☢ test - Í

defendant has shown that the second statement was involuntary notwithstanding the Miranda warnings. Distinguished, see Street (December 20, 2006), Davis (April 28, 2009), Bobby (November 7, 2011), and Fennell (April 29, 2013), above; Walker v. State , 296 Ga. 161, 766 S.E.2d 28 (November 17, 2014) ( Seibert distinguished where first part of interview wasn’t in violation of Miranda ). Jones v. State, 266 Ga.App. 717, 598 S.E.2d 366 (April 1, 2004). “A defendant’s written statement given to the police with the benefit of Miranda warnings is not tainted by an earlier oral statement given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, where no ‘coercive tactics were employed in obtaining the prior statement and that both the prior and subsequent statements were voluntary.’ Carter v. State, 249 Ga.App. 354, 355(2) (548 S.E.2d 102) (2001).” Heckman v. State, 276 Ga. 141, 576 S.E.2d 834 (January 27, 2003). Where defendant makes non-Mirandized statement, followed by Mirandized statement, “the admissibility of any subsequent statement turns on whether, under all the circumstances, that statement was knowingly and voluntarily made. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222) (1985). Further if the suspect made the initial statement voluntarily, the fact that it was not preceded by Miranda warnings will not taint a subsequent voluntary statement which had the benefit of those warnings.” Baker v. State, 238 Ga.App. 802, 521 S.E.2d 24 (June 30, 1999). Trial court properly excluded defendant’s statements as being the product of police coercion where officers threatened to arrest defendant and two others if defendant didn’t admit to owning drugs found in house. 1. Statements resulted from custodial interrogation. “ Handcuffed and surrounded by several police officers, [Defendant's] freedom of action was clearly curtailed so as to establish custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1097-1098(V)(A) (7 th Cir., 1993); see Thomason v. State, 268 Ga. 298, 302-303(2)(c), 486 S.E.2d 861 (1997). While [defendant] was in custody, Officer Davis interrogated him by express questions and also by words and actions designed to elicit an incriminating response. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Franks v. State, 268 Ga. 238, 240, 486 S.E.2d 594 (1997). Because Officer Davis failed to warn [defendant] of his Miranda rights, his oral statements were inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); Metheny v. State, 197 Ga.App. 882, 884-885(1)(b), 400 S.E.2d 25 (1990).” 2. Oral statement was product of coercion and thus involuntary. “In light of the handcuffing of Matthew, the direct threats to Matthew that they would jail his relatives if he did not confess, the spontaneous observation by a third party that the police were pressuring Matthew to confess, and the actions of the officer in beginning to pull a gun in the emotionally charged and volatile atmosphere where police were demanding that Matthew confess, evidence supported the court's finding that under the totality of the circumstances police coercive activities resulted in an involuntary confession.” 3. Reading Miranda prior to later, written statement didn’t remove taint from prior involuntary statement. “At this point a presumption arose that the coerced admission tainted the subsequent written confession. This presumption is overcome only if there was a break in the stream of events between the coerced statement and the subsequent confession such that the coercion surrounding the first statement sufficiently dissipated so as to make the second statement voluntary. Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 710, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967).” “The Supreme Court held in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), that an unwarned admission does not automatically bar a later confession preceded by proper warnings. However, if actual coercion attended the first statement, then the subsequent confession is normally rendered inadmissible under the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 928 (11 th Cir., 1985); cf. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285.” “Evidence supported the court's finding that same coercion also attended the subsequent written confession. Not only did the written confession immediately follow the coerced admission, but it took place at the same location under the watchful eye of the officers who had just forced the first confession. See [ United States. v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1467-1468 (10 th Cir., 1993)]. Moreover, before reading him Miranda rights, Officer Davis had wrested a commitment from Matthew that he would put the just stated admission in writing. Cf. Mobley v. State, 164 Ga.App. 154, 158(6), 296 S.E.2d 617 (1982). The reading of the Miranda rights did little to dissipate the coercion present throughout the encounter.” VVVVV. STIPULATIONS Wing v. State, 327 Ga.App. 361, 759 S.E.2d 243 (May 27, 2014). Convictions affirmed for DUI and failure to report accident. On appeal, defendant couldn’t challenge sufficiency of evidence as to failure to report an accident after “counsel for Wing stipulated that there were sufficient facts to find Wing guilty” and agreeing to stipulated bench trial without necessity of calling State’s witnesses. “Under these circumstances, ‘[Wings's attorney] led the court, as well as the State, to ... understand that the only contested issue there had been at trial was whether the evidence should be suppressed.’ Sanders v. State, 252 Ga.App. 609, 614–615(2), 556 S.E.2d 505 (2001) (holding that challenge to evidentiary sufficiency was waived, where defendant stipulated before the trial court to all elements of the offense). Consequently,