversations police believed appellant may have had with Coleman shortly before he was shot, and the reasons why the victims might have been in the park where the crimes occurred. Appellant at that time consistently denied any involvement in the crimes and maintained he did not speak with Coleman the night of the crimes. Even after appellant told police he saw Coleman's car in the park that night and saw two men shoot into the vehicle, the focus of questioning was on what appellant saw. After Miranda warnings were given, detectives went well beyond the scope of the initial interview, eventually obtaining statements from appellant in which he admitted his direct involvement in the crimes. Thus, the post- Miranda interrogation differed not only in the completeness and detail of the questions asked by the detectives but also in the content of appellant's statements.” Distinguishing Seibert (June 28, 2004) and Pye (October 29, 2007), below. Bobby v. Dixon, 10-1540, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (November 7, 2011). Sixth Circuit erred in granting habeas petition following Dixon’s Ohio murder conviction. Sixth Circuit erred in finding improper “two-tier” statement took place here. “As the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion explained, the circumstances surrounding Dixon's interrogations demonstrate that his statements were voluntary. During Dixon's first interrogation, he received several breaks, was given water and offered food, and was not abused or threatened. He freely acknowledged that he had forged [murder victim] Hammer's name, even stating that the police were ‘welcome’ to that information, and he had no difficulty denying that he had anything to do with Hammer's disappearance. [Cit.] Prior to his second interrogation, Dixon made an unsolicited declaration that he had spoken with his attorney and wanted to tell the police what had happened to Hammer. Then, before giving his taped confession, Dixon twice received Miranda warnings and signed a waiver-of-rights form which stated that he was acting of his own free will. The Ohio Supreme Court recognized that Dixon's first interrogation involved ‘an intentional Miranda violation.’ The court concluded, however, that ‘as in [ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)] the breach of the Miranda procedures here involved no actual compulsion’ and thus there was no reason to suppress Dixon's later, warned confession. [Cit.] (citing Elstad, supra, at 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285).” Distinguishing Missouri v. Seibert (June 28, 2004), below : “in this case Dixon steadfastly maintained during his first, unwarned interrogation that he had ‘[n]othing whatsoever’ to do with Hammer's disappearance. [Cit.] Thus, unlike in Seibert, there is no concern here that police gave Dixon Miranda warnings and then led him to repeat an earlier murder confession, because there was no earlier confession to repeat. Indeed, Dixon