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were contained in a prescription bottle labeled oxycodone, and there was testimony from two experienced witnesses qualified as experts in drug identification that, based on their experience and the fact that the pills' logo matched that of pharmaceutically prepared oxycodone tablets, the pills were oxycodone. This testimony was evidence of the pills' identity, and it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that the pills were oxycodone. See OCGA § 24-4-8 (testimony of a single witness sufficient to establish a fact); Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 570, 572(1) (531 S.E.2d 743) (2000) (whole court) (holding that lawful drug conviction does not require scientific evidence).” Burg v. State, 298 Ga.App. 214, 679 S.E.2d 780 (June 3, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of methamphetamine, even without scientific testing of the substance. “While Burg complains that the pipe was not tested for the presence of methamphetamine, as noted above, in drug possession cases the State is not required to present expert testimony scientifically identifying the substance or to introduce the drugs into evidence. See also Slade v. State, 222 Ga.App. 407, 408(1) (474 S.E.2d 204) (1996) (‘the State is not required to introduce the illegal drug itself into evidence’). In Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 570 (531 S.E.2d 743) (2000), regarding the identity of marijuana, we determined that other circumstances surrounding the arrest – the presence of drug paraphernalia, such as hemostats, pipes, rolling papers, partially smoked cigarettes, crack pipes, and other cocaine paraphernalia – supported the verdict. Id. at 573.” “In Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 421-22(1)(A)(c) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986), it was held that although the concept of ‘corpus delicti requires that in a drug-possession case there be proof by the state that the defendant possessed (or perhaps attempted to possess) the illegal drug ... there is no invariable requirements that in every such case, the drug itself be produced.’ There, the sole evidence establishing the identity of a substance was provided by witnesses who testified that they ‘had seen appellant Chancey use a white, powdery substance in a manner in which cocaine is used, and there was testimony as to his change in behavior after such use.’ Id. at 421.” Willingham v. State, 296 Ga.App. 89, 673 S.E.2d 606 (February 13, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to prove that substance possessed by defendant was marijuana, although “there was no expert testimony identifying the substance as marijuana, no crime lab report, and no contraband introduced into evidence by the state.” Sole evidence as to substance came from testimony of victim from whom it was stolen; defendant contends that victim’s testimony shows that he “never actually saw the marijuana but instead relied on statements made to him by [someone else] concerning what was in the bags.” Defendant, however, never challenged this identification of the substance at trial, raising instead an alibi defense. “‘Where a witness testifies to a conclusion of fact which could be within his knowledge and such testimony is admitted without objection, it cannot be attacked on review as being incompetent or insufficient.’ (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. Woodward Lumber Co., 76 Ga.App. 152, 153(1) (45 S.E.2d 294) (1947). See Maness v. State, 265 Ga.App. 239, 241(1) (593 S.E.2d 698) (2004) ( defendant waived claim that testimony identifying substance as marijuana was without proper foundation when he failed to object to the identification testimony at trial ); [other cites].” Distinguishing “ Chambers v. State, 260 Ga.App. 48, 50-52(1) (579 S.E.2d 71) (2003), where the defendant objected to the critical identification testimony at trial.” Sherrer v. State, 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction regarding methamphetamine despite absence of expert testimony identifying substance. “[T]he State was not required to produce expert testimony to show that police found methamphetamine in the house. See Lewis v. State, 233 Ga.App. 560, 562(3) (504 S.E.2d 732) (1998) (testimony indicating that police field test showing confiscated substance to be cocaine was sufficient, without expert testimony, for jury to conclude that it was cocaine).” Trujillo v. State, 286 Ga.App. 438, 649 S.E.2d 573 (July 9, 2007). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for trafficking in marijuana; State was not required to prove the THC content of the material. “Rather, pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-21(16), ‘“[m]arijuana” means all parts of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whether growing or not, the seeds thereof, the resin extracted from any part of such plant, and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or resin; but shall not include samples as described in subparagraph (P) of paragraph (3) of Code Section 16-13-25 and shall not include the completely defoliated mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil, or cake, or the completely sterilized samples of seeds of the plant which are incapable of germination.’ Nothing in this Code section defines marijuana by the THC content of the plant matter. Further, THC is treated separately in the criminal code as a Schedule I drug. See OCGA § 16-13-25(3)(P). In the instant case, the State, through the testimony of its expert, adduced evidence demonstrating that the green leafy substance seized was marijuana through the use of three tests: Duquenois-Levine, Fast Blue B, and microscopic examination. These are recognized and scientifically accepted methods for determining if plant matter is marijuana in Georgia courts. Cunrod v. State, 241 Ga.App. 743, 744-745(2) (526 S.E.2d 900) (1999); Wilson v. State, 256 Ga.App. 741, 744(3) (569 S.E.2d 640) (2002).”