☢ test - Í

Wing cannot now contest the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her conviction for failing to report an accident. See Sanders, supra; Scott v. State, 201 Ga.App. 162–163(1), 410 S.E.2d 362 (1991) (concluding that defendant waived right to challenge the sufficiency of evidence, where record revealed that the defense attorney led trial judge and prosecuting attorney to think that the only issue contested by defendant was whether the evidence, obtained by a search, should be suppressed).” Muldrow v. State, 322 Ga.App. 190, 744 S.E.2d 413 (June 12, 2013). Rape, kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel stipulated to venue, given that trial court had discretion to re-open evidence, anyway. Contrary to defendant’s argument, trial court wasn’t required to “question the accused personally as to whether he agrees to enter into a stipulation. … Here, unlike in In re: Glenn , [200 Ga.App. 276, 276, 407 S.E.2d 428 (1991)] the stipulation was both made by Muldrow’s attorney and presented to the jury in Muldrow’s presence without objection, which was sufficient to bind Muldrow and show his authorization. . See Denson v. State, 150 Ga. 618, 620–21(4) (104 SE 780) (1920) (holding that waiver by attorney was binding upon the accused when, before the State introduced the evidence complained of on appeal, counsel for the State, ‘in the presence of the accused and his counsel, stated the agreement, and the evidence of the witness was then read to the jury in the presence of the accused and his counsel ... without objection’); see also id. at 621 (‘It is generally agreed that stipulations, whether made by the defendant himself or by his counsel, are binding. The authorities are generally agreed upon the proposition that it is immaterial whether the stipulation is made by counsel employed by the accused or by counsel appointed by the court for the accused.’); Dryer v. State, 205 Ga.App. 671, 672(1) (423 S.E.2d 297) (1992) (‘Generally, a statement by defense counsel made in the presence of the defendant relating to the defendant's conduct is considered a statement by the defendant himself if the defendant does not repudiate counsel's authority to make the statement.’). Compare Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 41, 45–46 (28 SE 26) (1896) (holding that admissions purportedly made by an accused by way of his agents or attorneys in pleadings from a civil case are not admissible in a criminal case ‘unless shown to have been authorized by him’).” Tiller v. State, 286 Ga.App. 230, 648 S.E.2d 738 (July 2, 2007). Defendant’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon reversed; evidence presented to jury failed to prove that defendant was a convicted felon. State tendered certified copy of defendant’s prior conviction for felony theft by taking, but agreed with defense request to remove sentencing sheet from the exhibit. Exhibit thus tendered failed to disclose whether the charge was a felony or misdemeanor, and thus failed to prove that defendant was a convicted felon. “Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the only evidence before the jury regarding Tiller’s status as a convicted felon – that he had pled guilty to a crime that could have been either a felony or a misdemeanor – failed to provide the jury with a sufficient basis for finding that element beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cit.] Consequently, Tiller’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon must be reversed. [Cit.]” Fact that defendant offered to stipulate to his felony status does not change this result, as the offer was never communicated to the jury. “It is true that ‘[a] defendant may stipulate to ... factual matters, but the record must reflect that the defendant expressly authorized such stipulation and that the stipulation was intended to obviate the need for direct proof.’ [ Tompkins v. State, 278 Ga. 857, 858(1), 607 S.E.2d 891 (2005)]. Furthermore, where the parties have agreed ‘to stipulate facts in criminal cases, the trier of fact must be informed of the stipulated facts.’ Raby [ v. State, 274 Ga.App. 665, 666(1), 618 S.E.2d 704 (2005)] (citation omitted); see generally Graham v. State, 275 Ga. 290, 292-293(2), 565 S.E.2d 467 (2002). Accordingly, in this case, the cited remark by defense counsel does not constitute a stipulation that Tiller was a convicted felon. Tompkins, supra at 858, 607 S.E.2d 891.” Raby v. State, 274 Ga.App. 665, 618 S.E.2d 704 (July 27, 2005). “While parties may agree to stipulate facts in criminal cases, Sanders v. State, 252 Ga.App. 609, 613(2) (556 S.E.2d 505) (2001), the trier of fact must be informed of the stipulated facts. Cf. Stephens Cty. Bd. Tax Assessors v. Shirley, 263 Ga.App. 743, 744 (589 S.E.2d 263) (2003) (stipulated evidence not considered by jury could not be used to support award of attorney fees). Because the State failed to present the stipulation to the trier of fact and there was no other evidence that Raby was driving without a license, insufficient evidence exists to sustain Raby’s conviction for driving without a license.” Accord, Tiller (July 2, 2007), above. WWWWW. SUBPOENAS See PROCEDURE – SUBPOENAS, below XXXXX. SUBSTANCES, IDENTIFICATION OF Kessinger v. State, 298 Ga. App. 479, 680 S.E.2d 546 (June 23, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to support finding that pills were oxycodone, without any scientific analysis. “With respect to the identification of drugs, ‘identification testimony of experienced officers [is] admissible, and expert testimony based on scientific tests is not required to establish a substance is’ a controlled substance. Jones v. State, 268 Ga.App. 246, 249(1) (601 S.E.2d 763) (2004). Here, the pills