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if there is a total lack of evidence in the record that the witness at issue was an accomplice. Christian v. State, 277 Ga. 775, 776(1) (596 S.E.2d 6) (2004).’ King v. State, 277 Ga.App. 190, 194 (626 S.E.2d 161) (2006). In this case, there is no evidence in the record showing that Lynch was an accomplice to the drug trafficking crime. Although Lynch admitted to using methamphetamine, she denied that she committed the drug trafficking offense or that she abetted Evans in committing the offense. And, the fact that Lynch had been arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine does not establish that she acted as Evans’s accomplice. See Christian, 277 Ga. at 776(1); King, 277 Ga.App. at 193 (‘ The corroboration requirement is not triggered simply by the fact that a witness in a criminal trial was jointly indicted with the defendant. ’). Furthermore, Evans did not claim at trial that Lynch was his accomplice. He instead, predicated his defense on the premise that the drugs located during the officers’ search did not belong to him, and that he was being framed for the charges. [fn] Under these circumstances, Lynch’s testimony did not require corroboration to authorize Evans’s conviction. See id. ” Tadic v. State, 281 Ga.App. 58, 635 S.E.2d 356 (August 10, 2006). “‘[I]in incidents of child molestation, more often than not the child/victim is the only witness able to provide such direct evidence. Sexual offenses against children necessarily occur in secret. This is one reason that Georgia law does not require corroboration of a child molestation victim’s testimony .’ (Emphasis in original.) Cantrell [ v. State, 231 Ga.App. 629 (500 S.E.2d 386) (1998)]. Given that the allegations against Tadic did not include penetration, ‘the lack of medical evidence to corroborate the victim’s molestation is in no way exculpatory.’ Fitzgerald v. State, 193 Ga.App. 76(2) (386 S.E.2d 914) (1989). Thus, we find that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s findings. See Cantrell, supra at 629.” Accord, Coalson v. State , 237 Ga.App. 570, 515 S.E.2d 882 (April 8, 1999); Sweet v. State , 237 Ga.App. 613, 516 S.E.2d 317 (April 12, 1999); Redman v. State , 281 Ga.App. 605, 636 S.E.2d 680 (August 29, 2006); Foster v. State , 286 Ga.App. 250, 649 S.E.2d 322 (July 3, 2007); Lancaster v. State , 291 Ga.App. 347, 662 S.E.2d 181 (May 1, 2008); Smith v. State , 291 Ga.App. 389, 662 S.E.2d 201 (May 2, 2008); Crane v. State , 291 Ga.App. 414, 662 S.E.2d 225 (May 5, 2008); Simmons v. State , 291 Ga.App. 642, 662 S.E.2d 660 (May 22, 2008). Hill v. State , 295 Ga.App. 360, 671 S.E.2d 853 (December 19, 2008) ( overruled on other grounds, Stuart v. State , 318 Ga.App. 839, 734 S.E.2d 814 (November 28, 2012)); Daniel v. State , 296 Ga.App. 513, 675 S.E.2d 472 (February 17, 2009); Barnes v. State , 299 Ga.App. 253, 682 S.E.2d 359 (July 17, 2009); Harrison v. State , 299 Ga.App. 744, 683 S.E.2d 681 (August 18, 2009); Hamrick v. State , 304 Ga.App. 378, 696 S.E.2d 403 (June 10, 2010) (no corroboration required as to sexual battery , citing Foster ); Rayner v. State , 307 Ga.App. 861, 706 S.E.2d 205 (February 15, 2011); Mauldin v. State , 313 Ga.App. 228, 721 S.E.2d 182 (December 7, 2011). Johnson v. State, 277 Ga.App. 499, 627 S.E.2d 116 (February 6, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for armed robbery and related offenses reversed. “There were no eyewitnesses who saw Johnson participating in the alleged crimes. Neither co- defendant implicated Johnson, and Johnson did not confess to law enforcement or make any incriminating statements to any witnesses regarding the crimes. The State presented no forensic evidence linking Johnson to any of the stolen items or to the crime scene. In contrast to his co-defendants, there was no evidence linking Johnson to a stolen pistol used in the crimes, and there was no evidence that Johnson attempted to harass any potential witnesses or flee from the jurisdiction. Finally, there was no evidence that Johnson received any of the proceeds from the robbery. The state’s evidence showed only that Johnson … was an associate of the co-defendants and was present with the co-defendants at some point before and after the time of the alleged crimes. ‘Our criminal jurisprudence has not endorsed the doctrine of guilt by association.’ Mealor v. State, 134 Ga.App. 564, 565(1) (215 S.E.2d 272) (1975). ‘Mere presence, association or suspicion without any evidence to show further participation in the commission of the crime is insufficient to authorize a conviction.’ Brookins v. State, 202 Ga.App. 759, 760 (415 S.E.2d 674) (1992); Mattox v. State, 196 Ga.App. 64, 66(3) (395 S.E.2d 288) (1990).” Moore v. State, 277 Ga.App. 474, 627 S.E.2d 107 (February 3, 2006). Defendant cannot propound an alternative theory to explain circumstantial evidence against him, which theory is contradicted by his own testimony. “‘ We cannot find that circumstantial evidence is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence when a defendant’s direct testimony contradicts that hypothesi s.’ In re: M.M., 240 Ga.App. 571, 573, 524 S.E.2d 274 (1999). See also Lowery v. State, 264 Ga.App. 655, 657(2), 592 S.E.2d 102 (2003) (rejecting defendant’s reasonable hypothesis of innocence on appeal that was not presented to the jury and was directly contradicted by defendant’s own’s testimony).” Here, defendant offered a theory to explain witness’s testimony placing him at the scene of the crime, but his own testimony – denying being present at all – contradicted the theory. Todd v. State, 275 Ga.App. 459, 620 S.E.2d 666 (September 9, 2005). “Evidence of furtive gestures by a defendant upon the approach of law enforcement can serve as circumstantial evidence of guilt. See Castillo v. State, 232 Ga.App. 354, 356-357 (502 S.E.2d 261) (1998). As previously noted, the State presented testimony that Todd fell to the floor and