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contradicted his prior unwarned statements when he confessed to Hammer's murder. … Moreover, in Seibert the Court was concerned that the Miranda warnings did not ‘effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement’ because the unwarned and warned interrogations blended into one ‘continuum.’ 542 U.S., at 612, 617, 124 S.Ct. 2601. Given all the circumstances of this case, that is not so here. Four hours passed between Dixon's unwarned interrogation and his receipt of Miranda rights, during which time he traveled from the police station to a separate jail and back again; claimed to have spoken to his lawyer; and learned that police were talking to his accomplice and had found Hammer's body. Things had changed.” State v. Kendrick, 309 Ga.App. 870, 711 S.E.2d 420 (June 13, 2011). Trial court properly suppressed defendant’s Mirandized custodial statement, given after non- Mirandized statement taken by patrol officer. Officer stopped defendant carrying a ceiling fan and approaching people in a parking lot. Defendant gave his name but had no identification, and said he got the fan from his home because he needed some money. Officer detained defendant and “continued his investigation, telling Kendrick several times that he needed to be honest and show him exactly where he had gotten the fan. Kendrick eventually said that he would, and the officer handcuffed him and put him in the backseat of his patrol car. Kendrick directed the officer to a pile of trash located a short distance down the street. Once there, the officer testified, Kendrick repeatedly told the officer that he had taken the fan from the pile of trash; each time, the officer told Kendrick that he did not believe him and told him to be honest with him. Kendrick eventually told the officer that he had taken the fan out of the abandoned house that was near the pile of trash, adding that a door to the house was already open.” Officer then had defendant taken to police precinct, where an investigator was briefed on the first statement in defendant’s presence, then read Miranda and took a second statement. “As Kendrick's lawyer argued to the trial court, this case presents the type of situation that caused the United States Supreme Court concern in Seibert [ (June 28, 2004), below ] , and later, caused the Supreme Court of Georgia concern in Pye [ (October 29, 2007), below ] . … “This ‘two stage’ interrogation technique employed upon Kendrick is not materially distinguishable from those employed in Seibert and Pye. [fn: See Pye, supra at 800 and n. 6 (finding no requirement of any subjective intent by the police, because while the Seibert Court observed that the interrogation strategy employed there was admittedly deliberate, the Seibert Court specifically noted that a police policy ‘will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was here’ and therefore declared that ‘the focus is on facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work’). ] .” Distinguishes Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) ( see facts discussed in note on Seibert, below ) because Elstad “had ‘none of the earmarks of coercion,’ unlike here,” and because of factors present here described in Seibert “that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their object: ‘the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. ’” State v. Folsom, 286 Ga. 105, 686 S.E.2d 239 (November 2, 2009). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that portion of defendant’s statement given after Miranda warnings was admissible, although first two pre- Miranda hours were suppressed: “Here, pre- Miranda , Folsom was questioned about his ownership of a gun, and, although Folsom admitted that he had once owned such a gun and pawned it, he consistently maintained that he had no involvement in the murders. Post- Miranda , the questioning related specifically to Folsom’s connection to the crime that had been committed, and Folsom admitted his direct connection with the crimes. Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s determination that Folsom had not been subjected to an inappropriate two-stage questioning technique which destroyed the purpose of Miranda . Here, Folsom was not enticed to admit to the crime, given Miranda rights, and asked to repeat the pre- Miranda admission. At the time that Miranda rights were given in Seibert [(June 28, 2004), below ] and Pye [(October 29, 2007), below ], in contrast, ‘there was little, if anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid.’ Seibert, supra , 542 U. S. at 616 (V). That is not the case here.” Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 676 S.E.2d 215 (April 28, 2009). Defendant’s statements were properly admitted: “Davis voluntarily went to the police station in order to give a statement about his own claims that he had twice been assaulted. After completing his initial statement, the police suspected that Davis might be involved in the victim's murder. Although Davis was not taken into custody, at that point he was informed of his Miranda rights, which he waived in writing. Davis continued to speak to detectives, and eventually asked for an attorney. All questioning immediately ceased, and Davis was driven home by detectives.” Distinguishing Seibert (June 28, 2004), below (Mirandized custodial statement following non-Mirandized custodial statement suppressed). Reaves v. State, 284 Ga. 181, 664 S.E.2d 211 (July 11, 2008). “The admissibility of [defendant’s] pre- Miranda statements depends upon whether ‘“a reasonable person in the place of the defendant would feel so restrained as to