☢ test - Í

(612 S.E.2d 96) (2005). The existence of a tattoo, in and of itself, does not establish a defendant’s propensity to act in conformance with that depicted in the tattoo. We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled [defendant]’s objection to the admission into evidence of the photo of [defendant]’s tattoo.” Accord, Moore v. State , 294 Ga. 682, 755 S.E.2d 703 (March 3, 2014) (gun tattoo improperly offered “simply to suggest a propensity to carry or use a firearm like that depicted in the tattoo.”). Allen v. State, 272 Ga. 513, 530 S.E.2d 186 (May 8, 2000). The state’s questioning defendant regarding his “Thug Life” tattoo was admissible as evidence of defendant’s possible motive for committing a crime even though it may have incidentally called his character into question. Wilson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 426, 526 S.E.2d 381 (November 30, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for child molestation, statutory rape, and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffer to show jury an “abdominal tattoo” not mentioned by the victims, absent defendant’s own testimony or other foundation to show that the tattoo had existed at the time of the offenses. “[I]n order to display this type of evidence to the jury, a proper foundation must be laid, i.e., the party seeking to admit the evidence must demonstrate that it truly and accurately depicted the condition of the nontestimonial evidence at the time of the event at issue. See Miller v. State, 158 Ga. 697, 699(5)(b), 124 S.E. 195 (1924); Johnson v. State, 158 Ga. 192, 198(2), 123 S.E. 120 (1924); Chambers v. State, 159 Ga.App. 669, 284 S.E.2d 682 (1981); Curtis v. State, 141 Ga.App. 36, 39, 232 S.E.2d 382 (1977). The trial court has discretion in making the determination of whether a party has laid a sufficient foundation for introduction of the evidence, and such determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Cornell v. State, 265 Ga. 904, 905(2), 463 S.E.2d 702 (1995); Miller v. State, supra at 698(2), 124 S.E. 195.” Note, “the trial court never precluded Wilson from presenting other foundation evidence that would have established that the tattoo was present prior to March 1998. This evidence could have included, inter alia, witness testimony, business records, or photographs.” “Since no foundation evidence was presented in this case, this Court will not consider whether it would have been reversible error for the trial court to refuse to allow Wilson to display his torso unless he subjected himself to cross-examination if other foundation evidence had been presented.” CCCCCC. TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS/WIRETAPS London v. State, 333 Ga.App. 332, 775 S.E.2d 787 (July 16, 2015). Child molestation and related convictions reversed; trial court erred by denying motion to suppress recording of telephone conversation between defendant and victim. Police had victim call defendant to talk about the offenses; police recorded the conversations without obtaining an order from a superior court judge, as required by OCGA § 16-11-66(b). “‘OCGA § 16–11–66(b) provides that the telephone conversations of a child under 18 years of age may be recorded and divulged if, upon written application by a private citizen, law enforcement agency, or prosecutor's office, a judge of a superior court and the child consent to such taping,’ Bishop v. State, 241 Ga.App. 517, 519(1), 526 S.E.2d 917 (1999) (acknowledging that ‘OCGA § 16–11–66 provides two specific exceptions [to OCGA § 16–11–62] which allow such interception,’ the first exception being that a person who is a party to the communication may intercept it); OCGA § 16–11–66(a).” Also no evidence here that victim knew police were recording the conversation or consented to it. Boggs concurs specially, arguing that the code doesn’t prohibit police from listening to the phone call, with victim’s consent, and repeating what they heard in court. Boykins-White v. State, 305 Ga.App. 827, 701 S.E.2d 221 (September 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel didn’t move to suppress “recordings of conversations he had while using the jail's phone.” “OCGA § 16-11-62(4) prohibits any person from intentionally and secretly intercepting a telephone call by use of any device, instrument or apparatus. Smith v. State, 254 Ga.App. 107, 108(2)(a) (561 S.E.2d 232) (2002). However, OCGA § 16-11-66(a) provides an exception to this rule where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent. [fn] Id. Such consent can be either express or implied. This Court has found implied consent to the recording of a phone call when an inmate is told at the beginning of the telephone conversation that the call is subject to being monitored or recorded. Id. at 109(2)(a). In this case, it is undisputed that Boykins-White was told numerous times during his phone calls that the calls could be recorded or monitored. This is sufficient to establish Boykins-White's implied consent regarding the recording of his phone conversations.” Accord, Andemical v. State , A15A2362, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 871229 (March 8, 2016). Patterson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 100, 650 S.E.2d 770 (August 3, 2007). Defendant’s convictions for aggressive driving and related offenses reversed; police officer’s alleged telephone conversation with defendant was inadmissible hearsay where officer could not identify the voice on the telephone as defendant, and no other competent evidence