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equate to a formal arrest. (Cits.)” [Cit.]’ Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 358(2), 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006). However, the trial court has not yet made the findings of fact necessary to decide this question, including, but not limited to, whether Reaves was ordered to sit, and whether and when he was forbidden to use his cellular telephone. Therefore, we remand the case for the findings of fact which are necessary to determine whether Reaves was in custody prior to his first Miranda warning. See Hicks v. State, 255 Ga. 503, 504(1), 340 S.E.2d 604 (1986); Livingston v. State, 267 Ga.App. 875, 877(2), 600 S.E.2d 817 (2004). On remand, the trial court should note that, contrary to Reaves' argument, whether officers focused their ‘unarticulated suspicions’ on him and whether they secretly possessed probable cause to arrest him are irrelevant to the question of whether he was in custody. Hodges v. State, 265 Ga. 870, 872(2), 463 S.E.2d 16 (1995).” State v. Pye, 282 Ga. 796, 653 S.E.2d 450 (October 29, 2007). Based on Seibert (June 28, 2004), below, trial court properly suppressed defendants’ “two-stage” statements separated in time only long enough to give Miranda warning. “There was nothing in the circumstances which allowed Pye to view the portion of the interrogation after Miranda warnings ‘as presenting a markedly different experience from’ that portion of the interrogation before he was warned; the delayed Miranda warnings cannot be considered to have been effective under Seibert .” However, trial court erred in also suppressing statements made by defendant Pye immediately before police brought up the subject of the murder he’d committed – “Pye voluntarily went to the police station to discuss the theft of his wheel rims, and that is all that was discussed initially.” Only after the discussion turned from the incident where he was victim (of theft) to his killing of the thief, and police made clear that he was not free to leave, did the statement become the product of custodial interrogation. Distinguished, Fennell (April 29, 2013), above. United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11 th Cir., December 20, 2006). Defendant’s unwarned statement was inadmissible, but his subsequent warned statement was not tainted; based on “ Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). Elstad sets out the general rule that the existence of a pre-warning statement does not require suppression of a post-warning statement that was knowingly and voluntarily made, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, while Seibert sets out an exception for situations where police employ a deliberate ‘question first’ strategy. 542 U.S. at 617, 124 S.Ct. at 2613.” No such strategy was employed here: “The questioning of Street before he was given the full Miranda warnings was brief and general. Agent Fitzgerald did not withhold Miranda warnings, solicit a full confession, and then lead Street back through his confession again. Fitzgerald gave Street partial warnings up front. Because giving any warnings undermines the effectiveness of the ‘question first’ tactic, the fact that some warnings were given strongly evidences that the tactic was not being used. Fitzgerald did not set out to intentionally circumvent or undermine the protections the Miranda warnings provide. He just messed up.” See note on Seibert (June 28, 2004), below. And admission of the unwarned statement was harmless error where “the improperly admitted statements were encompassed within the more detailed, properly admitted confession.” Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (June 28, 2004). Police arrested defendant and thoroughly questioned her at police station about a suspicious death by fire, deliberately failing to give her Miranda warnings until they had obtained a confession that the fire was set deliberately to kill victim in his sleep. Questioning was then suspended for 20 minutes, whereupon questioning resumed in the same place with the same officer. Miranda warnings were then given, and defendant was re-questioned, using her prior statement to remind her that she had already confessed until she did so again. Held, both statements were inadmissible against defendant. Test is not whether officer intentionally withheld warnings in first statement; nor is a “fruit of the poisonous tree” analysis used, as in Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis. Rather, test is “ whether in the circumstances the Miranda warnings given could reasonably be found effective. If yes, a court can take up the standard issues of voluntary waiver and voluntary statement; if no, the subsequent statement is inadmissible for want of adequate Miranda warnings, because the earlier and later statements are realistically seen as parts of a single, unwarned sequence of questioning.” Distinguishes Oregon v. Elstad , 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); in Elstad , the initial statement was brief, made in the living room to explain to defendant’s mother why the officer was taking him into custody, while the second statement occurred at the police station “going well beyond the scope of the laconic prior admission.” Here, by contrast, the officer admittedly followed a stratagem for obtaining a non- Mirandized confession, took a short break, then resumed questioning, using the first statement to press defendant into again confessing. “The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish their object: the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.” Also significant here: “the police did not advise that her prior statement could not be used.” Dissent would merely apply the voluntariness analysis from Elstad : whether the prior coercion carried over, given the circumstances, and whether