☢ test - Í

Collins v. State, 278 Ga.App. 103, 628 S.E.2d 148 (March 7, 2006). “ Positive field test results are alone sufficient to sustain a conviction for selling or possessing cocaine. West v. State, 270 Ga.App. 71, 76(5) (606 S.E.2d 100) (2004); Riddle v. State, 267 Ga.App. 630, 632-633(2)(a) (600 S.E.2d 709) (2004). Positive test results from the State crime lab are not required. Davis v. State, 135 Ga.App. 203, 204-205(1) (217 S.E.2d 343) (1975). See Lewis v. State, 233 Ga.App. 560, 562-563(3) (504 S.E.2d 732) (1998).” Accord, Johnson v. State , 289 Ga.App. 206, 656 S.E.2d 861 (January 16, 2008). In re: P.M.H., 277 Ga.App. 643, 627 S.E.2d 211 (February 17, 2006). “P.M.H. alleges that the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to tender into evidence the packet containing the suspected contraband and the empty baggies. We disagree. In a drug possession case, the concept of corpus delicti requires the State to prove that the accused possessed the illegal drug; ‘there is, however, no invariable requirement that the drug itself be produced.’ Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 424, 426(1) (606 S.E.2d 871) (2004). In other words, the failure to produce the actual illegal drug does not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that there has been no proof of a corpus delicti. See Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 421(III)(1)(A)(c) (349 S.E.2d 717) (1986). When, as here, the circumstantial evidence suffices to prove the drug offense, the State is not required to tender the illegal drugs. See Williams, 270 Ga.App. at 426(1). Compare Phillips v. Williams, 276 Ga. 691, 692 (583 S.E.2d 4) (2003) (State failed to offer any evidence at trial regarding what happened to the alleged cocaine after it had been taken from defendant upon his arrest.).” Helton v. State, 271 Ga.App. 272, 609 S.E.2d 200 (January 12, 2005). Officer’s testimony was sufficient to identify methamphetamine. “We reject Helton’s contention that [narcotics investigator] Sosebee’s testimony was insufficient because he was never qualified as an expert. ‘It is well established that expert testimony is not necessary to identify a substance, including drugs. And even if police officers are not formally tendered as expert witnesses, if an adequate foundation is laid with respect to their experience and training, their testimony regarding narcotics is properly admitted.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Bilow v. State, 262 Ga.App. 850, 851(1) (586 S.E.2d 675) (2003). See also Lindley v. State, 225 Ga.App. 338, 340-341(1) (484 S.E.2d 33) (1997). Although Sosebee was never tendered as an expert, the state laid the foundation for his expert testimony, and the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection to the opinions the sergeant gave based on his experience as a narcotics investigator.” Accord, Best v. State , 279 Ga.App. 309, 630 S.E.2d 900 (May 11, 2006); Driscoll v. State , 295 Ga.App. 5, 670 S.E.2d 824 (November 26, 2008) ( quoting Helton ). Davis v. State, 270 Ga.App. 777, 607 S.E.2d 924 (December 6, 2004). Two samples of a substance were submitted to the State crime lab. “[T]he forensic chemist from the State crime lab testified at trial that he did a chemical analysis of the first sample and found that it tested positive for cocaine. He also testified that the second sample, which he did not test, looked virtually identical to, and had the same appearance, color, and texture as, the first sample. This was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that both of the samples contained cocaine.” Accord, Smith v. State , 289 Ga.App. 236, 656 S.E.2d 574 (January 18, 2008) (crime lab test of one ounce out of over 19 pounds of marijuana was sufficient). Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871 (November 12, 2004). Evidence supported cocaine possession conviction despite failure to tender the cocaine itself into evidence. “In a drug possession case, the concept of corpus delicti requires that there be proof by the state that the accused possessed the illegal drug; there is, however, no invariable requirement that the drug itself be produced. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 421(1)(A)(c), 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986). In the instant case, Williams confessed that he and the other two men went to Thomas’ house for the purpose of buying $100 worth of cocaine, that Thomas came out of his house with the cocaine and gave it to him, and that he later split the cocaine with [co-defendants]. Williams’ confession that he possessed cocaine was corroborated by proof that $100 was found on Thomas’ bed next to several bags of a substance that tested positive for crack cocaine. This constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence corroborating Williams’ confession and supporting the cocaine possession conviction. [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 268 Ga.App. 246, 601 S.E.2d 763 (July 1, 2004). “Jones’s contention that his marijuana conviction should be reversed because the forensic chemist never tested the suspected marijuana … lacks merit. In Atkinson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 570 (531 S.E.2d 743) (2000), we held that identification testimony of experienced officers was admissible, and expert testimony based on scientific tests is not required to establish a substance is marijuana. Id. at 571-573(1). But see Chambers v. State, 260 Ga.App. 48 (579 S.E.2d 71) (2003). In Chambers, we reversed the defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana, finding that, ‘[g]iven the exceedingly specific and scientific definition of [marijuana], the instances in which the [s]tate could exclude reasonable doubt without performing conclusive, scientific tests on the suspected marijuana would be very rare.’ Id. at 53(1). One of those rare instances is when there is circumstantial evidence