☢ test - Í

identified defendant as driver. Evidence showed that a male with a dark complexion aggressively drove a Honda Integra registered to defendant’s sister. The victim could give no more specific description of the driver. Officer went to the address of the vehicle’s registration and spoke to defendant’s mother. Officer testified that mother said defendant had been driving the car all day, but was not at home at the time of the officer’s conversation. Officer asked her to have defendant call officer. Officer later received a call from someone identifying himself as defendant, and giving his version of the events described by victim. Officer did not know defendant and could not identify his voice on the phone. Held, evidence was insufficient to identify defendant as the caller. “Georgia courts have long required ‘that there be a sufficient basis for a witness to identify a person with whom he spoke over the telephone, before testifying as to the contents of the conversation.’ Brown v. State, 266 Ga. 723, 725(3) (470 S.E.2d 652) (1996). One way to authenticate the identity of the speaker in a telephone conversation is ‘direct testimony of voice recognition.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 275 Ga. 326, 327(2) (565 S.E.2d 453) (2002). See also Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 369, 371(2) (602 S.E.2d 834) (2004) ; Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 599(3) (255 S.E.2d 710) (1979). Sufficient evidence for authentication has also been recognized where the party sought to be charged not only identifies himself over the telephone, but also later corroborates the conversation. See Brown, supra, 278 Ga. at 371(2); Brown, supra, 266 Ga. at 725(3). However, ‘[t]he testimony of one person to a conversation had with another person over a telephone, in which the person testifying did not know the other person or recognize the other’s voice, had not at that time ever heard the voice, and had never heard it since, and the identity of the other person had not been established otherwise than by what was said in the conversation itself, is hearsay and inadmissible.... ’ Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695(1) (69 S.E.2d 253) (1952). We have previously held that if the witness does not know a person and places a telephone call to the person’s place of business or personal telephone number, and asks for that person, these circumstances are not sufficiently reliable to authenticate the identity the person who comes to the telephone, even if that person identifies himself. See Tidwell Co. v. Robley Hats, Inc., 125 Ga.App. 102, 107(5) (186 S.E.2d 489) (1971) (circumstances not sufficiently reliable where the witness calls a person’s place of business, asks for him, and the person on the other end identifies himself, but the witness does not know the person and has never spoken to him before); Cannady v. Lamb, 146 Ga.App. 850, 851-852(3) (247 S.E.2d 500) (1978) (identity not authenticated in a telephone conversation where the witness obtains the telephone number from a person’s father, and that person later confirms that the number is correct).” Here, officer couldn’t identify voice, and defendant never corroborated the call. “The fact that the officer had left a message with Patterson’s mother for Patterson to call him does not provide any more reliability than the circumstances of calling a person’s place of business and asking for the person, or calling an individual’s telephone number obtained from that individual’s parent and verified by the individual as the correct number. See Tidwell Co., supra, 125 Ga.App. at 107(5); Cannady, supra, 146 Ga.App. at 851-852(3).” See also Carrollton Federal Savings & Loan v. Young , 165 Ga.App. 262, 299 S.E.2d 395 (1983) (caller could testify that he called business’s listed telephone number, someone answered in the name of the business, and conversation ensued relating to matters concerning the business). Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260 (June 25, 2007). Trial court properly admitted recordings of defendant’s telephone conversations from jail with his mother where defendant was aware calls might be recorded. 1. Miranda didn’t apply because no interrogation was involved. 2. No violation of right to privacy. “To invoke the privacy protection of the Fourth Amendment, Preston must establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576) (1967). While there appears to be no Georgia authority directly on point, federal courts and appellate courts of other states have decided this issue adversely to the position asserted by Preston. [Cits.] Persuaded by the rationale of the cited cases, we hold Preston had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the calls he placed to his mother from jail.” Urapo-Sanchez v. State, 267 Ga.App. 113, 598 S.E.2d 850 (April 15, 2004). “Law enforcement officers may intercept, record, and divulge a conversation ‘where at least one party thereto consents, and where the conversation is in furtherance of a crime.’ [Cit.] Although the [confidential informant (CI)] did not testify, [agent] testified that the CI had placed a recording device in his ear, dialed the telephone, and talked to Urapo-Sanchez while [agent] sat several feet away holding a cassette recorder. This evidence was sufficient to show that the CI consented to having the conversations recorded and divulged. [Cit.] Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting the recordings.” Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 532 S.E.2d 78 (June 12, 2000). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; trial court erred (but harmless) in admitting testimony about telephone call allegedly between defendant and victim. “[Witness] Ms. Horne testified that Ms. Young received a telephone call from Morrow on the morning of the murders, and that Ms. Young told Morrow to leave her alone. However, Ms. Horne did not listen on the line and she never heard the caller's voice. Ms. Young also never identified the caller as Morrow to Ms. Horne. Ms. Horne was allowed over defense objection to give her ‘opinion’ that the caller was Morrow based on the content of Ms. Young's