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crawled down the hallway of the mobile home upon the approach of law enforcement. ” McKeehan v. State, 274 Ga.App. 14, 616 S.E.2d 489 (June 23, 2005). Defendant’s rape conviction sustained although no one, including victim, could identify him. “Although McKeehan complains that he was never positively identified as the perpetrator, several eyewitnesses saw a man fitting his description in the area near the time of the attack, and evidence other than the victim’s identification of her attacker, including circumstantial evidence, may sustain a conviction for rape. See Walker v. State, 157 Ga.App. 728, 728-730(1) (278 S.E.2d 487) (1981).” Murphy v. State, 279 Ga. 410, 614 S.E.2d 53 (June 6, 2005). “[Defendant’s] admission to having shot the victim, but claiming self-defense, removes this case from the rule that a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence can be affirmed only if every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt is excluded. See Yarborough v. State, 183 Ga.App. 198, 199 (358 S.E.2d 484) (1987); OCGA § 24-4-6.” Edwards v. State, 272 Ga.App. 540, 612 S.E.2d 868 (March 29, 2005). Physical precedent only; two judges concur in judgment only. Defendant’s manslaughter conviction overturned because circumstantial evidence did not exclude every hypothesis save guilt of the accused. “[I]t is uncontested that Edwards had no significant contact with her baby until the time that she called the 911 operator. Moreover, although the father asserted that he had done nothing to harm the baby, he admitted that Edwards had no significant contact with the baby during this time period, and that their arrangement was that Edwards would take care of the baby during the week, and he would have the primary responsibility for the baby during the weekend. The State maintains that this case is comparable to Thomas v. State, 262 Ga.App. 492, 494(1) (589 S.E.2d 243) (2003), where we found that the circumstantial evidence, showing that the defendants were the victim’s primary caretakers and the only people in the victim’s room between the time others last saw her and the time she appeared almost lifeless the next morning, was sufficient to sustain the defendants’ convictions for cruelty to children and aggravated battery. Here, unlike Thomas, Edwards was not the primary caretaker of the child, nor was it established that she was the last person to have access to her baby before the child's injury. The State appears to assert that Edwards’ mere presence in the home was enough to support its equal access theory. In Johnson v. State, 269 Ga. 840 (506 S.E.2d 374) (1998), evidence was presented that ‘(1) on the night of the murder, Johnson was downstairs in the apartment; (2) on the night of the murder, two other adults--the baby’s mother and her boyfriend--were upstairs in the apartment, with the baby; (3) Johnson called 911 to report that the baby was not breathing; (4) neighbors heard Johnson say he ‘did not do it,’ and observed him acting upset; (5) Johnson denied knowledge about the murder, and offered no help to investigators; and (6) someone, acting alone or in concert with someone else, removed the crib from the apartment. There also was some evidence to suggest that, on one previous occasion, Johnson and others had observed [a co-defendant] toss the infant in the air, causing the baby to vomit.’ Id . at 841-842.” In re: E.A.D., 271 Ga.App. 531, 610 S.E.2d 153 (February 7, 2005). Juvenile’s adjudication of delinquency reversed; finding was based on her mere proximity to cocaine hidden under sofa cushions where she was sitting at home of probationer where officers executed search at 2:30 a.m. “The police officers who conducted the search further testified, however, they had no idea how long E.A.D. had been in the home, they did not know the purpose of her visit, and they never saw her put anything under the cushions of the couch.” Drugs were also found in multiple other locations in the house. Williams v. State, 270 Ga.App. 424, 606 S.E.2d 871 (November 12, 2004). Evidence supported cocaine possession conviction despite failure to tender the cocaine itself into evidence. “A confession alone, uncorroborated by any other evidence, does not justify a conviction. [Cit.] However, a free and voluntary confession of guilt by the accused is direct evidence of the highest character and is sufficient to authorize a conviction when corroborated by proof of the corpus delicti. [Cit.] In a drug possession case, the concept of corpus delicti requires that there be proof by the state that the accused possessed the illegal drug; there is, however, no invariable requirement that the drug itself be produced. Chancey v. State, 256 Ga. 415, 421(1)(A)(c), 349 S.E.2d 717 (1986). In the instant case, Williams confessed that he and the other two men went to Thomas’ house for the purpose of buying $100 worth of cocaine, that Thomas came out of his house with the cocaine and gave it to him, and that he later split the cocaine with [co-defendants]. Williams’ confession that he possessed cocaine was corroborated by proof that $100 was found on Thomas’ bed next to several bags of a substance that tested positive for crack cocaine. This constitutes sufficient circumstantial evidence corroborating Williams’ confession and supporting the cocaine possession conviction. [Cit.]” Accord, Rockholt v. State , 291 Ga. 85, 727 S.E.2d 492 (May 7, 2012). James v. State, 268 Ga.App. 851, 602 S.E.2d 854 (July 30, 2004). “It is well established that a victim’s testimony need