☢ test - Í

Merritt v. State, 285 Ga. 778, 683 S.E.2d 855 (September 28, 2009). Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for murdering her husband. “Because the evidence presented by the State was entirely circumstantial, such evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused. OCGA § 24-4-6. But it need not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis – only those that are reasonable. Smith v. State, 257 Ga. 381 (359 S.E.2d 662) (1987); White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 107(1) (317 S.E.2d 196) (1984). Whether every reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the defendant has been excluded is a question for the jury. Lindsey v. State, 271 Ga. 657, 658(1) (522 S.E.2d 459) (1999); White v. State, 263 Ga. 94, 97(1) (428 S.E.2d 789) (1993). Where the jury determines the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt, such a finding will be not be disturbed unless the verdict of guilty is insupportable as a matter of law. Berryhill v. State, 285 Ga. 198, 199(1) (674 S.E.2d 920) (2009); Bryant v. State, 282 Ga. 631, 634(2) (651 S.E.2d 718) (2007).” Accord, McKibbins v. State , 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314 (October 21, 2013) (murder conviction affirmed; “whether a hypothesis is a reasonable one is usually a matter for the jury.”); St. Louis v. State , 328 Ga.App. 837, 763 S.E.2d 126 (August 15, 2014). Ratana v. State, 297 Ga.App. 747, 678 S.E.2d 193 (May 12, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and possession of firearm during felony reversed based on insufficient evidence: defendant drove Hicks away from the scene where Hicks shot and killed victim, but “there is no evidence that Ratana drove Hicks to the scene or that Ratana did anything on the scene to advise or encourage Hicks to commit the crimes. Ratana's possession of a box of bullets of the same caliber as those used in the murder weapon in no way proves his possession of the weapon during the commission of the assault upon Howard.” Driving the perpetrator away might make Ratana an accomplice after the fact at common law, but does not make him a party to the crime. Fact that defendant’s car was parked in a position to enable a quick escape “showed nothing more than that Ratana's car, at some point, had been parked with its front end facing in the direction going out of the subdivision. To the extent that evidence constitutes circumstantial evidence of guilt, it simply does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.” Shields v. State, 285 Ga. 372, 677 S.E.2d 100 (May 4, 2009). “[C]ontrary to Shield's contention, the pathologist's testimony about the autopsy findings and his opinion regarding the cause of the victim's death constituted direct, not circumstantial, evidence. Kirk v. State, 289 Ga.App. 125, 126 (656 S.E.2d 251) (2008); see also Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584, 585(1) (255 S.E.2d 702) (1979).” Further, no other cause of death was supported by the evidence. Boone v. State, 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008). Defendant’s conviction for possession of drugs found in his van was supported by the evidence. “Boone argues that his convictions are supported by insufficient circumstantial evidence given the fact that codefendant Phillips had the key to his van. ‘To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, [however,] the proved facts need exclude only reasonable hypotheses – not bare possibilities that the crime could have been committed by someone else. And questions of reasonableness are generally decided by the jury.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Daugherty v. State, 283 Ga.App. 664, 667(1)(a), 642 S.E.2d 345 (2007).” Waters v. State, 288 Ga.App. 260, 653 S.E.2d 849 (November 6, 2007). At defendant’s trial for aggravated child molestation, evidence was sufficient to establish injury to victim, although victim testified that “she could not remember whether the molestation hurt. But in her earlier videotaped interview with investigators, which was played for the jury, J.S. stated, ‘It hurt.’ In Baker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 32 (491 S.E.2d 78) (1997) (physical precedent only), a case with very similar facts, the victim testified that ‘it hurt’ when the defendant molested her. We held: ‘In our opinion, evidence that the molestation “hurt” was sufficient to prove physical injury. It was not necessary for the child’s testimony to be corroborated by medical evidence. [Cit.]’Id. at 33(2). While our decision in Baker is physical precedent only, it was cited by the Georgia Supreme Court with approval for this same holding in Dixon v. State, 278 Ga. 4 (596 S.E.2d 147) (2004): ‘According to existing case law, all that is required to meet the “injury” requirement is that the victim experienced pain during the crime. See Baker v. State, 228 Ga.App. 32, 33 (491 S.E.2d 78) (1997) (“evidence that the molestation ‘hurt’ was sufficient to prove physical injury,” even without corroborating medical evidence). The State in this case introduced evidence that the victim did experience pain during the sexual intercourse.’ Id. at 7(2) n.15.” Evans v State, 288 Ga.App. 103, 653 S.E.2d 520 (October 26, 2007). Corroboration of co-defendant’s testimony was not required where co-defendant was not an accomplice of defendant – co-defendant was merely charged with possession of methamphetamine, while defendant was charged with trafficking. “While Evans is correct that ‘a person may not be convicted of a felony based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Metoyer v. State, 282 Ga.App. 810, 811(1) (640 S.E.2d 345) (2006), ‘corroboration is not required