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and the court before 9:00 a.m.” Held, trial court properly admitted these facts and the note into evidence. “We held in Aldridge [ v. State , 229 Ga.App. 544, 494 S.E.2d 368 (1997)] , a case of first impression, that ‘ evidence of attempted suicide by the accused where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of crime, is relevant as possibly indicating a consciousness of guilt and admissible for whatever weight the jury chooses to assign.’ [ Id. at 541.] Aldridge relied on the proposition that generally, any conduct of the accused that tends to show consciousness of guilt is admissible in Georgia. [Cit.]” AAAAAA. SUMMARY OF VOLUMINOUS EVIDENCE Womack v. State, 317 Ga.App. 496, 731 S.E.2d 387 (August 29, 2012). Convictions for rape and related offenses affirmed; no error in “allowing the testimony of a State's witness who summarized the content of over 700 clips of pornography depicting rape and/or bondage. … The record reflects that the hard drive containing the rape/bondage pornography was available to the court and to Womack; that the State made available all 1,500 videos for Womack to view at his convenience and that Womack's counsel had in fact taken the time to view some of the videos; that the two representative clips were previewed by both Womack, the State, and the court outside the jury's presence; that the investigator who testified had actually viewed all 773 videos contained on the hard drive; that the jury was never informed that approximately 1,500 clips were located and was instead only informed of the 773 that the investigator was capable of viewing and transferring prior to trial; and that the collection of rape/bondage pornography was so voluminous that it could not conveniently be examined in court by the jury. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Womack's objection to permitting a summary of the evidence. See Bennett v. State, 292 Ga.App. 382, 383 (665 S.E.2d 365) (2008) (State used representative sample of pornographic evidence when thousands of images were seized); Ayers v. State, 286 Ga.App. 898, 900(1) (650 S.E.2d 370) (2007) (same); see also Jenkins v. Smith, 244 Ga.App. 541, 543(2) (535 S.E.2d 521) (2000) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit summaries of voluminous business records). Cf. Stewart v. State, 246 Ga. 70, 73–74(3) (268 S.E.2d 906) (1980) (‘ When pertinent and essential facts can be ascertained only by an examination of a large number of entries in books of account, an auditor or an expert accountant who has made an examination and analysis of the books and figures may testify as a witness and give summarized statements of what the books show as a result of his investigation, provided the books themselves are accessible to the court and the parties. ’ (punctuation omitted)); Bible v. Somers Const. Co., 197 Ga. 761, 761(2) (30 S.E.2d 623) (1944); Cotton v. John W. Eschelman & Sons, Inc., 137 Ga.App. 360, 363(2) (223 S.E.2d 757) (1976); Hutcheson v. Am. Machine & Foundry Co., 129 Ga.App. 602, 603(2) (200 S.E.2d 371) (1973). See generally Paul S. Milich, ‘Summary of Voluminous Documents,’ Courtroom Handbook on Georgia Evidence (2012 ed.) (discussing new OCGA § 24–20–1006 and the pre–2013 Georgia rule regarding the admissibility of summaries of voluminous evidence).” BBBBBB. TATTOOS Jefferson v. State, 312 Ga.App. 842, 720 S.E.2d 184 (November 3, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly prohibited defense from asking police officer/state’s witness, on cross, “‘come down and examine [defendant’s] arm and tell us what he sees in the way of tattoos.’ After the state objected, the trial court, relying upon Wesley v. State, 228 Ga.App. 342, 491 S.E.2d 824 (1997) and State v. Battaglia, 221 Ga.App. 283, 470 S.E.2d 755 (1996), sustained the objection because ‘that deprives the State of the right to—cross-examine the defendant.’ We find no error. Although Jefferson had a right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination, OCGA § 24–9–64, the right is not unlimited. ‘[T]he scope of such cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court [ ] [cits.],’ White v. State, 253 Ga. 106, 110(4), 317 S.E.2d 196 (1984), and ‘[i]t is the duty of the court “to allow a searching and skillful test of (the witness's) intelligence, memory, accuracy and veracity.”’ Carroll v. Hill, 80 Ga.App. 576, 581, 56 S.E.2d 821 (1949). Here, what Jefferson sought was not related to a legitimate purpose of cross-examination, but to introduce evidence without the burden of cross-examination.” Belmar v. State, 279 Ga. 795, 621 S.E.2d 441 (October 24, 2005). Trial court committed harmless error in admitting evidence of defendant’s tattoo, which read “12 gauge,” where defendant was on trial for committing two murders with a 12 gauge shotgun. “In the case at bar, the evidence of [defendant]’s tattoo did not corroborate any testimony regarding the identity of the killer and, contrary to the State’s assertion, there was no evidence the victim was killed because [defendant] had an attachment to 12-gauge weapons. Rather, the State established at trial that [defendant] killed the victim because [defendant] believed the victim had drugged [defendant] and robbed him. [footnote omitted] In essence, the State used the evidence of [defendant]’s tattoo to establish for the jury that the [defendant] must have killed the victim because the victim was killed with a 12-gauge shotgun and the tattoo showed [defendant] had a propensity to use a 12-gauge shotgun. To show a defendant has a propensity for certain behavior, the State may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior similar behavior. Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358(2) (613 S.E.2d 628) (2005); Hampton v. State, 272 Ga.App. 273(2)